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Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy

On knowing and what is to be known

ShashiPrabha Kumar



Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy

Vaiśeṣika is one of the six systems of Hindu philosophy. It represents a pluralistic realism and is usually held to be an atomistic, metaphysical theory. This book explores the basic tenets of the classical Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy from a new perspective. It argues that Vaiśeṣika reveals an epistemological formulation of its own, which was diminished due to later developments in the history of Indian philosophical tradition.

Focusing on the principles of knowable objects and the processes of knowing as propounded by the Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy, the book offers a fuller appreciation of its theories. Providing a balanced approach by examining earliest available material in the original sources of Vaiśeṣika and concentrating on the epistemological pattern adopted therein, it presents an authentic and comprehensive understanding of Vaiśeṣika concepts. This is the first introductory sourcebook in English for the authentic study of Vaiśeṣika, and is of use to students and scholars of World Religion and Philosophy.

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First published 2013
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Kumar, ShashiPrabha, 1951–

Classical Vaisesika in Indian philosophy : on knowing and what is to be known/ShashiPrabha Kumar.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Vaisesika. 2. Ontology. I. Title.

B132.V2K84 2013

181'.44—dc23

2012033407

ISBN: 978-0-415-54918-9 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-203-44108-4 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk

For Prashasta and Pranav

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	x
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xiii
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xv
1 Introduction	1
2 Theme of knowing in Vaiśeṣika: <i>dharma</i>	8
3 Objects of knowing (<i>padārthas</i>)	14
4 Methods of knowing (<i>sādharmya</i> and <i>vaidharmya</i>)	38
5 Modes and means of knowing (<i>jñāna-prakāra</i> and <i>pramāṇas</i>)	58
6 Agent of knowing (<i>ātman</i>)	73
7 Abode and faculties of knowing (<i>śarīra</i> and <i>indriyas</i>)	85
8 Instrument of knowing (<i>manas</i>)	95
9 Goal of knowing (<i>niḥśreyasa</i>)	104
10 An overview	110
<i>Notes</i>	114
<i>Bibliography</i>	149
<i>Index</i>	156

Preface

This book addresses itself to the modern Western student, both postgraduate and undergraduate, who would like to get an authentic and intrinsic introduction to the Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy. At the same time it also intends to cater to scholars, albeit in a limited manner, Indian as well as Western, to whom a more detailed presentation of facts and discussion of problems in the original sources of Vaiśeṣika may be welcome.

Vaiśeṣika is one of the six systems of Hindu philosophy. Propounded by Kaṇāda, the system represents a pluralistic realism and is usually held to be an atomistic, metaphysical theory. However, on closer study, it reveals an epistemological formulation of its own, which was diminished due to later developments in the history of Indian philosophical tradition. Being a student of Vaiśeṣika during the last three decades, I have found sufficient material to substantiate the view that the system offers a lot of material for thought which needs to be studied in its earlier sources, not only as an ontological theory but also as an epistemological approach.

As the title '*Vaiśeṣika*' itself indicates, the system is so designated because it highlights the individual differences among various entities of the universe rather than their inherent unity or underlying oneness. Accordingly, this book intends to present the theories of Vaiśeṣika in an epistemological format. The primary purpose of this exercise is to deepen the existing scholarly understanding of the origins and early development of this critical and positive branch of Indian learning and to relate it to the current discussion on development of Indian philosophical thought in general.

Accordingly, my twin objectives are a fuller appreciation of the theories propounded in Vaiśeṣika, and demonstration of the necessity of renewed and more thorough investigations in the field.

The main theme of this volume is the principles of knowable objects and the processes of knowing as propounded by the scholars of classical Vaiśeṣika.

Traditionally, the knowledge of Vaiśeṣika, along with the grammar of Pāṇini, has been held to be essential as well as beneficial, for an adequate study of all *śāstras*: *Kāṇadaṁ Pāṇinīyaṁ ca sarvaśāstropakāraṁ*.

In contemporary times, the study of Vaiśeṣika is even more relevant, because it deals directly with the visible world around us and asserts that everything which exists in the universe is cognisable as well as communicable through language.

Obviously this is a very rational and realistic standpoint which seems much more appealing to the modern analytic, secular and scientific mindset.

It is not without reason then that recently there has been a renewed interest in the study of *Vaiśeṣika* all over the world. It was in the last century when some Western scholars such as B. Faddegon and Erich Frauwallner published their books on *Vaiśeṣika* that the quest of the academic fraternity for a deeper study in this field was aroused. More recently, another publication of a Western scholar, Wilhelm Halbfass, has proved to be a landmark for the current studies of *Vaiśeṣika*. His book, *On Being and What There Is*, generated enormous interest in this area, so much so that a separate panel on 'Early *Vaiśeṣika*' was organised under the philosophy section of the IXth World Sanskrit Conference held in Hong Kong in 1993. The proceedings of the above panel have already been published in *Asiatische Studien*, Johannes Bronkhorst (ed.), vol. XLVIII.2, 1994. A Russian scholar, Viktoria Lyssenko, has recently published two books on *Vaiśeṣika* in Russian. In addition to the above, several German scholars have been pursuing significant studies in the field (which came to light during my short-term Research Project *Contribution of 20th Century German Scholars to Indian Philosophy with special reference to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* undertaken at the University of Hamburg in 1999), but most of these are in German. Many Japanese scholars have worked on the texts and theories of *Vaiśeṣika*, as is to be evidenced from the comprehensive bibliography by Karl H. Potter in his *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vols I and II.

In addition to his many more valuable writings, B. K. Matilal has authored a concise, chronological account of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* literature in the series 'A History of Indian Literature' vol. VI. Likewise an exhaustive historical description of the development of the *Vaiśeṣika* school has been presented by Anantlal Thakur (in addition to his enormous editorial contribution in the field of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*) in a comprehensive volume, *Origin and Development of the Vaiśeṣika System*.

There are many more books written in Sanskrit, Hindi and English, published in India, details of which can be found in my own research volume titled *Vaiśeṣika Darśana Mein Padārtha-Nirūpaṇa* published in Hindi from the University of Delhi, India in 1992.

It is clear from the above that the system of *Vaiśeṣika* has gained an international status in the field of Indian philosophical studies, yet the fact remains that all the existing books on *Vaiśeṣika* are either too limited or focused in their scope or are too wide and advanced for the beginner: there is no single, independent book in English which can be referred to as an introductory sourcebook for an authentic study of classical *Vaiśeṣika*.

The present book aims to fill this lacuna at a crucial level and intends to adopt a balanced approach in this regard. It not only proposes to examine the earliest available material in the original sources of classical *Vaiśeṣika* and concentrate on the epistemological pattern adopted therein, but also attempts to provide a faithful

* A latest book by Katsunori Hirano has just been published in 2012: *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy and Text Science*.

and comprehensive understanding of Vaiṣeṣika concepts for both students and scholars.

This book is grounded in the original source texts of classical Vaiṣeṣika, namely the *Vaiṣeṣikasūtras*, *Praśastapādabhāṣyam* and its commentaries: *Vyomavati*, *Nyāyakandalī* and *Kiraṇāvalī*. Besides these, other later Vaiṣeṣika and Nyāya texts have also been quoted herein as and when relevant. To substantiate and explicate the development of thought in Vaiṣeṣika, recent research in the field is also referenced with due acknowledgements.

What follows from the above is that the strength of the present book lies in its being based on primary rather than secondary sources. At the same time, it must be admitted that therein lies its weakness as well, in the sense that there is almost no reference to Western philosophy. Moreover, the book is written in a descriptive style, so it is not meant for those who are looking for an analytical approach of Western philosophical deliberation.

As far as the English translation of Sanskrit terms is concerned, I am well aware of the difficulties: Sanskrit is such a potent language that there are various shades and levels of meanings in a single term which cannot be conveyed through any other language. An effort has been made to use the nearest possible equivalent English terms with the Sanskrit terms given in brackets.

This problem is specially visible in case of the term ‘*knowing*’ which is used in the title of this book. I would like to clarify that the term is used in the sense of cognition and knowledge (*jñāna*).^{*} Here, a quotation from Matilal clarifies my intention:

However, I believe that the sense that I recommend here for ‘knowledge’ or ‘knowing’ would, at least, be intelligible to the users of ordinary English, and would not seem entirely outlandish to western philosophers. My job is doubly difficult. For one has first to reckon with the special philosophical meaning of certain Sanskrit terms (which are not obviously used in exactly the same sense in ordinary Sanskrit). One has then to search for the nearly equivalent expressions in English, some of which may already be loaded with various other senses in philosophical writings.

(Matilal 1986, p. 102)

As already stated, I have endeavoured to present an outline of the basic theories available in the original sources of Vaiṣeṣika. Accordingly, references have been quoted in Roman script and appended in the endnotes of each chapter, so that those interested in having advanced access may peruse them.

In brief, the Vaiṣeṣika view of knowing in general and other topics in particular have been presented here in a brief but authentic manner with a fervent hope that those interested in the study of Indian philosophy will find another window to this subject area and will benefit from it.

ShashiPrabha Kumar

* ‘*Jñāna*’, n. knowing, becoming acquainted with, knowledge, Monier Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Delhi: Sharada Publishing House, reprint, 2005, p. 426.

Acknowledgements

Idam nama ṛṣibhyaḥ pūrvajebhyaḥ pūrvevhyaḥ pathikṛdbhyaḥ.

Ṛ gveda, 10/14/15

May we bow down before our fore-fathers and sages of ancient times, who carve for us these virtuous paths.

At the outset, I owe it to the seers and scholars who have transmitted this treasure-trove of knowledge in the form of vast Vaiśeṣika literature.

I am deeply obliged to my dear departed uncle Dr Gautam Sachdev, whose affectionate guidance and wholehearted encouragement have inspired me from my formative years up to the final drafting of this book last month, when he suddenly passed away in the UK.

I most respectfully acknowledge the contribution of my esteemed supervisor, the late Professor Vachaspati Upadhyaya who assigned me the topic of my Ph.D. research and introduced me to the rich tradition of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Later, when I started studying the texts and delved deeper into the theories of Vaiśeṣika, the writings of Dharmendra Nath Shastri, Erich Frauwallner, Anant Lal Thakur, Umesh Mishra and Sadanand Bhaduri greatly enlightened me. Their contribution has been of immense value in writing of this book.

Motivation for undertaking this task in hand was provided by two of my students at the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, Kiyokazu Okita and Gopal, who studied Vaiśeṣika with me in the Trinity term of 2007 and kept on persuading me to complete the book. I feel most privileged to have been directed to Routledge publishers by the OCHS Director Shaunaka Rishi Das and Academic Director Gavin Flood. I sincerely thank them both from the core of my heart. As far as the title of the book is concerned, I have no hesitation in admitting that it is influenced by the remarkable book on Vaiśeṣika authored by Wilhelm Halbfass.

Many thanks are due to the referees who read my sample chapters and provided valuable suggestions for improving the book. Their critical comments have definitely made it better. Due credit must be given to the editors at Routledge, particularly Dorothea Schaefer and Jillian Morrison, who patiently co-operated

with me at every stage and bore with my unintentional delay in submission of the manuscript due to unavoidable circumstances.

I am extremely thankful to the Vice-Chancellor of JNU, Professor S. K. Sopory, for granting me sabbatical leave for two semesters, thus enabling me to finalise the draft of my book.

This book would not have taken its present shape without the untiring effort and unstinting labour of my student Dr Devendra Singh who prepared the full typescript. He has earned a lot of my wishes and blessings.

Last, but not least, I am grateful to my family and friends for their sustained and patient support during the course of completion of this book.

ShashiPrabha Kumar

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of select Sanskrit/Hindi sources on Vaiśeṣika

BP	<i>Bhāṣāparichheda</i>
Kir.	<i>Kiraṇāvalī</i>
KR	<i>Kaṇādarahasya</i>
Lak.	<i>Lakṣaṇāvalī</i>
MM	<i>Mānāmanohara</i>
NBh.	<i>Nyāyabhāṣya</i>
NK	<i>Nyāyakandalī</i>
NKu.	<i>Nyāyakusumāñjali</i>
NL	<i>Nyāyalīlāvatī</i>
NM.	<i>Nyāyamañjarī</i>
NSM	<i>Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī</i>
NVTTP	<i>Nyāyavārtikatātparyapariśuddhi</i>
PPB	<i>Prasastapādabhāṣya</i>
PTN	<i>Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam</i>
SP	<i>Saptapadārthī</i>
SV	<i>Śloka-vārtika</i>
TD	<i>Tarkadīpikā</i>
TS	<i>Tarkasamgraha</i>
VAK	<i>The Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda</i>
VDmPN	<i>Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha Nirupaṇa</i>
VSUp.	<i>Vaiśeṣikasūtrapaskāra</i>
Vyo.	<i>Vyomavatī</i>

Abbreviations of select English sources on Vaiśeṣika

CIR	<i>Critique of Indian Realism</i>
CMNV	<i>Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika</i>
EIP	<i>Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies</i>
HIP	<i>History of Indian Philosophy (Frauwallner)</i>
IP	<i>Indian Philosophy (Radhakrishnan)</i>
ODVS	<i>Origin and Development of Vaiśeṣika System</i>
SNVM	<i>Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics</i>

1 Introduction

Vaiśeṣika is one of the six orthodox (having faith in Veda/verbal testimony) systems of Hindu philosophy which derives its name from 'viśeṣa',¹ a category representing the ultimate individuality of innumerable objects of the universe. The school holds an important position among other streams of Indian philosophical tradition, because it upholds the individual identities of selves (*ātman*s), minds (*manas*) and the atoms (*paramāṇus*). The basic significance of Vaiśeṣika lies in the fact that it begins with an analysis of the physical world around us and focuses on the commonsense experience of ordinary mortals. Almost all other schools of Indian philosophy aim at liberation, either from the cycle of rebirth or from all sorts of suffering; but the system of Vaiśeṣika is unique in the sense that although it does posit an ultimate goal of life, it begins with a premise to first know and explicate the variety of the visible world rather than negate it or escape from it: 'this philosophy owes its origin to a purely theoretical attitude of mind and not to that craze for liberation which dominates nearly all forms of Indian thought'.²

Vaiśeṣika is held to be founded by Kaṇāda, a sage who was believed to be so engrossed in his search for reality that he did not even care for his food and lived by eating minute particles of grain (*kaṇas*)³ only. He asserts that the world is constituted by six categories (*padārthas*): substance (*dravya*), attribute (*guṇa*), activity (*karma*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*).⁴ A seventh category, negation (*abhāva*) was added to the list by later scholars of Vaiśeṣika, and it was proclaimed that nothing remains outside of these six or seven categories. As regards the common criteria among the categories, Praśastapāda, the earliest available commentator of Vaiśeṣika, has stated that existence (*astitva*), nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and knowability (*jñeyatva*) are the three common characteristics available amongst the six categories.⁵

It is interesting to note that later scholars of the Vaiśeṣika school have mentioned any one of these three features as the main criterion of the six categories (*padārthas*). For example, Udayana⁶ and Annambhatta⁷ emphasise communicability (*abhidheyatva*) as a common feature among the categories while Śivāditya⁸ highlights knowability (*jñeyatva* or *pramiti-viśayatva*) as the one and only characteristic. However, on closer analysis it becomes clear that all the three features have an internal coherence which is manifested only when they are taken collectively rather than individually. In fact one of the modern Vaiśeṣika scholars has demonstrated their inner

2 Introduction

continuity and proved that these features not only exhibit three aspects of reality but also demonstrate the philosophical aptitude of Vaiśeṣika.⁹

In Indian philosophical tradition, the Vaiśeṣika is known as the ‘*Padārthaśāstra*’, i.e. the science of the ‘*arthas*’ or reals, which are indicated by ‘*padas*’ or the inflected words. Accordingly, the lexical meaning of *padārtha* denotes its literal, derivative sense as a ‘meaning of the word’ (*artha + pada*). The Chinese interpreter of the text ‘*Daśapadārthī*’ has illustrated this derivation of *padārtha* as follows:

The term *padārtha* (category) has been etymologically rendered into Chinese. The translation is literally ‘the meaning or object of a word.’ Kwehi-ci explains, *pada* means a footstep. Just as a man seeks an elephant by tracing his footsteps, we understand the meaning by *pada* because *pada* is the footstep of the meaning.

(Ui 1962, p. 121)

The Vaiśeṣika maintains that all the knowable and communicable objects of the world have been covered under these six or seven categories. However, in the earlier tradition of the school, there seems to be a divergence of opinion regarding the exact number of categories. Although Kaṇāda has explicitly mentioned only six, there are scholars who hold that the Vaiśeṣika aphorism (*sūtra*) containing a list of six categories is itself an interpolation.¹⁰ According to them, Kaṇāda actually seems to hold only three categories as ontologically real because he talks of substance, attribute and activity as ‘*artha*’¹¹ while it was Praśastapāda who, for the first time mentioned these six as categories or *padārthas*.¹² This view has gained further ground with the publication of two commentaries of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, *Avijñātakartṛkavyākhyā*¹³ and *Candrānanda Vṛtti*,¹⁴ neither of which contain the above aphorism. However, unless further textual evidence between the works of Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda is available, we are not in a position to say anything decisively in this regard.

At least one of the modern Western exponents¹⁵ of Vaiśeṣika has tried to outline a gradual and conceptual development of the theory of seven categories. There have also been different views regarding the exact number of categories outside the tradition of Vaiśeṣika, but within the tradition of Indian philosophy; this has been recorded in several texts of Vaiśeṣika itself in the form of opponents’ views, i.e. *pūrvapakṣa*, and rejected thereafter.¹⁶

In brief, after projecting and rejecting several views in this regard, the Vaiśeṣika has finally upheld the theory of seven categories and proved its claim that the whole variety of the visible world has been explained under these seven types of reals. As Whitehead asserted: ‘The Vaiśeṣika attempts to exhibit in one system the characters and interrelations of all that is observed.’¹⁷

Nomenclature of Vaiśeṣika

The school of Vaiśeṣika is variously expressed such as ‘*Kāṇāda*’,¹⁸ ‘*Kāśyapīya*’,¹⁹ ‘*Aulūkyā*’,²⁰ ‘*Pailuka*’²¹ and of course the popularly known ‘*Vaiśeṣika*’²² in the

ancient Sanskrit sources. The last term occurs only once in the treatise of Kaṇāda,²³ where it reflects a sense of a differentiating factor rather than the title of the school. It is not without reason, then, that Udayana, the author of *Kiraṇāvalī*, derives the word Vaiśeṣika from the term ‘*viśeṣa*’, meaning ascertainment of the characteristics of entities (*tattvaniścaya*) or distinguishing factor (*vyavaccheda*).²⁴ Accordingly: ‘The word Vaiśeṣika is derived from *Viśeṣa*, which means difference and the doctrine is so designated, because, according to it, diversity, and not unity, is at the root of the universe.’²⁵

Some of the lexicons and encyclopaedias also support the above view, either translating the word Vaiśeṣika as ‘*differentialist*’ or pointing out the underlying idea of differentiation.²⁶

In view of the above, one might say that the most commonly accepted appellation for the system under discussion is ‘Vaiśeṣika’, although we can not be very sure about the earliest usage of the term in this sense. However, the basis for this particular nomenclature is widely believed to be the category of ‘*viśeṣa*’, which is propounded by the system for the first time²⁷ and is also the novel contribution of the school to the Indian philosophical tradition.

Sources of Vaiśeṣika

The earliest available text of the Vaiśeṣika system is undoubtedly the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* authored by Kaṇāda, although very little can be said with certainty about the historicity of Kaṇāda or the exact date of redaction of these aphorisms. Based on the findings of available studies on Vaiśeṣika, one can roughly place them somewhere around 600²⁸ to 200 BC.²⁹ It is probable that the theories of Vaiśeṣika are much earlier than the available *sūtra*-text. Even in its present form, there are not only various readings of the text or several commentaries on it, but also different strata of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, as is evident by the comparative statements of two recent exponents of Vaiśeṣika.³⁰ Unfortunately, many of the texts on Vaiśeṣika, reference to which is frequently or sporadically suggested in the later literature, have been lost and the period between *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* and its first available explanation, i.e. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, is usually regarded as the ‘dark period’ in the history of Vaiśeṣika tradition.³¹

The study of philosophical Sūtra works is beset with difficulties. Apart from the condensed style, which makes them sometimes difficult to understand even where no other problems intervene, we often have reason to suspect that these texts may have undergone interpolations and other modifications. In practice this means that, in order to understand a Sūtra text, we should know as much as possible of its history, of vicissitudes it has undergone from its beginning until today.

(Bronkhorst 1994, 665–681)

The systematic reconstruction of the Vaiśeṣika school starts with Praśastapāda, who is not only the commentator but a co-ordinated re-interpreter of the

4 Introduction

system. In fact, Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, also known as *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (PPB) is the most important literary evidence/source for an authentic study of Vaiśeṣika. It signifies the start of a new era in Vaiśeṣika literature and is a comprehensive treatise: due to its concise and systematic arrangements of Vaiśeṣika theories it virtually eclipsed all other earlier works on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*. Technically the scholars may continue to conjecture on the specific nature of this treatise as to whether it is a '*bhāṣya*'³² or a *saṃgraha*,³³ but there is little doubt about its coveted status in later Vaiśeṣika thought. This is because the work of Praśastapāda is neither just a sequential commentary on the aphorisms of Kaṇāda nor a completely independent text; rather it is a continued, concise addition to the theories propounded by him and gives a standard, systematic shape to the school of Vaiśeṣika by also adding a few new theories.³⁴

This is substantiated by the rich commentarial tradition on *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. There are four important, ancient available commentaries on *Praśastapādabhāṣya*:

- *Vyomavatī* of Vyomaśiva (948–72 AD);³⁵
- *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara (991 AD);³⁶
- *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayana (1005 AD);³⁷
- *Lilāvatī* of Śrīvatsa (not yet available).

In addition, there are at least four 'modern' commentaries:

- *Sūkti* of Jagadīsa Tarkālaṅkāra (second quarter of the seventeenth century AD);³⁸
- *Setu* of Padmanābha Miśra (sixteenth century AD);³⁹
- *Bhāṣyanikaṣa* of Mallinātha (not yet available);
- *Kaṇādarahasya* of Śaṅkara Miśra (second quarter of the fifteenth century AD).⁴⁰

Besides the above there are many more major texts, treatises and commentaries which have continuously enriched the system of Vaiśeṣika and been instrumental in the gradual development of its theories. It is neither possible nor desirable to give a detailed exposition of all these sources, but a brief list⁴¹ is given in the table for a bird's eye-view of the rich Vaiśeṣika literature:

Title of the text	Name of the author	Date (approx.)
• <i>Daśapadārthī</i>	Maticandra	6th century AD
• <i>Saptapadārthī</i>	Śivāditya	10th century AD
• <i>Pramāṇamañjarī</i>	Sarvadeva Sūri	10th century AD
• <i>Lakṣaṇāvalī</i>	Udayana	10th century AD
• <i>Nyāyakusumāñjali</i>	Udayana	10th century AD
• <i>Nyāyalīlāvatī</i>	Śrī Vallabha	12th century AD
• <i>Mānamanohara</i>	Vādivāgiśvara	12th century AD

• <i>Tārkikarakṣā</i>	Varadarāja	12th century AD
• <i>Padārtharatnamamañjuṣā</i>	Kṛṣṇa Miśra	14th century AD
• <i>Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam</i>	Raghunātha Śiromaṇi	16th century AD
• <i>Padārthīyadvayacakṣuḥ</i>	Umāpati Upādhyāya	16th century AD
• <i>Tarkāmṛta</i>	Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra	17th century AD
• <i>Upaskāra</i>	Śaṅkara Miśra	17th century AD
• <i>Nyāyalilāvati-Kaṇṭhābharāṇa</i>	Śaṅkara Miśra	17th century AD
• <i>Bhāṣāpariccheda/Kārikavalī</i>	Viśvanātha	17th century AD
• <i>Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī</i>	Viśvanātha	17th century AD
• <i>Tarkakaumudī</i>	Laugākṣi Bhāskara	17th century AD
• <i>Tarkasaṃgraha</i>	Annambhaṭṭa	17th century AD
• <i>Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā</i>	Annambhaṭṭa	17th century AD
• <i>Kāṇādasiddhāntacandrikā</i>	Gaṅgādharasūri	17th century AD
• <i>Padārthamaṇḍanam</i>	Veṇīdatta	18th century AD

Presuppositions

As already mentioned, the system of Vaiśeṣika is primarily a pluralistic school. Its philosophical standpoint is broadly based on the following presuppositions:

- The external world around us is real and its reality is proved by the common-sensical experience. While the external objects of ordinary human experience are the solid ground for realistic assertions of Vaiśeṣika, these objects are not dependent on human cognition, rather they have their own ontological status as reals.
- The realistic worldview propounded by Vaiśeṣika leads to a pluralistic position in metaphysics. Accordingly, the Vaiśeṣika asserts that the nature of reality is multifarious and it consists of material, quasi-material, psychic and spiritual entities.
- Worldly objects as experienced by ordinary human beings can be broadly classified as substances (*dharmins*) and attributes as well as activity (*dharma*s).

The Vaiśeṣika emphasises that both these aspects of reality are essentially different and not identical, as projected by the other schools of Indian philosophy. In this regard, it is noteworthy that this idea of identity or difference is crucial in Indian thought. In fact this can be the guiding principle, depending upon the adherence to any one or both of these in equal or unequal proportions. Accordingly, various schools of Indian philosophy can be classified as follows:

- the philosophy of being or identity: Advaita Vedānta;
- the philosophy of becoming or difference: Buddhism;
- the philosophy subordinating difference to identity: Sāṃkhya;
- the philosophy subordinating identity to difference: Vaiśeṣika;
- the philosophy co-ordinating both identity and difference: Jainism.⁴²

6 Introduction

In other words, the Vaiśeṣika asserts that the knower or the subject (*jñātā*), the known or the object (*jñeya*) and the process of knowing (*jñāna*) are all real. The Vedānta holds that knowing self or consciousness (*jñātā*) is the only reality and knowledge (*jñāna*) as well as knowing objects (*jñeya*) are not different from it. On the other hand, Buddhists hold knowing (*jñāna*) alone to be real. The Sāṃkhya also accepts the knower (*jñātā*) and knowing (*jñāna*) as identical. Even though Sāṃkhya is classified as a realistic school, since it propounds the distinct identity of knowable (*jñeya*) as the matter (*prakṛti*), yet it needs to be noted that matter (*prakṛti*) herein is stated to be dependent on the knower (*jñātā*).⁴³ Therefore, it is only the school of Vaiśeṣika, along with Nyāya, that is a true realism in the sense that it grants an independent, ontological status to various entities of the empirical world.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor dismisses patent facts of experience on the demands of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The entities it admits are directly taken from experience.

(Dasgupta 1975, vol. I, p. 312)

Interrelation of Vaiśeṣika with other schools

This brings us to the issue of Vaiśeṣika and its relation to other schools of Indian philosophy. It is interesting to note that the system of Vaiśeṣika owes its allegiance to Veda⁴⁴ and consolidates its theories in close co-ordination with the Nyāya in a later period. The commentator of *Nyāyasūtras*, Vātsyāyana, has quoted verbatim one or two *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*,⁴⁵ so much so that Praśastapāda has also been identified with Gautama, the author of *Nyāyasūtras*, but this seems to be a mistake.⁴⁶ Vaiśeṣika must also have been very close to the Yoga, as there are ample references to show that in early Indian literature, the word Yoga frequently signifies the Vaiśeṣika system. Both Kautilya and Bādarāyaṇa used the word Yoga to suggest this.⁴⁷ Likewise, it has also been suggested that the Vaiśeṣika was an older school of Mīmāṃsā.⁴⁸

At the same time we find several references pertaining to refutation of Vaiśeṣika theories in the Mīmāṃsā⁴⁹ and Vedānta sources.⁵⁰ Uṇi has suggested that a materialistic tendency dominates the whole Vaiśeṣika system,⁵¹ thus the connection and question of a Buddhist reference with Vaiśeṣika or Cārvāka⁵² is not totally unfounded. There is no denying that the Vaiśeṣika system not only preceded but also contributed to and has grown enormously in discussion and disagreement with the Buddhist⁵³ and Jaina schools of Indian philosophy. There is also a theory of a Jaina origin of Vaiśeṣika,⁵⁴ in fact a detailed study of Vaiśeṣika elements in non-Vaiśeṣika works⁵⁵ is yet to be undertaken, but would definitely be a very rewarding exercise and could yield interesting results for a fresh look at the history of Indian philosophy.

What follows from the above brief delineation is that the system of Vaiśeṣika provides a strong foundation for the realistic tendencies in Indian philosophical thought. It has not only enriched the literary stock of Indian philosophy through

its long and rich source material but also paved the path for pluralistic explanation of the physical world by propounding innumerable material particles (atoms) as its ultimate, eternal constituents, along with an acceptance of plurality of the spiritual (eternal selves) and the psychic (minds) phenomena. To conclude:

The realistic, physicalistic, and analytical orientation of the Vaiśeṣika and the allied Nyāya system has attracted the special attention of modern Western and Indian scholars. It has been claimed as an exemplary expression of the nonmystical, secular, analytical and scientific potential of Indian thought.

(Halbfass 1993, p. 81)

2 Theme of knowing in Vaiśeṣika *Dharma*

In Indian philosophical tradition, the exponents of various branches of learning enunciate four factors at the outset of their discourse:

- the content of the proposed study (*viṣaya*);
- the purpose of the enquiry being undertaken (*prayojana*);
- the eligibility of the seeker (*adhikārī*);
- the relation between the text and the context (*sambandha*).

Vaiśeṣika is primarily known as a pluralistic realism and is characterised as a ‘Nature-Philosophical School’.¹ The Vaiśeṣika theory of categories presents a mixture of physical theory, metaphysics and philosophy of psychology:² nevertheless it reflects the traditional trend of presenting an integrated approach to reality wherein the material as well as the spiritual, metaphysical as well as the moral³ aspects of human experience are discussed. Accordingly, Kaṇāda, the propounder of Vaiśeṣika, begins his exposition of Vaiśeṣika by proclaiming in the first aphorism of his treatise that the main theme of his discourse will be ‘*dharma*’: therefore, I shall now explain *dharma*.⁴

The concept of *dharma*⁵ is so central in Indian philosophy that almost all schools of thought have dwelt upon it in one form or another. Specially, the Vaiśeṣika, usually known to be a *padārthaśāstra*, sets out with a task of explaining *dharma*.

It is significant that Kaṇāda starts his discussion on *dharma* with two terms: ‘*atha*’ and ‘*ataḥ*’, which connote the sense of ‘thereafter’ and ‘therefore’ respectively. The former signifies, according to the commentators, that only when the seekers of the ultimate goal (*nirāśreyaśa*) approach Kaṇāda with adequate preparation and prove themselves eligible does he start this discourse (*śāstra*), while the latter implies that they have the requisite mental worth and moral aptitude⁶ essential for anyone desiring to embark upon the path of philosophy in Indian tradition. This is the idea of the eligible seeker (*adhikārī* or *pātra*), one of the four factors, i.e. *anubandhacatuṣṭaya*, mentioned above for initiation into any *śāstra*. The remainder of his statement declares that the Vaiśeṣika is basically aimed at explaining the nature of *dharma*, which is in turn a means for achieving

the material attainment along with moral and spiritual accomplishment: the *abhyudaya* as well as *niḥśreyasa*: ‘*Dharma* is that from which *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa* emanate.’⁷

Nature of *dharma*

This brings us to the two aspects of *dharma*, namely:

- that which is a means to ‘*abhyudaya*’, worldly progress;
- that which is a means to ‘*niḥśreyasa*’, the ultimate goal or liberation.

It may appear that the two aims outlined above are different and that *dharma*, which leads to each one of them, is also different. Therefore, one who is desirous of seeking *abhyudaya* or worldly pleasures should follow a different *dharma* while those who seek *niḥśreyasa* or spiritual salvation, have to pursue the path of another *dharma*. On a closer study of Vaiśeṣika, it becomes clear that the concept of *dharma* is so comprehensive and cohesive that both the above aspects are, in fact, integrally related to each other and signify two stages of the same path to perfection. In the history of Indian philosophical thought, there is a very prominent tradition of this duality in approach to the ultimate goal of life. The same is effectively expressed through terms like ‘*svarga*’ (heaven or bliss) and ‘*apavarga*’ (liberation or release). Vaiśeṣika scholars have also used these terms on many occasions,⁸ more so when explaining *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa* respectively.

However, what is more important to notice here is the fact that another orthodox (*āstika*) school of Indian philosophy, the Mīmāṃsā, also begins with the intention of initiating investigation into the nature of *dharma*, but it defines *dharma* as follows: ‘Thereafter, therefore (arises a) quest to comprehend *dharma*. That which is enjoined by the Veda as conducive to welfare, is *dharma*.’⁹

Obviously, the Mīmāṃsā restricts itself to the ritualistic notion of *dharma* enshrined in and enjoined by the Veda for attainment of *svarga*,¹⁰ while the Vaiśeṣika takes a more inclusive viewpoint and tries to accommodate both the aspects of *dharma* in its scheme of enunciation. What is intended here is to highlight this approach of Vaiśeṣika wherein both of the levels of reality are included rather than excluded.

Although the Vaiśeṣika accepts *niḥśreyasa* or *apavarga* as its ultimate goal and does not discuss the nature of *svarga* in clear terms, many interpreters of Vaiśeṣika texts have explained *abhyudaya* as pleasures of *svarga* and *niḥśreyasa* as ‘*apavarga*’ or liberation.¹¹ None of them, except Śaṅkara Miśra, has tried to expound the inherent relation between these two. Śaṅkara Miśra, in his commentary titled *Upaskāra* on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, has tried to give a logical explanation to Kaṇāda’s definition of *dharma*. According to him, *abhyudaya* signifies knowledge of the reality and *niḥśreyasa* means the final cessation of suffering; *dharma* is a means to both of them.¹²

In other words, *niḥśreyasa* being the highest goal and *dharma* being the means for attainment of that goal, it may be said that *dharma* is the extraordinary cause which leads to the final pursuit of a human being (*puruṣārtha*).¹³

Special *dharma*: *dharmaviśeṣa*

Here a question arises as to which type of *dharma* is the means to the ultimate goal. It might be said that only the abstaining type of *dharma* can lead to the highest goal, therefore one needs to abstain from sensory objects to accomplish this aim.¹⁴

As already mentioned, the notion of *dharma* is the main content of knowing in Vaiśeṣika. What is worth noting here is that a specific type of *dharma* (*dharmaviśeṣa*), is actually stated to be the means for a proper knowledge, so it may be said that both the content as well as the means of knowing are stated to be *dharma* in Vaiśeṣika. In fact, the real Vaiśeṣika reference to this is made available in the fourth aphorism of Kaṇāda, which says:

The supreme good is achieved through the knowledge of reality resulting from a special merit arrived at through the inductive method of agreement and difference of properties of the six categories, namely, substance, quality, action, universal, particularity and inherence.¹⁵

Evidently, here is a reference to the specific type of *dharma*, i.e. the *dharmaviśeṣa* which brings in the kind of knowledge that is required for attainment of the final goal (*niḥśreyasa*). This special sort of *dharma* is none other than the one suggested above, i.e. the abstaining one¹⁶ (*nivṛttilakṣaṇa*).

However, there are scholars who do not subscribe to the above view of Śāṅkara Miśra and assert that the abstaining type of *dharma* does not occupy any prominent position in the scheme of Kaṇāda. An impartial examination of the contents of Kaṇāda's text would convince that it gives a description of the characteristics of categories (*padārthadharmas*) and thus Śāṅkara Misra's interpretation does not seem justified.¹⁷

There is another reference to this type of *dharma* in Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika where he talks of direct perception of reality by the seers (*ārṣa darśana*) which is also caused through lots of *dharmanas*.¹⁸

The plural signification of *dharma* here points to the practice of yogic methods by the seers which enables them to perceive even remote, subtle objects in a vivid and direct manner. This fact is also evidenced from several source texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika:

- A *yogī* attains pure knowledge which is devoid of all images.¹⁹
- The ascetics (saints) see unmanifested objects also.²⁰
- The reason for this direct awareness lies in the fact that the impurities of the *yogī*'s mind are consumed by the daily practice of meditation.²¹

Obviously, this type of *dharma* is not easy to acquire, and can only be accomplished through a proper moral training as well as an adequate rational approach. Here is the Vaiśeṣika view of complementing spiritual practices with scientific methodology. Kaṇāda himself has outlined this in the aphorism quoted above through the terms ‘*sādharmya*’ (similarity) and ‘*vaidharmya*’²² (dissimilarity). These two ways of knowing are, in fact, the crux of scientific enquiry and no system of knowledge can proceed without these two as underlying tools. Significantly, both these terms are again based on the idea of *dharma* which is foundational to the system of Vaiśeṣika. In other words, real knowledge pertains to the notion of *dharma* and can only be obtained through knowing the similarities and dissimilarities subsisting among various objects of the world. This is not an ordinary awareness of several objects existing in the world but a proper understanding of the Vaiśeṣika categories, which is required for attainment of the highest goal in life. It is not just rational information but also an experiential realization that begins with scientific enquiry and culminates in yogic perception which again is perfected by the grace of God: ‘That knowledge (of the categories) proceeds from *dharma*, manifested by the injunctions of the Lord.’²³ It means that even *dharma* alone cannot lead to liberation until it is granted by God: ‘*Dharma*, too, by itself, does not accomplish final beatitude, until it is aided by the wish of God.’²⁴

Dharma as an attribute of ātman: puruṣaguṇa

This brings us to the metaphysical aspect of *dharma* in Vaiśeṣika, according to which it is an attribute or characteristic feature of the substance (*dharmin*). It needs to be emphasised here that being a realistic pluralism, the Vaiśeṣika believes in and argues for *dharma* and *dharmin* as two separate independent entities. In fact, it is this fundamental, basic postulate which has been responsible for a major shift in the nature of *dharma* in the later tradition of the Vaiśeṣika school.

Initially, *dharma* was not enumerated as one of the attributes of the self (*ātman*) in Kaṇāda’s Vaiśeṣika, which lists only 17 qualities.²⁵ As stated above, Kaṇāda conceptualised *dharma* in an abstract, impersonal form, either as a means to *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa*, or as a subtle principle of yogic power, i.e. *dharma viśeṣa*.

However, in view of the above background, *dharma* has been conceptualised in later (post-Kaṇāda) Vaiśeṣika as an attribute of the self (*ātman*), which is the source of pleasure, happiness and liberation for him who accomplishes it:

Dharma is the property of Man; it brings about to the agent happiness, means of happiness and final deliverance; it is supersensuous; it is destructible by the experiencing of the last item of happiness.²⁶

What follows from the above is that according to post-Kaṇāda Vaiśeṣika, i.e. Praśastapāda onwards, *dharma* is a property of the self (*ātman*) and not a potency or power of the action as has been conceived by the Mīmāṃsakas: ‘What is known

as “*Dharma*” or “Merit” is a property belonging to Man; and it is not a potency residing in the action performed.²⁷

Dharma as a moral obligation

As far as the moral aspect of *dharma* in Vaiśeṣika is concerned, it was suggested by Kaṇāda in the cryptic style in the sixth chapter of his treatise where he discussed the moral issues with reference to social system.²⁸ However, the credit for systematic exposition of *dharma* as a moral obligation again goes to Praśastapāda, who expounded it in the form of virtues and obligations and also classified it in two types: general duties (*sāmānyadharmas*) and specific duties (*viśeṣadharmas*).²⁹ The list of general obligations includes universal human qualities which are foundational for social and communitarian life, while the special duties are specific duties of different strata of society based on their particular vocation (*varṇa*) or stage (*āśrama*). Even a cursory glance at this portion of his text reveals ample material for the social and moral aspect of *dharma*³⁰ in Vaiśeṣika. He has also stated that whatever is forbidden in the tradition or opposed to the means of *dharma*, gives rise to *adharma*.

It is interesting to note here that the definition of *dharma* in Vaiśeṣika has been contraposed to the definition of *adharma*: ‘Just as *dharma* is conducive to exaltation, *Adharma* is that which leads to non-*abhyudaya*.’³¹ Similarly, the concept of *adharma* has been explained in contrast to *dharma*: ‘*Adharma* also is a quality of Self; it is conducive to sin and undesirable results; it is imperceptible; destructible by the cognition of the last item pain (resulting from it).’³²

Dharma as an attribute of objects: padārthadharma

As already stated, Praśastapāda, the renowned commentator of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, titled his treatise *Padārthadharmasamgraha*, which not only highlights the significance of *dharma* in the Vaiśeṣika scheme of things but also suggests the specific nature of *dharma* in this school of Indian philosophy. This was perhaps necessitated by the sarcastic remarks of the opponents of this view:

Kaṇāda started with a premise of explaining *dharma* but narrated six *padārthas* instead of that; he is like a person who intends to go to the Himalayas, but ends up reaching to the ocean!³³

It is possible that Praśastapāda tried to respond to such statements from his opponents by interpreting *dharma* not in the nature of some ritualistic or scriptural concept, but rather in the form of attributes of objects for the specific nature of categories enumerated by Kaṇāda. Significantly, Bhartṛhari, the famous grammarian (300 AD) had already justified the usage of term *dharma* by Kaṇāda in the sense of right knowledge of categories such as ‘*dravya*’ etc.³⁴

In view of the above it is clear that the Vaiśeṣika view of *dharma* is not normative or prescriptive, rather it is descriptive and has since been widely accepted across

the schools of Indian philosophy. It is not without reason, then, that the twin terms *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa* and also *dharma* and *adharma* are frequently referred to in the sources of Indian philosophical thought.

Source of *dharma*

Last but not least, one needs to mention that the source of *dharma* according to the Vaiśeṣika system is actually the objective criterion laid out by Kaṇāda in the very definition of *dharma*, which is secular and inclusive in approach. However, in the post-Kaṇāda Vaiśeṣika, the source of *dharma* has been stated to be the scripture only, as has been evidenced by Praśastapāda in his statement 'The means of Dharma consists in various substances, qualities and actions, laid down, in the Veda and the Law-Books, some as belonging in common to all men.'³⁵

Study of later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts reveals that this idea also (like various other concepts) was revised and the system adopted a broader approach in the sense that not only scripture, but also tradition or convention as practised by noble persons, could guide the course of *dharma*.³⁶

In brief, it may be said that the Vaiśeṣika concept of *dharma* is the central theme of this school, and is wide and inclusive, covering various aspects of its nature and several shades of its connotation in the course of the development of the tradition.

Even on the basis of a very sketchy delineation above, it is quite clear that the idea of *dharma* as propounded in Vaiśeṣika is based upon a balanced view of reality which neither negates scientific spirit nor rejects spiritual pursuit. This is the greatest single contribution of Vaiśeṣika, as Frauwallner observes:

As against other philosophical creations, it was forgotten too easily that there were also other directions which did not create a philosophy out of longing for Deliverance but which endeavoured to explain the world in a scientific manner out of pure striving for philosophical knowledge. And this must be properly emphasized. Further these directions have exercised influence from different sides. To him who does not know them, much in other systems would remain unintelligible, much that was created now in contrast, now in union, with other systems. Finally the Vaiśeṣika, the most important of the systems of Nature-philosophy brought forth with its doctrine of the categories a creation which represents an important constituent of the thought-wealth of Indian philosophy. Wide layers of later Indian Philosophy are formed through the manner of thought of the Vaiśeṣika and are dependent on it. They would be as little understood without the knowledge of this system as the scholastics of the Middle Ages without the philosophy of Aristotle.

(Frauwallner 1973, vol. II, p. vii)

3 Objects of knowing (*padārthas*)

The Vaiśeṣika system proclaims that the essential knowledge of the six categories (*padārthas*), substance (*dravya*), attribute (*guṇa*), activity (*karma*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*), would lead to the attainment of the ultimate goal, *niḥśreyasa*. These six categories (*padārthas*)¹ are therefore the real objects of knowing. Although the propounder of the school started his exposition by saying that he would be explaining the nature of *dharma* he is now enumerating the six ‘*padārthas*’, but there is no inconsistency here: these six categories themselves are either the substrata (*dharmins*) or the attributes (*dharmas*), and an understanding of these will lead to the attainment of the final aim. It is important to emphasize that both of these are held to be two separate, independent entities in Vaiśeṣika,² although related through a peculiar relation termed inherence, i.e. (*samavāya*).

In several source texts of Vaiśeṣika, it is explicitly stated that these categories (*padārthas*) are the objects of knowledge. Besides the well-known enunciation of Praśastapāda where six categories are said to possess three common characteristics – isness (*astitva*), nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and knowability (*jñeyatva*)³ – there are many more statements to support the view. It will be useful here to quote a few:

- *Jñeyatvaṃ jñānayogyatā*. Knowability is, in fact, being the object of knowledge.⁴
- *Pramitiṣayāḥ padārthāḥ*. Categories are the objects of valid knowing.⁵
- *Jñeyatvaṃ padārthatvaṃ*. Being a category consists of being an object of valid knowing.⁶

In view of the above, anything which exists and can be given a name is ‘*padārtha*’. In other words, designation depends on knowability; therefore that which has the capacity to be the object of knowledge is *padārtha*.⁷

Accordingly, some of the details of six categories as delineated in classical Vaiśeṣika philosophy are listed below.

Substance (*dravya*)

Substance is first and foremost among the six categories propounded by Kaṇāda, and is therefore enumerated in the very beginning. It denotes the self-existence of reals, which may also be characterized as ‘being in itself’.

Kaṇāda has defined substance as that to which the attributes are ascribed and which is an inherent cause.⁸ In simple terms, ‘*dravya*’ is the substratum or ‘*dharmin*’ while activity and attributes are its ‘*dharma*s’. This essential dichotomy of *dharmin* and its *dharma*s is the crux of Vaiśeṣika realism, which has been strongly opposed by the Buddhist idealists. Vyomaśīva has quoted the opponents’ view:

There is nothing like *dravya* which is different from and beyond the attributes, since our cognitions are confined to the attributes only. Our sense organs like eye and skin can only grasp the colour and touch respectively. We do not perceive anything else which may be held to be independent of these. It is only our mental construct which presents things in a conglomerated manner, otherwise there is nothing beyond these attributes.⁹

Udayana has also echoed the same view of the opponents when he says that: ‘In short, all the objects of the universe are discrete properties, *dharmin* or substance is totally unreal.’¹⁰

The Vaiśeṣika response to the above objection is mainly based on the argument of corelation¹¹ (*pratibandhāna*).¹² It means that seeing and touching are two different cognitions which point towards something else to which these two attributes pertain. For example, one can ‘see’ a pot and also ‘touch’ it, both these properties of colour and touch cannot be cognised unless and until there is a self-sustaining single substratum, which in turn is not just a conglomerate of attributes but an independent whole in itself, that precisely is a substance (*dravya*).¹³

Therefore, conception of substance as an independent entity in itself and also a substratum of its attributes is, in fact, the foundation for Vaiśeṣika theory of reals: it is not only supported by the commonsensical experience but also logically justified.¹⁴ Accordingly, the self-dependence of substance is proved by its independent understanding.¹⁵ In other words, activity and attribute cannot be comprehended without being associated with a substance while a substance does not need any other substratum for its comprehension.

In the Vaiśeṣika system of categories, qualities, actions, and even generic properties (universals) are supposed to be occurrent in substance, and the substance is said to be the substratum of these properties. Moreover, these properties are also tied to the substance by a REAL relation which is called the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Thus, what is called substance is, in the Vaiśeṣika school, not a ‘bundle’ or a collection, but a systematic whole having theoretical structure of its own. It is a real entity, and ex *hypothesi* not dependent upon qualities, etc. Rather, qualities, etc. are said to be dependent upon substance for their existence.

(Matilal 2005, p. 75)

Nine types of substances (*dravyas*)

According to the Vaiśeṣika scheme of categories, substances are of nine types:

- earth (*pṛthivī*);
- water (*jala*);

16 *Objects of knowing*

- fire (*tejas*);
- air (*vāyu*);
- ether (*ākāśa*);
- time (*kāla*);
- direction (*dik*);
- self (*ātman*);
- mind (*manas*).

One of the later commentators has clarified this by saying that there is a specific significance in the order of enumeration of these substances which is revealed on closer study:

Earth, Water and Light are placed first as they are comprehended by Perception, the first means of knowledge. Air is placed next as being experienced by the sense-organs. Ether follows because it unites all the previous four. Time and Space are taken next as they give rise to perceivable properties as posteriority and priority. Then Soul as the means of uniting all these and lastly Mind as the instrument of the Soul.¹⁶

The nine substances (*dravyas*) are again classified into various groups depending on the similarities or dissimilarities amongst them.¹⁷

Earth (prthvī)

Earth, the first of the nine substances, is defined in Vaiśeṣika as the substratum of the property of smell.¹⁸ Although there are 14 attributes assigned to earth,¹⁹ smell is its specific attribute, in the sense that both of these are inherently related while other properties residing in earth are related to it through conjunction. Likewise, smell pertaining to other substances is related to them through conjunction. Besides smell, the other 13 properties attributed to earth are:

- colour (*rūpa*);
- taste (*rasa*);
- touch (*sparsa*);
- number (*saṅkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- severalty (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*saṃyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*);
- priority (*paratva*);
- posteriority (*aparatva*);
- weight (*gurutva*);
- instrumental liquidity (*naimittika dravatva*);
- elasticity (*sthitisthāpaka saṃskāra*).

Earth is classified as eternal (*nitya*) and non-eternal (*anitya*): it is eternal in the form of ultimate causes or atoms and non-eternal in the form of produced effects, which are again stated to be of three types:

- body (*śarīra*);
- sense organ (*indriya*);
- object (*viṣaya*).

The multifarious things available on earth, excluding the earthly body (*pārthiva śarīra*) and earthly sense-organ (*pārthiva indriya*), are all the objects of earth (*pārthiva viṣayas*). These things are termed as objects (*viṣaya*) because they are the means of experience.²⁰

Significantly, one should note here that in common usage, the term object (*viṣaya*) also denotes the objects of knowledge, but in the above case the term is used in a restricted sense only.²¹ If the term object (*viṣaya*) is used in its wider connotation, then the body and sense organ should also be included within its ambit, but this is not the case, as is reflected in many of the Vaiśeṣika texts.

Water (*jala*)

Kaṇāda has defined water (*jala*) as the liquid substance possessing colour, taste, viscosity and touch.²² The revised definition of water (*jala*) would be that it contains wateriness as its generic attribute and cold touch as its specific attribute.²³ Interestingly, one of the recent exponents of the Vaiśeṣika system has given an innovative definition of water (*jala*) indicating that water is constituted of two types of airs or gases.²⁴ This is closer to the modern scientific exposition of water, but since it does not sit well with the basic tenets of Vaiśeṣika, it need not be elaborated upon here. Water as a substance possesses 14 properties in all:

- colour (*rūpa*);
- taste (*rasa*);
- touch (*sparsa*);
- natural liquidity (*sāmsiddhika dravatva*);
- viscosity (*sneha*);
- number (*saṅkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- severalty (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*saṁyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*);
- posteriority (*paratva*);
- proximity (*aparatva*);
- weight (*gurutva*);
- velocity (*vega saṁskāra*).²⁵

18 *Objects of knowing*

The colour of water is non-luminous white (*abhāsvara śukla*). Although water might seem to be blue etc. in certain cases, that is not natural and is caused due to the combination of earthly atoms,²⁶ it is held to be unchanging even with the application of heat (*apākaja*). Sweet taste is the natural attribute of water, because it does not change even after application of heat. In this case, several doubts have been raised in Vaiśeṣika texts and it has been proved that water is the substratum of natural sweet taste. Viscidity (*sneha*) is another property which is specifically attributed to water only.²⁷ Likewise, natural liquidity (*sāmsiddhika dravatva*) is also available in water alone.

Water is also initially divided in two types: eternal and non-eternal. Watery atoms are the eternal form of water while watery products are the non-eternal ones and are classified in three kinds:

- watery body (*jalīya śarīra*);
- sense organ (*jalīya indriya*);
- object (*jalīya viṣaya*).²⁸

It is intriguing to note here that this triple division of non-eternal water seems to be more on a logical, rather than the metaphysical ground, since the watery body can not be proved by perceptual experience.²⁹ Obviously the watery body is held to be non-womb-born (*ayonija*) only. Faculty of taste (*rasanā*) is stated to be the sense organ created out of watery atoms because it alone captures the property of taste, no other organ can grasp it. The technical reason for this physical phenomena is given in Vaiśeṣika texts as abundance of watery atoms (*blūyastva*).³⁰ In other words, because the faculty of taste is formed of an excessive watery component, it can grasp only taste and not colour or touch. It is said to be located in the tip of the tongue.³¹ River, ocean, snow and hailstorm are the watery objects which have been created out of watery dyads (*dvyaṇukas*) and triads (*tryaṇukas*).³²

Fire (tejas)

The third substance in the Vaiśeṣika list is enumerated as fire (*tejas*), which possesses two specific attributes:

- luminous white colour (*bhāsvara sukla rūpa*);
- hot touch (*uṣṇa sparśa*).

Besides these two, fire has nine more properties:

- number (*saṅkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- severalty (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*saṁyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*);
- proximity (*aparatva*);

- remoteness (*paratva*);
- instrumental liquidity (*naimittika dravatva*);
- velocity (*vega saṁskāra*).

Fire is also divided in two groups: eternal and non-eternal. The fiery atoms are held to be eternal and fiery products are said to be non-eternal; these are classified under three headings:

- fiery body (*taijasa śarīra*);
- fiery sense organ (*taijasa indriya*);
- fiery object (*taijasa viṣaya*).

The first of these is again described in a logical manner, for it is neither supported from perceptual experience nor scientific evidence.³³ The organ of seeing (*cakṣu*) is the faculty produced out of fiery atoms (*taijasa paramāṇus*) because it captures only colour and not hot touch, the other property ascribed to fire.³⁴ Interestingly, some of the Vaiśeṣika texts have here raised an issue as to why the visual organ or the faculty of seeing (*cakṣu*) cannot capture hot touch and have surmised that only the law of cause and effect can be posited as an evidence here, because it is felt through the common experience of all that the eye can grasp only colour (and not hot touch), we have to infer that it is so due to the unseen factor (*adrṣṭa*): this is the only plausible answer from the Vaiśeṣika point of view.³⁵

Moreover, although the faculty of seeing can capture colour, it does not itself contain manifested colour, since it is held to be imperceptible by Vaiśeṣika. Nor does it possess manifested hot touch, for in that case any visible object would have been burnt in the summer season due to collection of several seeing organs (*cakṣus*).³⁶

Fiery objects have been classified in four types, namely: earthly (*bhauma*), celestial (*divya*), abdominal (*udarya*) and mineral (*ākaraṇa*). Earthly fire (*tejas*) is the gross visible fire which is produced from earthly wood and other earthly objects, while celestial fire (*divya tejas*) is stated to be electricity which is derived out of water; abdominal fire (*udarya tejas*) is the heat generated in the abdomen which helps in digestion of the food and last, but not least, is the fiery object in the form of minerals or metals which have also been stated to be fiery (*taijasa*) in Vaiśeṣika texts.³⁷ Obviously, this last type of fire is controversial and has been refuted in the Indian philosophical tradition by many scholars of opposing schools. However, the Vaiśeṣikas have argued in favour of their position that since the liquidity of metals like gold etc. is diminished but does not get destroyed even if extreme heat is applied to them, it can be inferred that they belong inherently to fire. On the other hand, earthly objects lose their liquidity in such a situation, so it is also proved that the metals are not constituted of earthly atoms. Similarly, gold etc. cannot be classified under water because they do not have natural and permanent liquidity; they can also not be termed as airy because they are visible while air is not.³⁸ Vaiśeṣika scholars have proved through a process of elimination that metals such as gold etc. can not be classified under earth, water or air: they are fiery only.³⁹

Interestingly, the classical Vaiśeṣika position on metals being classified as a type of fire has been vindicated by modern science.⁴⁰ Heat in a microwave oven does not change the basic nature of earthly objects such as cereals and food items but it immediately generates fire if a metal utensil is placed within it.

Air (vāyu)

The fourth Vaiśeṣika substance is air, which is defined as possessing airness (*vāyutva*),⁴¹ the substratum of natural moderate touch and devoid of colour.⁴² Air has been stated to possess nine attributes:

- touch (*sparśa*);
- number (*saṅkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- severalty (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*saṁyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*);
- proximity (*aparatva*);
- remoteness (*paratva*);
- velocity (*vega saṁskāra*).

Air cannot be perceived visually, so its existence is proved through inference in the Vaiśeṣika tradition. Like the previous three substances, air has also been classified in two types – eternal and non-eternal. Eternal air is in the form of atoms while non-eternal air is divided into four types:

- airy body (*vāyavya śarīra*);
- airy sense organ (*vāyavya indriya*);
- airy objects (*vāyavya viṣaya*);
- vital air (*prāṇa vāyu*).

Just like the watery and fiery bodies, airy bodies are also accepted in Vaiśeṣika, either on logical grounds or a mythological basis; although there is no empirical evidence for their existence, it has been argued that airy bodies can also be the abode of experience due to combination of earthly atoms.⁴³ Some scholars of the Vaiśeṣika such as Udayana and Śrīdhara have rightly said that this is just a secondary statement, its primary import is to convey that there are airy bodies in which airy atoms are the inherent cause while combination of earthly and other types of atoms makes them the abode of experience.⁴⁴

Moreover, airy bodies are available in the region of air, as has been propounded by the scriptures:

According to TS, the ‘Airy Organism’ is to be found in the realm of the god ‘Vāyu’. In the Vaidika tradition and belief, the space between the surface of the Earth and the orbit of the Sun, i.e., the region called ‘antarīkṣa’ is

controlled by the deity called 'Vāyu' and is peopled by Organisms constituted chiefly of Air. The region is known as 'Vāyuloka', the controlling regent as 'Vāyu' and the organism as 'vāyavīya' (Airy). It is to be noted that 'Airy Organisms' comprise spirits and beings of that genre.

(Bhattacharya, 1976, p. 70)

The faculty of touch is stated to be the airy organ (*tvak*) which enables all living beings to grasp the property of touch; it pervades the whole body and is composed of airy atoms. It is worth mentioning here that only the exterior covering of the body, i.e. skin, should not be taken to be the airy organ because it is those interior cells of skin which grasp cold or hot touch, which in turn is experienced by the innermost conscious agent.⁴⁵ To be more precise, skin is only the abode of the airy organ,⁴⁶ which is the natural covering of the body and constituted of airy atoms.

The airy form of object is that which is experienced by touch – hot, cold or moderate. It is inferred as the propelling factor of visible movement in trees etc.⁴⁷

The fourth type of non-eternal air is described as vital air. Although it could have been covered under airy object itself, it has been detailed separately and stated to be of five types. This is significant, as will be clear from the following.

Vital air (*prāṇa*) is the first type of air which moves within the body and activates blood, motion etc. Although this inner air is mainly one, but has been described as five due to the difference in its positioning and activity within the body.⁴⁸ Just as one person is understood in different roles, similarly one and the same air is expressed by five terms due to different actions performed by it; such as it is termed *prāṇa* when it moves as breath, in and out of nose or mouth; *apāna* when it propels the juices of eaten food downwards; *samāna* when it impels the equal movement of inner energy for digestion of eaten food; *udāna* when it carries the energy upwards and *vyāna* when it reaches the juices of digested food everywhere within the body.⁴⁹ The fivefold delineation of the same vital air (*prāṇa vāyu*) in the body is also explained due to the difference in their location.⁵⁰

Ether (ākāśa)

Ether is the fifth substance of Vaiśeṣika, and is held to be the substratum of sound, one, pervasive and eternal. Unlike the first four material substances, it cannot be classified as eternal and non-eternal because it has no parts and is indivisible.

Ether cannot be visually perceived because even though it has gross magnitude, it does not have colour. Therefore, the existence of ether as a substantial basis for the property called sound (*śabda*) has to be proved by inference only. Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda have had recourse to the process of elimination, and by way of showing that the attribute of sound cannot inhere in any of the other eight substances accepted in the Vaiśeṣika tradition have argued that ether has to be accepted as the inherent cause of sound. The Mīmāṃsakas (and the grammarians) have objected to this view and have asserted that sound itself is a substance and not a property of ether.⁵¹ However, the Vaiśeṣikas have rejected their theory and have propounded that since no substance can inhere in a partless substance, sound

22 *Objects of knowing*

cannot be held to be a substance,⁵² it is a specific property which is externally perceptible through a particular sense organ, and is inherent in an eternal, partless, pervasive substance which is none other than ether. In this way, sound (*śabda*) is the sign that leads us to the acceptance of ether.⁵³ Sound being its specific property, ether has five more general properties:

- number (*saṅkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- severalty (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*saṁyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*).

Several questions have been raised regarding the nature and number of ether, but all have been logically resolved in Vaiśeṣika sources,⁵⁴ and it has been stated that ether is a material substance (*bhūta-dravya*)⁵⁵ like the first four substances, but is neither divisible nor perceptible like them.

Nonetheless, the faculty of hearing (*śrotendriya*) is ascribed to ether; it is stated to be ether itself, delimited in the eardrum, since the sounds can be heard there alone and nowhere else.⁵⁶ Otherwise, ether being a pervasive and eternal substance, sound should be audible everywhere and at all times. Since it is not so, it must be concluded that sound cannot be grasped without the auditory organ, i.e. ether delimited in the eardrum of living beings. The Vaiśeṣikas have further specified that this seemingly simple and physical process of hearing cannot take place unless it is supported by the unseen force (*adr̥ṣṭa*), i.e. the moral residual force pertaining to the individual self. This also explains the phenomena of deafness: despite being all pervasive and eternal, ether is present in the eardrum of a deaf person, but he cannot listen due to his own merit and demerit (*adr̥ṣṭa*)⁵⁷ being imperative in this regard.

Time (kāla)

Time is the sixth in the Vaiśeṣika scheme of substances and has been stated to be a necessary precondition for all sorts of action. It is held to be a substance, because it possesses certain common properties:

- number (*saṅkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- severalty (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*saṁyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*).⁵⁸

The existence of time is proved on the basis of cognitions regarding proximity, remoteness, simultaneity, early and late. All of these types of understanding are actually dependent upon the notion of time. Therefore, the commonsensical experience of all such types as past, present and future etc. is rooted in the

acceptance of time. The notions of proximity and remoteness are explained on the basis of solar movements; one who has observed more solar movements in his life is held to be senior in age while the other one who has seen fewer solar movements is known as comparatively junior in age. In other words, remoteness and proximity are based on the concept of time, which is experienced daily by each one of us in the form of solar movements.

Here a question naturally arises as to the relation between these solar movements and the person being characterised as elder or younger. The Vaiśeṣikas have answered this question and proposed that neither of the relations, conjunction or inherence, is exclusively possible in this case; it has to be a special kind of relation which is termed as '*saṁyuktasaṁyuktasamavāya*'. It means that the person being proposed as elder (*para*), is conjoined (*saṁyukta*) with some substance (*saṁyukta*), which is in turn in contact with the Sun, wherein the solar movement is inherent (*samavāya*). In short, there has to be a substance which is conjoined with the Sun and this substance is time.⁵⁹ Obviously, the first four substances cannot serve this purpose because they are of a limited magnitude and so cannot be related with all the available objects.⁶⁰ The fifth substance, ether, cannot connect these properties with a substance which is already conjoined with the object in question. Therefore, we are left with no choice but to accept time as an additional and independent substance⁶¹ which is responsible for explaining these cognitions.⁶²

Moreover, the visible changes in the phenomenal world also point to the notion of time; the obvious difference between the bodies of a young and an elderly person can only be explained on the basis of temporal difference,⁶³ so the existence of time is proved beyond doubt. Interestingly, another argument has also been adduced by a Vaiśeṣika scholar in this regard: the mere presence of various objects denotes the existence of time, but this 'presence' is different from 'isness' because the latter merely connotes their individual existence, while the former signifies their temporal relation. Besides, isness is excluded in the case of each object, while presence is inclusive of all that is present.⁶⁴

Direction (dik)

The seventh substance in the Vaiśeṣika list is direction, which is not just the ordinarily understood space or locus; rather it is the basis for our cognitions such as 'from here'⁶⁵ or east, west, far, near etc.⁶⁶ Since direction cannot be directly perceived its existence is proved through inference, i.e. proximity and remoteness are the signs of direction.⁶⁷ The very fact that we use words like remote and near is evidence that there is a substance which makes such usage possible.⁶⁸

Five attributes are ascribed to the substance termed direction:

- number (*saṅkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- severalty (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*saṁyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*).⁶⁹

As regards the difference between ether and direction, Vaiśeṣika texts state that the temporal proximity or remoteness between two objects remains unchanged, while the spatial proximity and remoteness are changeable.⁷⁰ For example, the father of 'A' will always be elder (temporally remote) to him, he can never become younger; but anybody who is spatially remote from 'A' can be spatially near him at another point of time. Moreover, time can only refer to solar movement or activity, while direction relates the solar direction with worldly objects.⁷¹

Self (ātman)

The next and the most important substance in the Vaiśeṣika list is the self,⁷² which is held to be the substratum of knowing:⁷³ its existence is proved by the process of inference since it, like mind, is not to be directly perceived.⁷⁴ Twelve reasons have been given by Kaṇāda⁷⁵ himself in this regard; these have been explained by Praśastapāda and elaborated by his commentators, who are also inclined to believe that the self is directly cognised through mental perception. A close examination of all these arguments reveals that although the self (*ātman*) cannot be perceived by external sense-organs due to its being a subtle substance,⁷⁶ at the same time none can deny the self-experience of one's own self. In fact, Kaṇāda has categorically stated that the *yogins* can perceive their own self.⁷⁷

It is noteworthy that in the Vaiśeṣika view, self is not accepted as conscious by nature, rather it is held to be the inherent cause of consciousness or knowledge.⁷⁸ Since according to Vaiśeṣika the cause and effect as well as substance and qualities are two independent entities, knowledge is accepted as an adventitious attribute of the self.

In all, 14 attributes have been ascribed to the self according to Vaiśeṣika; of these knowledge is the first and foremost:

- knowledge (*buddhi*);
- pleasure (*sukha*);
- pain (*duḥkha*);
- desire (*icchā*);
- aversion (*dveṣa*);
- effort (*prayatna*);
- merit (*dharma*);
- demerit (*adharma*);
- impression (*saṁskāra*);
- number (*saṅkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- severalty (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*saṁyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*).⁷⁹

Another important assertion of Vaiśeṣika in this regard is the plural number of the self which is based on the argument of the law of individual retribution, i.e.

vyavasthā.⁸⁰ The same has also been explained as a rule for regulating pleasure and pain etc.⁸¹ The dimension of the self has been propounded as the pervasive one, i.e. *paramamahat* or *vibhu* in terms of Vaiśeṣika, because if it is accepted to be of medium size (*madhyama-parimāṇa*), as held by the Jaina philosophers, then it cannot be eternal, as theorised by the Vaiśeṣika scholars.

Existence of the self has been discussed in detail by several Vaiśeṣika scholars who have argued that the physical body cannot be the substratum of knowledge, because it is produced out of material substances and all material products are obviously unconscious. Moreover the dead body does not have consciousness, which itself is evidence to prove that there is something beyond the physical body in which consciousness inheres.⁸²

Knowledge or consciousness cannot be an attribute of sense-organs either, because those being only the instruments of cognitive activity are themselves unconscious and therefore cannot be accepted to be the substrata of knowledge.⁸³ Besides, the possibility of memory cannot be explained reasonably if the sense-organs are held to be the substrata of knowledge, because even when a particular sense-organ is not working, one can remember the objects perceived by the same.⁸⁴ This means that there is some other substratum of knowledge other than the sense-organs. Likewise, the mind can also not be held to be the substratum of knowledge or conscious because it is the instrument of knowing and not the agent.⁸⁵ Moreover, it would pose the problem of several simultaneous cognitions which is not the case in our daily experience.⁸⁶ One of the later Vaiśeṣika scholars has argued that mind being a minute substance cannot be held to be the substratum of knowledge because in that case, all the attributes such as desire, pain etc. ascribed to the self will cease to be perceptible because gross magnitude is a precondition of perceptibility.⁸⁷

Mind (manas)

Last but not least is the ninth substance, 'mind', which is held to be the internal organ and an instrument for knowing. Existence of the mind is proved through inference and the argument given in this regard is as follows: even though the self, sense-organs and the objects are in contact, sometimes cognition occurs and at another time it does not occur; this proves that there is something more than these three which is instrumental in the occurrence of cognition, and that is the reason for acceptance of mind as an instrument of knowing. Mind has no specific attribute but is stated to be a substratum for the five generic attributes:

- number (*saṅkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- severalty (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*samyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*).

Accordingly, the number pertaining to mind is stated to be innumerable, for each body is associated with an independent mind. The magnitude of mind is accepted

to be minute. Gautama, the author of *Nyāyasūtras*, has given an important argument for proving the minuteness of mind, which says that all our cognitions are successive and not simultaneous.⁸⁸ It is therefore quite logical to accept a minute object like mind, which acts as a medium between the external sense-organs and the self, that is eternal and pervasive. Otherwise, each one of us should have cognition of all objects at all times. Moreover, the mind and the self both being pervasive (*vibhu*), their conjunction cannot take place because two pervasive substances cannot conjoin according to the Vaiśeṣika view. So the process of cognition will become impossible if we do not accept mind as being minute. Severalty is another attribute of the mind besides conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity and velocity.⁸⁹ Being minute and corporeal, mind is also a substratum of activity, because activity is ascribed to corporeal substances only.

Attribute (*guṇa*)

The second category or the object of knowing is attribute, which is defined by Kaṇāda as that which inheres in a substance, is not the substratum of attribute and is not the cause of conjunction or disjunction independently.⁹⁰ Praśastapāda has elaborated the nature of attribute by describing four similarities (*sādharmyas*) among all the attributes enumerated by him: association with attributeness (*guṇatvābhisambandha*), being inherent in any of the nine substances (*dravyāśritatvam*), being devoid of attributes (*nirguṇatvam*) and activities (*niṣkriyatvam*). In fact, these are the common characteristics of all attributes.⁹¹ What follows from the above is that the attributes (*guṇas*) are inhered in by the class character (*jāti*) of attributeness (*guṇatva*), are themselves inherent in the substances, and are never inhered in by the attributes and the activities.⁹²

Vaiśeṣika is a proponent of realism which postulates that the substance and its attributes are two independent entities:

That something is, that something exists, is the first proposition of the Vaisesika philosophy, but nothing can simply be . . . So, we must push forward and assert that a thing is, because it possesses certain properties besides mere existence. Whatever exists, does so because it has certain qualities.

(Radhakrishnan 1989, vol. II, p. 185)

Obviously, this view is in contrast to the Buddhist point of view which argues that we only perceive properties or attributes, but do not in fact experience any substratum other than these as such. Even if we subscribe to a substance, it is not independent of its properties.⁹³

Vaiśeṣika scholars have criticised the above-mentioned view of the Buddhists and have argued that if the properties and their substrata are identical there should not be any distinction between 'colour and cloth', 'touch and pot' etc. Moreover, even a blind person would be able to perceive the colour of the cloth just like the touch of the pot. Since our common experience does not support such perception, we have to accept that the properties and their substratum are two different entities.⁹⁴

Number of attributes (*guṇas*)

In this way, after proving the existence of attributes as an independent category, the number of attributes accepted in the Vaiśeṣika view is enumerated. An earlier list of attributes given by Kaṇāda mentions only 17:

- colour (*rūpa*);
- taste (*rasa*);
- odour (*gandha*);
- touch (*sparsa*);
- number (*saṅkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- severalty (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*saṃyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*);
- proximity (*aparatva*);
- remoteness (*paratva*);
- intellect (*buddhi*);
- pleasure (*sukha*);
- pain (*duḥkha*);
- desire (*icchā*);
- aversion (*dveṣa*);
- effort (*prayatna*).⁹⁵

Later, seven more were added to the list by Praśastapāda:

- weight (*gurutva*);
- liquidity (*dravatva*);
- viscosity (*snēha*);
- impression (*saṃskāra*);
- merit (*dharma*);
- demerit (*adharma*);
- sound (*śabda*).⁹⁶

and a total of 24 attributes were accepted in the Vaiśeṣika tradition. Questions have been raised regarding the lesser or greater number of attributes, but the list of 24 attributes has been prevalent and acceptable after Praśastapāda.

These 24 attributes are again classified in several groups depending upon their inherence in various substances, their grasping through one, two or more sense-organs, their causes and effects etc.⁹⁷

As regards the knowability of these 24 attributes (*guṇas*), Praśastapāda has clearly mentioned that only four out of these 24 attributes – weight, merit, demerit, and mental faculty – are imperceptible⁹⁸ and so are to be known through inference, while the others are perceived either by one or more than one sense organs;⁹⁹ the remaining six specific attributes pertaining to the self – cognition,

pleasure, pain, aversion, desire and effort – are to be known through mental perception.¹⁰⁰

It is noteworthy in this regard that cognition, which is not different from knowledge according to Vaiśeṣika, is stated to be internally perceptible like the other five specific attributes of the self. Although some opponents have claimed that cognition is not perceived mentally, it is inferred, the Vaiśeṣikas have rejected the claim¹⁰¹ and maintained that cognition is in fact perceptible.

Activity (*karma*)

The third category in the Vaiśeṣika view is held to be activity,¹⁰² which is in fact the principle of motion or movement pertaining to corporeal substances. It has been defined as inhering in one substance (*ekadravyam*), being devoid of attributes (*aguṇam*) and being an independent cause of conjunction and disjunction (*saṃyogavibhāgeśvakāraṇam*).¹⁰³

The Vaiśeṣika view of activity maintains that at a given time, one single activity can stay in one object only. Accordingly, the first epithet in the definition of activity signifies that one particular activity pertains to one substance at one point in time, otherwise when one object starts moving, or stops moving, all other objects should be affected. In cases of simultaneous movement of various objects, there are a number of different activities operating in different objects,¹⁰⁴ so the definition given by Kaṇāda is clear in its intent.

Moreover, it is the peculiar nature of activity that although it is caused through any one of the four attributes – weight, fluidity, effort and conjunction – and is also the non-inherent cause of attributes like conjunction or contact, disjunction and velocity,¹⁰⁵ yet it is not inherently related to attributes as such and so, not being inhered in by any of the attributes (*aguṇavattva*), is a common characteristic of all the activities.¹⁰⁶

In the Vaiśeṣika view activity is also held to be an independent cause of conjunction or contact and disjunction; this particular aspect of activity clearly distinguishes it from attributes.¹⁰⁷

Besides the above-mentioned three defining features, there are other characteristics of activity which have been suggested in Vaiśeṣika texts:

- Activity is destroyed by its own effect, i.e. the subsequent conjunction (*uttara-saṃyoga*) which is produced in the fourth moment of activity.¹⁰⁸
- Activity is invariably the non-inherent cause of movement according to Vaiśeṣika, because only a substance can be the inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of an effect, while attribute can be both the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) as well as the instrumental cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*).¹⁰⁹
- Activity can never generate another activity, just as a substance can cause another substance and attribute can cause another attribute.¹¹⁰
- Activity can also not be a cause of substances, because a substance is produced only after the activity is over and no decaying activity can cause a substance.¹¹¹

- Activity is transitory by nature,¹¹² because it cannot last more than four or five moments.¹¹³ In other words, activity is the transient feature of substance (*dravya*), while attribute (*guṇa*) is the intransient one.
- Activity cannot pertain to pervasive substances, so it is ascribed to corporeal substances only.¹¹⁴

The existence of activity is proved by perception itself, since ‘it moves’ is directly perceived by each and every person.¹¹⁵

Although perceptibility of activity is refuted by several scholars following diverse traditions such as Buddhist, Jaina, Grammarian, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā and even Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣikas have countered their viewpoint and reaffirmed their stand that activity is not inferred, it is directly perceived.¹¹⁶ Even the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas have supported this view and refuted the arguments of Prabhākaras.

As far as the types of activity are concerned, the Vaiśeṣikas have classified it into five types:

- throwing upwards (*utkṣepaṇa*);
- throwing downwards (*avakṣepaṇa*);
- contraction (*ākuñcana*);
- expansion (*prasāraṇa*);
- going or moving in general (*gamana*).¹¹⁷

Obviously, these five types are described due to the particular direction in which the movement takes place. All of these five types of activity are manifested through their respective movements,¹¹⁸ which are also expressed by the prefixes used in each of the titles.¹¹⁹

There is much discussion of these five types of activity in several Vaiśeṣika texts, which reflects the course of development regarding the nature of this category, and at least one explanation provided by M. R. Bodas seems to be convincing for this fivefold classification. According to him:

A closer inspection, however, might reveal some sort of principle even in this arbitrary division. Motion is primarily divided into three kinds according to its direction, namely, vertical, horizontal and slanting or miscellaneous. The vertical motion may be from below upwards (*utkṣepaṇa*), or from above downwards (*avakṣepaṇa*). Horizontal motion also may be twofold, motion nearer to oneself (*ākuñcana*) or motion further from oneself (*prasāraṇa*). All other motions are relegated to the comprehensive class of *gamana*. It is not of course meant that the above groups exactly correspond to the ordinary conceptions of *utkṣepaṇa* etc., but that some such principle was in the mind of the *Sūtrakāra* when he made the division seems to be highly probable.

(Bodas 1974, p. 89)

There is one more interesting aspect of activity which needs to be outlined here; Praśastapāda has elaborated this aspect which was originally hinted by Kaṇāda

himself. It pertains to the causal relationship of several attributes with activity and provides a ground for the eight factors responsible for generating of various types. The above-mentioned eight factors are listed and elaborated by B.N. Seal as follows:

- pressure (*nodana*);
- impact (*abhiḥātā*);
- velocity (*vega saṃskāra*);
- elasticity (*sthitisthāpakatā*);
- weight (*gurutva*);
- liquidity (*dravatva*);
- effort (*prayatna*);
- unseen force (*adr̥ṣṭa*).¹²⁰

Various types of special movements such as gyration (*bhramāṇa*), vibration (*kampana*), dripping of water (*syandana*) etc. and slanting motion of air (*tiryak-pavana*), burning up of fire (*ūrdhvajwalana*), bending down (*namana*), climbing up (*unnamana*) and flowing down of water (*abhisarpaṇa*) have also been explained by Vaiśeṣika scholars, but all are subsumed under the general type of activity (*gamana*) accepted in the tradition.¹²¹

Universal (*sāmānya*)

Universal¹²² is the fourth category enumerated by Kaṇāda¹²³ which inheres in all of the three categories mentioned above. It signifies the natural class characters pertaining to substances, attributes and activities in general. It is defined as that which is the ground of universal being experienced in all the individual members of a particular class.¹²⁴ In other words, the one eternal principle which inheres in many is termed as universal (*sāmānya*).¹²⁵

Significantly, three features of universal are explicitly mentioned in the definition quoted above:

- Universal is eternal: this aspect of the definition is important: otherwise the definition of universal would become too broad and entities like conjunction (which are inherent in more than one) would fall into its ambit.¹²⁶
- Universal inheres in many: if this part of the definition of universal is removed, then again the fallacy of over-wideness will crop up, since the magnitude of ether is also eternal and one.¹²⁷
- Universal inheres (in its particulars). This part of the definition, i.e. ‘inhering in’ is also unavoidable, otherwise it will apply to absolute negation as well, which is eternal and is available in many; but since non-being cannot be related to anything through inherence, it is excluded.¹²⁸

It is also noteworthy that in the earlier phase of Vaiśeṣika, this category was termed as universal (*sāmānya*), but later another term, ‘*jāti*’, came to be used as its

equivalent.¹²⁹ Some scholars have noted that since the grammarians have also used these two terms, there may be some interrelation.¹³⁰

The acceptance of universal is widely discussed in the various texts of Vaiśeṣika and several arguments have been given in this regard, the most important being the commonsensical experience based on the law of causation. Buddhists have vehemently criticised the concept of '*jāti*' propounded by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and have instead advocated the concept of '*apoha*'; long debates have taken place between these two camps.¹³¹ It would be out of place here to go into detail, suffice to say that the Vaiśeṣika scholars have refuted almost all the objections raised by the opponents and that they are joined by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas in this case.¹³²

Universal has been broadly classified in two types:


- wide (*para*);
- narrow or limited (*apara*).

Out of these the widest class character (*para sāmānya*) or being (*bhāva*) is the ground for experiencing the inclusive notion only,¹³³ while the concept of universal usually performs both the functions, inclusion as well as exclusion. Kaṇāda has proclaimed earlier that both these categories of universal and particularity are actually dependent on the understanding (of the knower).¹³⁴ However, in the very next statement he clarifies that the widest form of universal (*para*) is that which can never be understood as the basis of differentiation. Those types of universal which also act as particularity are in fact the limited class character (*apara sāmānya*) and are said to be three in number: substancehood (*dravyatva*), attributeness (*guṇatva*) and activityhood (*karmatva*). These are only broadly counted as three, because there may be many more narrower forms of these three also, such as earthiness (*pṛthivītvā*), wateriness (*jalatva*) and fieriness (*tejastva*) etc.

In this way the classification of universal (*sāmānya*) in two types (*para* and *apara*) is only meant to explain the principle of inclusion and exclusion. Out of these two kinds of universal, the former is the more inclusive one because it incorporates all of the three possible categories in its ambit and does not exclude any one of these at any level.

The other type of universal, i.e. the limited universal, is a relative one; when it is comprehended in relation to the wider form of universal, it will be termed as narrow but when it is compared with the narrower forms of universal it will be stated to be wide.

In view of the above, some of the later Vaiśeṣika scholars have divided universal in three types: the widest (*para*), the medium (*parāpara*) and the narrowest (*apara*).¹³⁵ All these three types of universal can be illustrated from the following:



Of these three types, the most inclusive form of universal is expressed through another technical term used in Vaiśeṣika texts, ‘*sattā*’ (existence).¹³⁶ Kaṇāda has himself explained the concept of supreme universal (*sattā*) in clear terms: widest universal is that due to which all the first three categories, namely substance, attribute and activity are understood to be existent.¹³⁷ It must be clarified that the supreme universal (*sattā*) here should not be taken in its literal sense of ‘existence’ since it is different from isness (*astitva*), which is the common characteristic of all the six categories, so the term *sattā*’ is used in a restricted sense in Vaiśeṣika sources. It is aptly explained as that which subsists in the first three categories, namely substance, attribute and activity.¹³⁸

It should be noted here that according to the Vaiśeṣika view, universal is the principle of similarity¹³⁹ but all types of similarity cannot be characterised as universal or class character because there are some imposed, external similarities also, known as ‘*upādhis*’ which are only temporary and cannot be counted as *jāti*. Udayanācārya has enumerated six such factors which act like bars between an *upādhi* and *jāti*. These six factors have been termed as deterrents for natural class character or *jāti* (*jātibādhakas*).¹⁴⁰

In the Vaiśeṣika view universal is held to be perceptible, since the same sense-organ which grasps an object also perceives the class character pertaining to that object. Although it is the individual that comes in direct contact with the sense-organ, at the same time the class character inherent in a particular object is also perceived by the same sense organ.

Particularity (*viśeṣa*)

The fifth category, particularity,¹⁴¹ is the basis for nomenclature of Vaiśeṣika because it is the innovative idea of this school of Indian philosophy. Kaṇāda has enumerated particularity as one the six categories but has not dwelt upon its nature. He has, however, suggested a significant aspect of particularity by using the term ‘ultimate particularity’ (*antya-viśeṣa*), distinguishing it from particularity in general.¹⁴²

In Vaiśeṣika tradition, the first ever reference to the concept of particularity as a category is found in the *Daśapadārthī* of Maticandra. However, it is in fact Praśastapāda who has given a detailed description of particularity as such. Accordingly, particularity is known as ultimate particularity because it subsists in the ultimate atoms and eternal substances and distinguishes its substrata from other entities.¹⁴³

The number of particularity is said to be countless because it inheres in each of the innumerable atoms, selves and minds.¹⁴⁴ Now a question might arise as to when each of the eternal substances is associated with separate particularities and a single particularity is not accepted to inhere in many substances (*dravyas*) simultaneously, why is particularityness (*viśeṣatva*) as a class character for inhering in all the countless particularities not accepted. In this regard, the response provided by Vaiśeṣika tradition is interesting, i.e. if ‘*viśeṣatva*’ is accepted as a universal, then the very purpose of propounding particularity will be defeated,¹⁴⁵ and the

nature of particularity will also be contradicted, so it is logical to hold that there is no need to accept another distinguishing factor for each of the countless particularities, because they are accepted to be self-differentiating (*svatovyārta*) by nature. Although particularity is held to be a distinguishing factor among eternal substances, none of the particularities is related to universal as such (*sāmānya*) or (*jāti*). In other words, particularities perform double roles: on the one hand, they distinguish their respective substrata from each one of its kind, and on the other hand, they distinguish themselves from their own counterparts, i.e. the particularities.¹⁴⁶

Regarding the knowing of particularity, it has been said in several Vaiśeṣika texts that the particularity cannot be directly perceived by ordinary mortals, it is a matter of inference only. However, the *yogins* can and do perceive particularity (*viśeṣa*) through their extraordinary faculties.¹⁴⁷ The particularity is said to be cognisable by inference, since all its substrata, i.e. the eternal substances, are themselves to be inferred. They are, however, directly perceived by the *yogins* through extraordinary perception. So the multiple number of particularities are also said to be directly perceptible for the *yogins*.¹⁴⁸ in Vaiśeṣika, although the claim has been questioned by none other than Raghunātha Śīromaṇi, one of the later scholars from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.¹⁴⁹ It is worth mentioning here that in Indian philosophical tradition the concept of particularity as an independent category has not only been refuted by both the schools of Mīmāṃsā, but also the Buddhists and Advaita.¹⁵⁰

As already stated, there are two forms pertaining to each object: the generic and the specific;¹⁵¹ both of these are known through 'inclusive notion' and 'exclusive notion' respectively.¹⁵² The category of particularity provides a ground for comprehending the ultimate exclusion among the eternal and partless objects. Kaṇāda has not only enumerated particularity as the fifth category in his list, but also stated that this is the 'ultimate distinguishing feature' and is therefore different from the relative notion of universal and particularity which depends on the understanding of the agent. According to him, particularities are termed as '*antya*' because they subsist in the end (*anta*), i.e. the ultimate partless, eternal substances and the ultimate parts of all material objects, the atoms.¹⁵³ The term '*anta*' here signifies eternal objects because the particularities remain at the end, when everything else is created or destroyed.¹⁵⁴ This proves that the particularities are not only eternal but also countless, for each one of the innumerable eternal objects has its own particularity. Moreover, the particularities are not in any way related to the universal. Not only this, but they are also different from substance, attribute and activity since they are inherently related to the eternal substances only.¹⁵⁵

The necessity for postulating an independent category in the name of particularity has been argued as follows: all the gross objects of the visible world can be differentiated from each other due to their form, parts, properties or activity. But the question remains as to how the subtle but numerous substances of similar or of dissimilar kind can be distinguished from others. The category of particularity is envisaged for differentiating amongst the atoms, souls and minds, which are held to be distinctly numerous. In fact, particularity is the principle of atoms,

selves and minds. It is due to particularity that each atom is different from other atoms of its own class or of another class. To put it more precisely, particularity is the factor which separates each of the eternal substances from one another. More importantly, particularities are held to be self-differentiating, so there is no need to accept another principle for differentiating amongst multiple particularities. If another particularity be accepted for differentiating one particularity from another, there will be the fallacy of *infinite regress* (*anavasthā*).¹⁵⁶

Particularities are stated to inhere only in the eternal substances, so it follows that the non-eternal substances and the remaining categories do not have any particularity. In other words, the products of the first four substances, attributes or properties, activity, universal and particularities themselves do not require any further particularity, nor do the remaining two categories, inherence (*samavāya*) and negation (*abhāva*).

According to the Vaiśeṣika view, the category of particularity is related to the respective individual entities through the relation of inherence.

Inherence (*samavāya*)

The sixth category, '*samavāya*', is of the nature of inherence, which is defined as an eternal relation between the cause and the effect;¹⁵⁷ it is stated to subsist in the following five pairs of relata:

- parts and the whole (*avayava-avayavī*);
- properties and the substance (*guṇa-guṇī*);
- activity and the substance (*kriyā-kriyāvān*);
- universal and the individual (*jāti-vyakti*);
- particularity and the eternal substances (*viśeṣa-nityadravya*).¹⁵⁸

In the Vaiśeṣika worldview, there are three types of objects in the universe: the substances, the attributes and the relation between them. All of these are independent and real objects, but are of course related in an inseparable manner through a relation conceived in the name of inherence. Obviously, the first two are in the form of relata while the last is a relation which binds them both.

Inherence is in fact a unique relation that obtains between two objects which are inseparable (*ayutasiddha*).¹⁵⁹ Although conjunction is also stated to be a relation in Vaiśeṣika sources, it is different from inherence in the sense that it is placed in the list of 24 properties, while inherence is accepted to be an independent category.

Not only this, but conjunction itself being a property is related to its substrata through the relation of inherence. The significance of inherence in the Vaiśeṣika school is thus clear. Moreover, inherence, being a unique relation, is naturally related to both its relata and does not require any other relation for relating it to them.

Inherence is, in fact, the foundation for causation theory propounded by the Vaiśeṣika school.¹⁶⁰ Accordingly, the effect is stated to be non-existent in its cause before production;¹⁶¹ it is held to be a new product (*asatkāryavāda* or *ārambhavāda*). This does not mean that there is no rule as such and anything can be produced out

of anything because it is observed by everyone that a particular effect is produced out of a particular cause only. In other words, the cause and the effect are inseparably related through inference. It is therefore not wrong to surmise that the Vaiśeṣika school must have propounded inference as an independent category to explain the essential distinction between the cause and the effect accepted by them.¹⁶²

Accordingly, inference (*samavāya*) is held to be a relating principle between:

- 1 substances and properties;
- 2 substances and activity;
- 3 substance and universal;
- 4 eternal substances and particularity.

But there is no inference for relating inference to its relata, and no inference for relating negation to anything else. In other words, inference operates amongst the first five categories only. Besides, the Vaiśeṣika holds the view that inference is only one in number.¹⁶³ Kaṇāda has explicitly mentioned that the singularity of inference is explained by the oneness of being (*sattā sāmānya*),¹⁶⁴ but this view has also been refuted by various scholars from within the Vaiśeṣika tradition.¹⁶⁵

The knowing of inference is stated to be by inference because it is not perceptible according to Vaiśeṣika, while the Naiyāyikas hold that inference can be perceived through adjectival contact of the sense-organ with its object.¹⁶⁶ Without going into detail, it can be said that since the Vaiśeṣika scholars have offered several arguments to prove the existence of inference, hence it is clear that they do not accept its perceptibility.

Negation (*abhāva*)

According to the Vaiśeṣika view, reality has two aspects – positive and negative. The six categories enunciated above are covered under positive while the seventh category, '*abhāva*', represents the negative.

Kaṇāda has not clearly enumerated negation¹⁶⁷ as an independent category, but the later Vaiśeṣika tradition, beginning from Śivāditya¹⁶⁸ and Udayanācārya,¹⁶⁹ has not only accepted it as the seventh category, but also tried to explain that its acceptance was implied in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*.

It has been argued by Vaiśeṣika scholars that reality does not consist of positive entities only, it also points towards a negative aspect of being. Therefore, an additional category has to be accepted as the foundation for explaining such experiences. It is termed as '*abhāva*' and has been differently interpreted as negation, non-existence or absence by various scholars.¹⁷⁰

It is noteworthy here that the term negation is confined only to the field of language, while the *abhāva* of Vaiśeṣika is a metaphysical entity. In other words, negation deals with form but non-being is an essential category.

Interestingly, although Kaṇāda has not listed *abhāva* as an independent category in his aphorisms, he has used the term *abhāva* in more than one aphorism and has also delineated the four types of *abhāva*.¹⁷¹ Praśastapāda has also not described

abhāva as an independent category,¹⁷² but discussed it under the means of knowing and said that *abhāva* is not an independent means of knowing, it is a form of inference only. This clearly proves that *abhāva* was not actually accepted as an independent category until the time of Praśastapāda, because since the time *abhāva* was accepted as a category, it was also established that it is directly perceived. In other words, *abhāva* meant to be a negation of something and in that form it was taken to be an object of inference. It means that until the time of Praśastapāda logical acceptance of *abhāva* (as negation) was in the Vaiśeṣika tradition, but its metaphysical existence was yet to be proved. Śrīdhara has clarified the position of Praśastapāda in the following manner: he has not mentioned non-being (*abhāva*) as a separate category, because its existence depends upon being and not because he does not accept non-being (*abhāva*).¹⁷³

Types of *abhāva*

As stated above, Kaṇāda has not explicitly mentioned *abhāva* as an independent category but he has referred to all the four types of it accepted in the later period by his followers from Śivāditya and Udayanācārya onwards. Accordingly the Vaiśeṣika school has classified *abhāva* into four types:

- antecedent negation (*prāgabhāva*);
- consequent negation (*pradhvaṁsābhāva*);
- absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*);
- reciprocal negation (*anyonyābhāva*).

The first of these four is explained as the non-existence of the effect in its cause; the second occurs when the effect is destroyed; the third is a type of non-existence which is for ever; and the fourth is atemporal¹⁷⁴ in the sense that it is the absence of mutual identity in the objects of the world.

As far as the knowing of *abhāva* is concerned, the Vaiśeṣika (along with the Nyāya) school holds that it is directly perceived. Kaṇāda has also accepted that all the four types of *abhāva* are perceptible, just as the positive categories are.¹⁷⁵

Surprisingly, Praśastapāda does not accept perceptibility of non-being and includes it under inference.¹⁷⁶

However, his commentator Śrīdharaācārya has questioned him on the point and enquired as to when the vacant ground is directly perceived without an object, i.e. a pot, then how can we not accept that non-being is directly perceived?¹⁷⁷ It is noteworthy here that the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas do not accept perceptibility of non-being (although they accept an objective reality like non-being and four of its types), rather they have posited an additional means for cognising non-being, i.e. non-mental apprehension (*anupalabdhī*).¹⁷⁸ But Śrīdhara has refuted the Bhāṭṭa position and propounded that *abhāva* is perceptible through a specific kind of contact between the sense-organ and the locus of *abhāva*.¹⁷⁹

Other schools of Indian philosophy, such as the Buddhists, Sāṃkhya, Vedāntins and Prābhākaras, are not ready to accept *abhāva* as an independent category, rather

they have criticised and rejected the Vaiśeṣika view in this regard. However, later Vaiśeṣika scholars, after arguing against all such objections, have re-established that it is more logical to accept *abhāva* as an independent, additional category.¹⁸⁰

On the basis of the above delineation, it may be said that the Vaiśeṣika view of the world is a comprehensive one and it encompasses all that is to be known, i.e. the sevenfold objects of knowing. There is a logical ground for enunciation of the six categories in sequential order.¹⁸¹ Accordingly, the substances are the basic substrata, attributes and activity are the qualifying properties which express different aspects of the same. Just as the system of Kaṇāda propounded a category called universal (*sāmānya*) to explain the similarities found in several classes of objects, similarly they went on to posit a category called particularity (*viśeṣa*) so that the distinctness of each of the ultimate invisible objects could be accounted for. At one end of our knowing stands the notion of being, i.e. '*sattā*', and at the other end of human understanding is this concept of particularity (*viśeṣa*) which is the ultimate idea of particularity, i.e. *antyaviśeṣa*. Besides the above five categories, inherence (*samavāya*) was also accepted as an independent category to relate all of those entities mentioned above. However, the process of knowing the reals is incomplete until we include the negative aspect of reality. Finally the category *abhāva* was added to the list of Vaiśeṣika categories and was claimed to cover all the objects worth knowing in its exposition.

4 Methods of knowing (*sādharmya* and *vaidharmya*)

Kaṇāda proclaimed in the beginning of his treatise that the purpose and content of his system is explaining the nature of '*dharmā*','¹ i.e. the characteristics of the reals. Now a question would naturally arise as to what are the methods for knowing the same. Kaṇāda had himself anticipated the above and hence has stated that the essential nature of reals, which are enumerated as six, can be known through the following twin methods:

- similarity (*sādharmya*);
- dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*).²

The Vaiśeṣika school has accepted both of these as methods of knowing; the same has been stated in brief by Kaṇāda himself, while a detailed delineation in this regard has been provided by Praśastapāda and his commentators.

As already discussed in a previous chapter the Vaiśeṣika, like most of the schools of Indian philosophy, aims at attaining the highest end, i.e. *niḥśreyasa*. Accordingly this ultimate goal can only be achieved through a proper understanding (*tattvajñānam*) of the six categories. This type of knowledge is made possible by a special kind of merit accrued through divine benediction, according to Praśastapāda. It is for this special type of knowing that these two methods, similarity (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*), have been laid out in Vaiśeṣika.

Twin methods of knowing: similarity and dissimilarity

It is quite common to know an object through these two ways: first, the similar features of any knowable object with others of its class are to be noted and analysed. Thereafter, the dissimilarities of that particular object with others of its class need to be identified and discussed. Only by employing both these methods can one be sure of the real nature of the object under consideration. The well-known ways of Indian logic, positive (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*),³ also denote these twin ways of knowing as *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya*. All forms of scientific assertions are also basically rooted in these two types of methods. Likewise, the two methods employed in the Western system of logic, deduction and induction,⁴ are also broadly based on these two aspects; of course they are

supported by experimentation. In the realm of philosophical studies there is no better way of ascertaining the nature of reals than the two methods suggested by Kaṇāda.

In view of this, it is now appropriate to discuss the details of these two methods as expounded in the sources of classical Vaiśeṣika. Let us reiterate that according to Vaiśeṣika, both of the terms denoting methods of similarity (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) are based upon the central idea of Vaiśeṣika – *dharma*, which has already been explained as the theme of knowing. Accordingly, *sādharmya* signifies common characteristics while *vaidharmya* indicates distinguishing features; these two are in turn the essence (*tattvam*) of reality, knowledge of which leads to the ultimate goal of life.⁵ It is crucial to understand the similarities and dissimilarities in various types of categories enunciated in Vaiśeṣika texts.⁶

However, it is also noteworthy in this regard that these methods are not mutually exclusive, because the similarity among two or more objects of a particular class may be a dissimilarity among others. In the same way, whatever is being understood as dissimilarity in a particular case, may be a similarity elsewhere. This has to be ascertained by referring to particular instances in each case.⁷ This fact has also been stated by Śaṅkaramiśra, a later commentator of Vaiśeṣika.⁸

Similarities among categories

As stated above, Kaṇāda himself has employed the methods of similarity and dissimilarity while discussing the nature of the six categories. Accordingly, he has mentioned that the first three categories – the substance, attribute and activity – are common in the sense that they are to be characterised as *artha*⁹ because these have six similarities (*sādharmyas*):

- being existent (*sat*);
- being non-eternal (*anitya*);
- having a substance as substratum (*dravyavat*);
- being an effect (*kārya*);
- being a cause (*kāraṇa*);
- having a universal and a differential (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*).¹⁰

The remaining three categories in the list of Vaiśeṣika – universal, particularity and inherence – are termed *arthāntara*¹¹ or just *padārtha* (terms which also cover the previous three categories).

Besides the above, Kaṇāda has suggested various other similarities among different groups of categories for a proper understanding of their essential nature. For example, both the categories, substance as well as attribute, are stated to possess a common characteristic of giving rise to similar effects (*sajātīyārambhakatva*).¹² In other words, substances can produce another substance and attributes can produce another attribute, but activity (*karma*) does not produce another activity.¹³

Elaborating the above statements of Kaṇāda, his commentator Praśastapāda enumerates two more common attributes of three categories (*padārthas*),

substance (*dravya*), attribute (*guṇa*) and activity (*karma*), and says that these are related to the highest class (*sattā*) as well as the medium class character (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*) and can be communicated by the technical term *artha* in Vaiśeṣika tradition; they can all be the cause of merit and demerit.¹⁴ Subsequent scholars such as Śrīdhara have explained it as follows:

- These three categories are termed *artha* because the Vaiśeṣika tradition, beginning from Kaṇāda, has applied this term to them.¹⁵
- The first three categories can cause merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) as their subsidiary causes.¹⁶

As regards the remaining three categories of classical Vaiśeṣika, universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*), Praśastapāda mentions seven similarities among them:

- These three categories exist in themselves and are not related to the most generic attribute, i.e. ‘*sattā*’, like the former three categories (*svātmasattvam*).¹⁷
- The last three categories are to be defined through cognition (*buddhi*) only, since no other means of knowing can prove their existence.¹⁸
- The three categories under discussion are eternal (*nitya*) and so are not the effect of any cause (*akāryatvam*).¹⁹
- They are also not the cause of any effect since they do not produce anything in the capacity of material cause or non-inherent cause (*akāraṇatvam*).²⁰
- These three categories have no sub-classes; it means that due to different conditions for deterring their generic status, universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*) are not inherited in by any generic attribute (*asāmānyaviśeṣavattvam*).²¹
- These three categories are eternal because they are indestructible (*nityatvam*).²²
- The last three categories are not to be characterised as *artha* by which term the former three categories are expressed by Kaṇāda, rather they are to be taken as other than *artha*, i.e. *arthāntara* (*arthaśabdānabhidheyatvam*).²³

After explaining the above similarities among six categories as enunciated by Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda elaborated further on this aspect and has pointed out nine types of similarities among different groups of six categories:

- All the six categories (mentioned in the list of Vaiśeṣika by Kaṇāda), i.e. substance (*dravya*), attribute (*guṇa*), activity (*karma*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*), have three common characteristics, namely isness (*astitva*), nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and knowability (*jñeyatva*).²⁴ These three common characteristics among the six categories have been adequately explained by the commentators of Praśastapāda. Accordingly ‘*astitva*’ means being an object of affirmative statements;²⁵ ‘*abhidheyatva*’ signifies the notion of being verbally communicable²⁶ while ‘*jñeyatva*’ expresses knowability.²⁷

- Another, albeit somewhat limited, group of six categories, non-eternal substances (*anityadavyas*), attribute, activity, universal, particularity and inherence (excluding eternal substances, i.e. the atoms of the first four substances, ether, space, time self and mind) share a similarity among them, which is characterised as being subsistent (*āśritatva*).²⁸
- Five categories, substance, attribute, activity, universal and particularity, have two similarities, i.e. being inherent (*samavāyitva*) and being mutually exclusive (*anekatva*).²⁹
- Another group of five categories, attribute, activity, universal, particularity and inherence, have two similarities, i.e. not possessing any attribute (*nirguṇatva*) and not having any activity (*niṣkriyatva*).³⁰
- Three categories, namely substance, attribute and activity share four common characteristics:
 - being related to existence (*sattāsambandha*);
 - having generality and particularity (*sāmānyaviśeṣavattva*);
 - being expressed by the term *artha* (*svasamayārtha-śabdābhidhīyatvam*);
 - being causes of merit and demerit (*dharmādharma-kartṛtva*).³¹
- Another group of three categories, non-eternal substances, non-eternal attributes and activity, have two similarities, i.e. being an effect (*kāryatva*) and being non-eternal (*anityatva*).³²
- Six categories excluding the spherical magnitude of atoms (*pārimāṇḍalya*) have one common characteristic, i.e. being a cause to some other magnitude (*kāraṇatva*).³³
- All the six categories, except the above-mentioned eternal substances, which do not need any substratum to inhere, are similar in the sense that they subsist in any of the substances.³⁴
- The last three categories, universal, particularity and inherence, share seven similarities:
 - They have their own nature for their subsistence (*svātmasattvam*), i.e. they are not related to the widest universal termed 'sattā' in Vaiśeṣika philosophy.³⁵
 - Cognition alone is the evidence for their existence (*buddhilakṣaṇatvam*); it means that universal, particularity and inherence do not have any other effect (which substance, activity and attribute possess) that can prove their existence except their own understanding.³⁶
 - These three categories are not the effect of any other causes, because they are not actually produced (*akāryatvam*); they exist even after all their substrata have been destroyed.³⁷
 - These three categories do not have any cause, inherent or non-inherent (*akāraṇatvam*), although they do have an instrumental cause (*niṣkriyākāraṇa*) in the sense that cognition is the instrument for their existence (*buddhinimittatva*).³⁸ Udayana has interpreted it in a different manner; according to him it pertains to effects other than their own characteristics.³⁹

42 *Methods of knowing*

- Universal, particularity and inherence do not have any medium universal (*parāpara sāmānya*).⁴⁰
- These three categories are eternal, since they are never destroyed (*nityatvam*).⁴¹
- Last, but not least, these three categories are never expressed by a particular epithet *artha* in the Vaiśeṣika tradition (*svasamayārthaśabdān-abhidheyatvam*)⁴² (this is a technical term of classical Vaiśeṣika and is used by Vaiśeṣika scholars in a restricted sense).⁴³

One of the commentators of Praśastapāda, Udayanācārya, has indicated one more similarity in these three categories, which, according to him, is suggested by the term ‘*ca*’. This similarity is expressed by him as ‘*kāraṇānapekṣatvam*’ (not requiring any cause), i.e. universal, particularity and inherence do not require any cause for their subsistence.⁴⁴ But how it is different from the similarity *akāraṇatvam* (already stated by Praśastapāda), is worth examining.

Udayana has listed five more types of similarities among the six categories:

- Substance, attribute, activity, universal and inherence – these five categories (excluding particularity) share a common characteristic, i.e. all of these inhere in non-eternal substances (*anityadharmatva*) while particularity always inheres in eternal substances.⁴⁵
- Five categories, substance, attribute, universal, particularity and inherence, have another similarity of being eternal (*nityatva*), while activity is always non-eternal.⁴⁶
- Four categories, substance, attribute, activity and universal, share a similarity in the sense that all of these are perceptible to ordinary human beings other than *yogins*.⁴⁷
- Attribute and activity can only be a non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇatva*)⁴⁸ while substance is essentially an inherent cause.
- Two categories, eternal substance and inherence, do not inhere in anything (*asamavetatva*),⁴⁹ while the remaining four categories, attribute, activity, universal and particularity, are always inherent in their substrata.

Similarities among substances

After discussing the similarities among six categories, the Vaiśeṣika scholars move on to employ this method further and enunciate the significant similarities available among all of the nine types of substances.

Praśastapāda clearly mentions that all of the nine substances enumerated by Kaṇāda have the following five common characteristics:⁵⁰

- The nine substances share a universal termed ‘*dravyatva*’, i.e. substancehood,⁵¹ therefore all of these have been classified under the category of substance.
- Earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self and the mind – these nine substances produce the effects inherent in each of them respectively.⁵²

- All of the nine substances are inherently related to any one or more of the attributes.⁵³ It is noteworthy here that Udayana has suggested a subtle difference among these similarities. According to him, the second and third similarities listed by Praśastapāda are meant for determining the instrumental cause, while the first is for denoting the usage of substancehood.⁵⁴
- Another similarity among all the nine substances according to Vaiśeṣika is that these are neither destroyed by their cause nor by their effect, therefore they are not contrary to both of these. Śrīdhara has explained this by saying that attributes are sometimes destroyed by their effects, like the preceding word by the succeeding word; and sometimes by their causes, like the ultimate word by the penultimate one. Similarly activity is also destroyed by its effect, i.e. the following conjunction. But the substances are not destroyed by either of these two factors – neither by their effects nor by their causes. Elaborating it further, he says that the eternal substances are indestructible by nature, so there is no question of their causes or effects. As regards the remaining non-eternal substances, they are destructible and have their causes as well, but those causes cannot destroy them; rather they are destroyed by other factors.⁵⁵
- All the nine substances share another common characteristic in that they are inhered in by their own ultimate particularity. The very term *antyaviśeṣa* denotes inherence, so it follows that the ultimate particulars are inherently related with all the nine substances.⁵⁶

Similarities among different groups of substances

The similarities among different groups of substances are discussed as available in Vaiśeṣika sources. Praśastapāda and his commentators have deliberated upon this issue as follows:

- All the substances excluding the four '*avayavidravyas*', i.e. earth, water, fire and air, as also the products of four kinds of atoms, have a similarity in the sense that they are not inherent in anything and they are all eternal.⁵⁷

Udayana, one of the commentators of Praśastapāda, has interpreted this by saying that the above-mentioned eternal substances, except the '*avayavidravyas*', are themselves of the nature of substratum for inhering therein. Moreover, he has suggested the following three similarities among non-eternal substances excluding the partless (*niravayava*) by the use of the term '*ca*' by Praśastapāda:

- The non-eternal substances, i.e. earth, water, fire and air do not have any particularity (*viśeṣa*), because it only pertains to eternal substances.
- These four substances are always inhering in some substance.
- The above-mentioned four substances are non-eternal because they all have parts.⁵⁸

44 *Methods of knowing*

- The six substances – earth, water, fire, air, self and the mind – are similar in that they are all not only plural in number, but also mutually exclusive and each of them inheres in its respective sub-class.⁵⁹

Again, Udayana has suggested an additional similarity among the six substances, i.e. being connected with the attribute of impression (*saṃskāra*).⁶⁰

- Four similarities among the five substances – earth, water, fire, air and mind – have been listed by Praśastapāda:
 - being inhered with activity or movement like throwing upwards etc.;
 - being of corporeal (*mūrta*) magnitude, which is limited;
 - having remoteness and proximity;
 - having velocity.⁶¹
- Ether, space, time and self – these four substances have three similarities mentioned below:
 - being conjoined with all the five corporeal (*mūrta*) substances;
 - having immeasurably large magnitude;
 - being a uniform substratum for all the conjoined substances.⁶²

In this case, Śrīdhara has clarified that there is no repetition in the first and third similarity listed above, because the former suggests conjunction with all the connected substances while the latter indicates their being substrata, albeit in a metaphorical manner.⁶³

Udayana has suggested one more similarity available among the above-mentioned four substances – these four substances are not connected with activity, remoteness, proximity and velocity.⁶⁴

- *Five substances*, namely earth, water, fire, air and ether, are similar in that they are all material substances, are of the nature of their respective sense-organs, and each one of them is inhered with one specific attribute which is grasped by one external sense organ respectively.⁶⁵
- *Four substances*, earth, water, fire and air are themselves inherent causes (of their effects) and are also inhered with the attribute of touch.⁶⁶

Here again, Udayana has mentioned that Praśastapāda's statement is only indicative and not exhaustive. He has therefore suggested three more similarities among earth, water, fire and air:

- These four substances, as mentioned above, have relative minuteness as well as largeness.
- These are all related to elasticity (*sthūṭisthāpaka saṃskāra*).
- These are all inherent causes of their respective sense-organs and bodies.⁶⁷
- *Three substances* – earth, water and fire – are all perceptible, inhered in by colour and liquidity.⁶⁸ Śrīdhara clarifies that here perceptibility signifies that these three substances can be grasped by external sense-organs, otherwise the

next similarity mentioned in the list, i.e. '*rūpavattva*' will prove mere tautology. Moreover, even though the self is also held to be perceptible (internally), yet it is not to be grasped by external sense-organs.⁶⁹

- *Two substances* – earth and water – are inhered with the attribute of weight and taste.⁷⁰ Śrīdhara elaborates that both of these similarities are to be taken together and not individually; in other words, none of these can be left out from the nature of earth or water - this is indicated by the term *ca* employed by Praśastapāda.⁷¹

However, Udayana has interpreted this term *ca* differently and has indicated two more similarities with reference to earth and water. Accordingly, both of these substances can be visualised with the help of light and both have non-luminous white colour.⁷²

- The five material substances (*bhūtadravyas*) already listed above and the individual selves share one similarity: they are all inhered in by specific attributes.⁷³ Specific attributes of the material substances according to Vaiśeṣika view are colour, taste, smell, touch and sound, which pertain to fire, water, earth, air and ether respectively. Likewise there are nine specific attributes which are held to be inhering in the self according to the Vaiśeṣika viewpoint. These attributes are stated to be specific because they differentiate their substrata from other substances.⁷⁴ Udayana has also echoed this idea albeit in different words.⁷⁵
- The three substances, earth, water and self, have a similar number of attributes inhering in them, i.e. 14.⁷⁶ This similarity is only restricted to the number of attributes, because the attributes pertaining to each substance have already been listed and there may be repetition in only a few of those.⁷⁷ Udayana has mentioned that this similarity is only suggestive and not comprehensive, since it does not cover the divine self in its ambit. In other words God, which is a kind of self according to Vaiśeṣika, does not have these 14 attributes.⁷⁸
- Ether and the innumerable number of selves are similar in the sense that both of these substances are inhered in by (one or many) such specific attributes which are momentary and non-pervasive in nature.⁷⁹ Śrīdhara clarifies this aspect by saying that although specific attributes are also inherent in other material substances like earth etc., yet they are excluded by employing the term 'non-pervasive' (because earth etc. have specific attributes which are pervasive).⁸⁰
- Space and time are associated with five attributes each and are held to be instrumental causes for all the produced effects.⁸¹ Elaborating this further, Udayana mentions that number, magnitude, severalty, conjunction and disjunction inhere in space and time, so this is a similarity available in these twin substances.⁸² Besides this, they have another similarity, i.e. each effect is produced in a particular space and time, and not elsewhere.⁸³
- Earth and fire are similar because both of them are inhered in by the instrumental (*naimittika*) liquidity.⁸⁴ It means that the liquidity in earthly

objects such as butter and fiery objects like gold is caused by the application of heat, so it is not natural but brought on by some external factor.⁸⁵

Śrīdhara has raised a doubt here regarding the fieriness of gold on behalf of the opponent and after refuting it, has upheld the Vaiśeṣika view that the liquidity in gold is due to its fiery nature and not due to its being earthly in nature.⁸⁶

Having dwelt upon several similarities among different groups of substances, Praśastapāda concludes the matter by saying that all the nine substances are mutually exclusive, even though they share various similarities cited above. In fact, many more similarities can be explored among different categories. In contrast, the similarities which do not cover a particular substance or a group of substances should be taken as the dissimilarity thereof.⁸⁷

Explaining these statements of Praśastapāda, Udayana clarifies that whatever is similar among a particular group of substances will be dissimilarity for the opposite ones; likewise whatever is dissimilar for one or a group of substances, will be similarity for others. In other words, one can explain it by assuming that the opposite of similarity will itself be dissimilarity from other categories, or the opposite of dissimilarity will itself be similarity to the remaining ones.⁸⁸

The same can be further illustrated by the following examples:

- 'Earth is inhered in by smell' – this is the dissimilarity of earth from other substances, so 'being devoid of smell' (*nirgandhatva*) should be taken to be the similarity for other substances starting from water.
- Weight and taste inhere in water and earth, hence this is a similarity between these two substances, but the same will be a dissimilarity among the remaining substances by contrasting, e.g. being devoid of weight and taste (*agurutva* and *arasavattva*) will be the dissimilarity for fire, air etc.
- Likewise, being meant for others, i.e. not being an abode of experience and being unconscious (*parārthatva* and *acetanatva*), is the similarity among all other substances except the self (which is an abode for experience of pleasure, pain etc. and is conscious), so this will be a dissimilarity for the self.
- All other substances, except the mind, are similar in that none of them is the internal sense-organ and has eight attributes (*anantaḥkaraṇatva* and *anaṣṭ-aguṇavattva*); therefore this is a dissimilarity of the mind from the remaining eight substances.⁸⁹
- Not being inhered in by viscosity and natural liquidity (*nīḥsnehatva* and *akledatva*) is the similarity for eight substances barring water (which is a substratum for these two attributes).
- Not being hot to the touch and consequently not burning anything (*anuṣṇatva* and *adāhakatva*) is the similarity for eight substances except fire (which possesses both of these properties).
- Being inhered in by natural touch (*apākaḥ-sparśavattva*) is the similarity for water, fire and air (while this is a dissimilarity for earth, since it is inhered with the kind of touch which changes due to application of heat [*pāka*]).

- Water and fire are inhered in by the natural colour (*apākaja-rūpavattva*) while earth has a type of colour which is changed after applying heat to the earthly object.
- Air, ether, space, time and mind are not to be grasped by any of the sense-organs (*atīndriyatva*) while out of the remaining four substances, the self is mentally perceptible and earth, water and fire by the olfactory, gustatory and visual sense organs respectively.⁹⁰
- Self and the mind are able to operate only when endowed with a body (*śarīrāvacchedena vṛttilābha*), while this does not apply to other substances).
- Starting from air, all the six substances are similar in that they do not have colour (*nīrupatva*) while the remaining three do have it.
- Starting from ether, all the five substances are devoid of touch (*sparśaśūnyatva*) while the remaining four are inhered in by touch.
- Time, space, self and the mind are similar because they never cease to be (*abhūtatva*).⁹¹

Similarities among attributes

Now that the similarities (and dissimilarities) among the six categories and nine substances have been discussed, it is appropriate to point out the similarities among attributes as available in classical Vaiśeṣika sources. This is discussed by Praśastapāda as follows:

All the attributes (24 according to Praśastapāda) beginning from colour, have four similarities, namely:

- Being inhered in by a sub-class called ‘attributeness’ (*guṇatva*).⁹² This similarity is in fact the dissimilarity or distinguishing feature of attributes from substances as well as activities and other remaining categories.⁹³
- All the attributes are inherent in any one of the substances, it means that they are always secondary to substances.⁹⁴

Although Praśastapāda had already indicated that all the categories except partless ones are dependent and non-eternal,⁹⁵ here it is being reiterated with a specific purpose. Vyomaśiva explains it by saying that here it is meant to emphasise two aspects of attributes: first that they inhere in substances, and second the dependence of attributes upon substances. Otherwise substance, activity and particularity may also inhere in substances, but they are not always dependent on substances. Likewise, both universal and inherence subsist in substances, but besides this, they also subsist in attributes and activity. In brief, the attributes are inherent only in substances (and not in attributes or activity); and they are always dependent on substances, i.e. never available without referring to a substance. Therefore we never find a substance without any attribute⁹⁶ (however, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas might hold on a logical basis that in the initial moment of its production, the substance in the form of an effect stays without any attribute).⁹⁷

Here a question might arise because out of the six categories accepted in classical Vaiśeṣika, inference does not inhere anywhere while all the remaining five categories are inherent in substance: how can *dravyāśritatvam* be a similarity only for the attributes?

Udayana answers that the attributes always inhere in substances as secondary (while the substances are held to be primary); they are neither non-inherent like inference, nor inhere in some substances randomly like activity. Likewise, the attributes are also not non-inherent like select substances and do not inhere in non-substances like universal. So it is the conclusive and exclusive sense of *dravyāśritatvam* of attributes.⁹⁸

Note that the above similarity among all the attributes is only for elucidating the nature of attributes and not for distinguishing it from other categories because, as stated above, it is also available in other categories like substances and activity.⁹⁹

- The third similarity among all the attributes propounded in Vaiśeṣika is that they are devoid of properties (*nirguṇatvam*). It means that one attribute cannot produce another attribute according to Vaiśeṣika, otherwise there will be the fallacy of *infinite regress* (*anavasthā doṣa*).¹⁰⁰ From this point of view, statements like ‘a colour’, ‘limited word’ etc., where a number or qualifying epithet is ascribed to a particular attribute, should be taken to be metaphorical. Similarly, the property of number cannot inhere in any attribute because of the above assertion.¹⁰¹
- Last comes the fourth similarity among all the 24 attributes according to Vaiśeṣika, and that is being bereft of activity (*niṣkriyatvam*). In other words, activity does not pertain to properties. It may be doubted that when a particular substance moves its attributes also appear to be moving, but the Vaiśeṣika response to this would be that activity inheres in corporeal substances only and just as movement of an object makes it appear to be the activity of the widest universal, i.e. ‘*sattā*’, similarly it is just an appearance and not reality. If anything is accepted only on the basis of appearance, then everything will have to be accepted as moving.¹⁰²

Similarities and dissimilarities among different groups of attributes

After enunciating common characteristics among the 24 attributes, Praśastapāda goes on to discuss similarities and dissimilarities among different sets of attributes depending upon their affiliation with different groups of substances:

Corporeal, non-corporeal and dual types of attributes

Ten attributes – colour, taste, smell, touch, remoteness, proximity, weight, liquidity, viscosity and velocity – are corporeal (*mūrta*) because these are ascribed to substances with limited magnitude only.¹⁰³

Śrīdhara explains this by stating that five out of these ten attributes enumerated above, colour, touch, remoteness, proximity and velocity, inhere in earth, water and fire; three out of these five (excluding colour and touch) are inherent in mind; taste and weight are available in earth and water; liquidity in earth, water and fire; while smell inheres in earth alone.¹⁰⁴

Vyomaśīva elaborates on this in a more precise manner and clarifies that these ten attributes are characterised as corporeal because they are ascribed only to the corporeal substances, but it should not be mistaken that only these ten are the attributes of corporeal substances, since they have other attributes as well. He goes on to illustrate that colour and liquidity etc. are inherent in three substances beginning from earth; weight and taste in two; touch in four; smell only in earth; taste only in water; while remoteness, proximity and velocity are in all the five corporal substances.¹⁰⁵

- Another set of ten attributes – cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, mental impression and sound – are inherent in non-corporeal substances only.¹⁰⁶ Again it needs to be emphasised that these attributes are ascribed only to the non-corporeal substances and not that the non-corporeal substances have only these attributes, because there are other attributes, such as number, which inhere in non-corporeal substances. Of these ten attributes, the first nine inhere in the self while the last, sound, inheres in ether.¹⁰⁷
- The third set of five attributes, number, magnitude, severalty, conjunction and disjunction, are inherent in both types of substances – corporeal as well as non-corporeal. Therefore, these have been characterised as ‘ubhayaguṇā’.¹⁰⁸

Attributes inhering in more than one substance and inhering in one substance

- Conjunction, disjunction, dual number (*dvitva saṁklyā*), dual severalty (*dvipṛthakṭva*) etc. are such attributes which are (simultaneously) available in more than one, i.e. at least two substances.¹⁰⁹ The term ‘*ādi*’ denotes that there may be a situation when these attributes inhere in more than two substances.¹¹⁰
- Remaining attributes (except the above-mentioned four) inhere in one substance each at a time.¹¹¹ It means that colour, taste, smell, touch, oneness, single severalty, magnitude, remoteness, proximity, weight, liquidity, viscosity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, mental impression and sound inhere in a single substance each.¹¹²

Specific attributes and generic attributes

- Colour, taste, smell, touch, viscosity, liquidity caused by some external factor, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, mental impression and sound – these 16 attributes are similar in the sense that they are all specific attributes.¹¹³ If it be asked what is specific about them, the

Vaiśeṣika response would be that the term specific, i.e. 'viśeṣa', signifies differentiation, hence they are characterised as specific attributes.¹¹⁴ It means that just as the colour of a particular object differentiates its substratum from others due to its luminosity; likewise taste due to its sweetness, smell by its own nature, touch on account of heat etc., viscosity by its stickiness, natural liquidity by its own nature and cognition etc., by their own specificity distinguish their substrata from other substances.¹¹⁵ Therefore, these are all specific attributes.

- The remaining attributes – number, magnitude, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, liquidity caused by some external factor and velocity – are generic attributes.¹¹⁶ These are similar because all of these attributes are commonly available in their substrata but they cannot differentiate one substratum from another.¹¹⁷ For example, number one or two might pertain to a particular object, but it cannot distinguish that object from another object which is also inhered by number one or two; whatever difference exists between those two objects is actually due to their different substrata and not because of their number.

Attributes to be grasped by any one or two of the external sense organs, by internal sense organ and not to be grasped by any sense organ

- Sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell – these five attributes are similar because each of these is to be grasped by one external sense-organ respectively.¹¹⁸
- Number, magnitude, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, liquidity, viscosity and velocity – these ten attributes are similar in the sense that they are all grasped by two external sense-organs, i.e. eye and touch.¹¹⁹
- Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort are similar because they can only be grasped by the internal organ.¹²⁰

Interestingly Śrīdhara has raised several significant objections from the opposing side regarding cognisability of cognition itself, most of which cannot be discussed here but one is worth mentioning: how can cognition itself be grasped by the mind if it is inherent in the self and produced by the objects and sense-organs, particularly when the self is also not essentially conscious? To this, he has responded by saying that the natural law of causality itself is the determining factor in such cases. For example, although the threads are not the cloth, yet the cloth inheres in them only and not in the loom etc., similarly even though the self is not conscious by nature, yet cognition is inherent in it.¹²¹

- Weight, merit, demerit and mental impression – these four attributes cannot be grasped by any of the sense-organs, external or internal.¹²² Therefore they are characterised as *atīndriya*, i.e. these have in fact transcended the sense organs.¹²³

Attributes produced by the properties in the inherent cause of their substrata or not produced by those

- Natural colour, taste, smell and touch; magnitude, oneness, single severalty, weight, liquidity, viscosity and velocity – these 11 attributes of the Vaiśeṣika list belong to the first kind, because they are preceded by the attributes of the respective inherent causes of their substrata.¹²⁴ For example the colour of the cloth is produced by the colour of the threads and not otherwise.¹²⁵
- Udayana clarifies that the attribute of velocity in the above list is also indicative of elasticity, since that is also preceded by the respective attributes of its inherent cause. This is in fact a similarity among the above-mentioned 11 attributes, so even when velocity is produced by activity, there is no fallacy of over-pervasion.¹²⁶
- Ten attributes – i.e. cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, mental impression and sound – are not produced by the respective properties of inherent causes of their substrata, i.e. self and ether. This is so because the substrata of these ten attributes are in fact eternal and they do not have any inherent causes.¹²⁷

Udayana has added that the above-mentioned ten attributes are invariably ‘*akāraṇaḡuṇapūrvakāḥ*’, while there are other attributes not mentioned here – conjunction, disjunction, velocity and liquidity caused by some external factor – which are also not produced by the properties of the inherent causes of their substrata, but they are not always of that type because sometimes they are also seen to be produced by the properties of their inherent causes.¹²⁸

Attributes produced either by conjunction or activity or disjunction or mental understanding

- There are 19 attributes which have been listed as being produced by conjunction: cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, mental impression, sound, magnitude of cotton (etc.), subsequent conjunction, liquidity caused by some external factor, remoteness and proximity along with the four specific attributes of earth substance which change due to application of heat.¹²⁹

The commentators have explained each of the above-mentioned attributes separately and the type of conjunction which produces them as non-inherent cause.¹³⁰ Accordingly, specific attributes of the self beginning from cognition are produced due to conjunction between self and the mind; sound of a specific sort is produced due to contact between a drum and ether; voluminous magnitude of cotton etc. is affected by a peculiar type of loose contact termed ‘*pracaya*’ in Vaiśeṣika sources; subsequent conjunction is created by the preceding conjunction, liquidity in butter etc. is generated due to contact of fire; remoteness and proximity are produced by the conjunction of space and time with a specific object; colour,

taste, smell and touch in earthly atoms are produced by the chemical action which takes place after application of heat.¹³¹

Vyomaśiva clarifies here that only those attributes which are listed above, are produced by conjunction, but it does not mean that they are produced by conjunction alone, since they can also be produced otherwise, e.g. sound can also be produced either by sound or by disjunction.¹³²

- Three attributes – conjunction, disjunction and velocity – are produced by activity.¹³³ Only a particular type of conjunction and disjunction, i.e. the first one of a series of these two, are affected by activity (whereas the succeeding ones are created by different causes).¹³⁴ Similarly, the attribute of velocity is produced by activity, only when it is available in a substance which does not possess velocity.¹³⁵

Here again, it is noteworthy that the above-mentioned attributes are grouped together due to similarity in their productive causes, but it does not in any way restrict their production from other causes also.¹³⁶

- Sound and subsequent disjunction – these two attributes are produced by disjunction.¹³⁷ Śrīdhara clarifies that although these two attributes have been listed as similar, there is a subtle distinction in the sense that the first sound can be produced by disjunction also while the succeeding disjunction is produced by disjunction alone.¹³⁸
- Remoteness, proximity, dual number and double severalty are dependent on our cognition.¹³⁹ It means that cognition is the instrumental cause in their production. Further, number three onwards as well as severalty of more than two objects should also be included here.¹⁴⁰

Attributes giving rise to their similar, dissimilar, similar and dissimilar attributes

- Nine attributes are similar on account of their causality in affecting their likes; colour, taste, smell, touch excluding hot touch, sound, magnitude, singular number, severalty of one object and viscosity give rise to their similar properties.¹⁴¹ It means that a particular colour causes the same colour, smell affects smell like its own, touch causes touch of its kind and so on. However, the term '*ārambhaka*' (cause) signifies causality in general and does not mean being the non-inherent cause, otherwise the epithet '*anuṣṇa*' (not hot) in the above statement will be incongruent, because hot touch is also the instrumental cause of its dissimilar properties like colour etc. and the non-inherent cause of its like, i.e. hot touch.¹⁴² In fact, the term *anuṣṇa* is used here to exclude hot touch which can produce both types of touch, i.e. like and unlike of itself.¹⁴³

- Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort are similar in the sense that they give rise to attributes which are not like themselves.¹⁴⁴ For example, pleasure causes desire, pain produces aversion, both desire and aversion give rise to effort and effort in turn generates activity.¹⁴⁵
- Conjunction, disjunction, number, weight, liquidity, hot touch, cognition, merit, demerit and mental impression produce properties of both kinds, i.e. like and unlike of themselves.¹⁴⁶ To illustrate: on the one hand conjunction can cause subsequent conjunction which is like itself; on the other hand when two piles of cotton conjoin, the same conjunction can give rise to a large magnitude which is totally unlike it. Similarly disjunction can cause disjunction and also sound etc.¹⁴⁷ Udayana says that the similar attributes caused by these ten attributes need not be mentioned because they are well-known, but the dissimilar ones are worth explaining: conjunction (which is an attribute) gives rise to a totally dissimilar category, i.e. substance; disjunction can cause severalty; number can produce magnitude; falling ensues from weight; flowing follows from liquidity, agglutination from viscosity, and from hot touch (or heat) are colour, taste, smell and touch – which are not like it.¹⁴⁸

Attributes causing effects in the objects inherent in their substrata, non-inherent in their substrata or in both of these

- Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, mental impression and sound give rise to their effects which are inherent in their respective substrata.¹⁴⁹ For example cognition takes place in the self and generates mental impression there; pleasure gives rise to desire in the self only; aversion ensues from pain and desire causes memory and effort in the self itself. Likewise sound generates sound in ether only where it is inhering itself.¹⁵⁰
- Colour, taste, smell, touch, magnitude, viscosity and effort are similar because they give rise to such effects which are not inherent in their substrata.¹⁵¹ For example, the colour etc. of parts produces colour etc. in the whole (which is a different entity according to the Vaiśeṣika view). Likewise the attribute called effort which is inherent in the self creates activity in the parts of the body.¹⁵²
- Conjunction, disjunction, number, severalty from one object, weight, liquidity, velocity, merit and demerit produce effects in both, i.e. their substrata and elsewhere.¹⁵³

The commentators have elaborated on this statement: conjunction creates an effect in its own substratum and also otherwise when the contact between drum and ether causes sound; disjunction between two parts of the bamboo stick causes disjunction in its own substratum but creates sound elsewhere; number of the cause produces number and magnitude in its effect (which is different from itself) and also creates number in its own locus; likewise merit causes pleasure in oneself but produces activity elsewhere, i.e. in fire etc.¹⁵⁴

- Weight, liquidity, velocity, effort, merit, demerit and a particular type of conjunction are similar because they cause activity of one form or the other.¹⁵⁵ For example weight causes falling, liquidity causes flowing, velocity causes gyrating, effort gives rise to action, merit and demerit produce earthquake etc., and particular types of contacts like pressure and impact produce motion in arrows etc.¹⁵⁶

Attributes which are non-inherent causes, instrumental causes, both of these causes together or none of these causes at all

- Colour, taste, smell, touch except hot touch, number, magnitude, severality from one, viscosity and sound are non-inherent causes.¹⁵⁷ A non-inherent cause has been defined as a cause which co-inheres in the inherent cause and whose potency as a cause is well-determined. The co-inherence has again been divided in two kinds, simple co-inherence in the inherent cause or co-inherence in the same object along with the inherent cause.¹⁵⁸ For example, self (being a substance) is the inherent cause of pleasure, pain etc. but therein inheres the contact (an attribute) between self and the mind (which causes pleasure and pain) – this is the first type of non-inherent cause for all the specific attributes of the self; other attributes of the self do not have the potency to produce any of the specific attributes of the self. Similarly, cloth is the inherent cause of its colour, and the colour of the threads is inherent in the threads, therefore ‘co-inherence of the colour (of the threads) in the threads along with the colour of the cloth’ (which is the inherent cause of the cloth) is the non-inherent cause of the second type.¹⁵⁹
- Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit and mental impression are instrumental causes.¹⁶⁰ It means that these are only instrumental causes and not the non-inherent causes.¹⁶¹ It is an established view of Vaiśeṣika scholars that attributes can never be the inherent cause of anything, since substance alone is the inherent cause according to them. Therefore, being instrumental causes means that these attributes are no doubt causal factors, but excluding both, the inherent as well as non-inherent cause.¹⁶²
- Conjunction, disjunction, hot touch, weight, liquidity and velocity are causes of both types, i.e. non-inherent as well as instrumental.¹⁶³ For example conjunction of drum and stick is the instrumental cause in production of sound, while conjunction of drum with ether is the non-inherent cause for the same. Likewise, disjunction of two parts of one bamboo is the instrumental cause while the disjunction of one bamboo part with ether is the non-inherent cause for the production of sound. Similarly hot touch inhering in the cause is the non-inherent cause of hot touch available in the effect; again hot touch is the instrumental cause for such type of colour etc. which changes with the application of heat; weight [*gurutva*] is the non-inherent cause of falling down [*patana*] of its own substratum, a heavy object falls down due to its weight. Weight is also the instrumental cause of activities [*kriyā*] like pressure [*nodana*] and impact [*abhighāta*] etc., i.e. this type of activity takes place due to weight.¹⁶⁴

- Further, liquidity is the instrumental cause of agglutination (*samgraha*) and non-inherent cause of velocity (*vega*) as well as dripping (*syandana*). Velocity is the non-inherent cause of velocity and going (*gamana*) in general while an instrumental cause of impact (*abhighāta*).¹⁶⁵
- Remoteness, proximity, dual severalty and the rest of the attributes are not causally efficient.¹⁶⁶ It means that these are neither non-inherent cause nor instrumental cause for anything.¹⁶⁷

Interestingly, here Vyomaśiva has raised a question from the opponent's side as to how these attributes can be stated to be similar on the grounds that they are neither type of cause to any effect, since they are also causally efficient in production of cognition. To this, he responds that of course they are causally efficient in that case but here it is intended to convey the idea of causality in general. He has also clarified that these attributes are common in the sense that they are not causally efficient, but it does not mean that not being causally efficient pertains to these attributes alone because there are others like specific magnitude of the atoms which are also not causally efficient.¹⁶⁸

Partially subsisting attributes and attributes that pervade the whole of their substrata

- Conjunction, disjunction, sound and the nine specific attributes of the self pervade only a part of their substrata, while remaining attributes extend in the whole.¹⁶⁹ It means that the former group of these attributes might subsist in one part of their substrata while they may not be available in the other part. It might seem incongruous at first, but a closer look removes the inconsistency. For example, conjunction between a big tree and a person signifies that there is a contact with the upper branch of the tree and not with the whole tree as such, since the roots are not even visible.¹⁷⁰ Likewise, sound is also non-pervasive because it does not extend up to the whole of its substratum, i.e. ether; and specific attributes of the self are only internally perceived and not externally. On the other hand, colour etc. are perceived in the whole of the substratum, so they pertain to the latter group of attributes.¹⁷¹
- The remaining attributes (except the above-mentioned ones) are extensive in the whole of their substrata.¹⁷² In other words colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude, severalty, weight, liquidity, viscosity, velocity, elasticity, remoteness and proximity are similar in the sense that they pervade the whole of their substrata.¹⁷³

Attributes co-extensive with their substrata and otherwise

- Natural colour, taste, smell and touch (which are not produced by application of heat), magnitude, single severalty, natural liquidity, weight and viscosity are similar in the sense that they exist as long as their substrata are present.¹⁷⁴ It means that these attributes perish only when their loci are destroyed and not otherwise.¹⁷⁵

- Attributes other than those enumerated above do not last as long as their substrata,¹⁷⁶ rather they are destroyed even while their substrata exist.¹⁷⁷

Praśastapāda and his commentators have drawn out a long list of similarities and dissimilarities among different groups of attributes. However, one of the commentators, Udayana, says that this list is only suggestive and not exhaustive, so one should go on employing these methods for exploring further similarities and dissimilarities among various categories. He has himself added a long list to the above which needs to be elucidated as follows:

- 'Not being inhered in by colourness or tasteness' is the similarity among all other attributes except colour or taste etc.
- 'Being specific attribute of corporeal substances' is the similarity among natural liquidity, colour, taste, touch and viscosity.
- 'Being endowed with touch' is the similarity among colour, taste, smell, viscosity, weight, liquidity and elasticity.¹⁷⁸
- 'Subsisting in water alone' is the similarity among viscosity, cold touch and natural liquidity.
- 'Subsisting in fire alone' is the similarity between hot touch and luminosity.
- 'Being attributes of earth and water' is the similarity between taste and weight.
- 'Subsisting in earth alone' is the similarity among smell, all types of taste except sweetness and all types of colour barring white.
- 'Being specific attributes of the self' is a common characteristic of all the nine attributes: cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit and mental impression.
- Colour and liquidity are similar since they subsist only in earth, water and fire.¹⁷⁹
- 'Liquidity caused due to some external factor' is dissimilar from all other attributes because it subsists only in earth and fire.
- 'Being produced by the application of heat' is the similarity among liquidity caused due to some external factors and colour, taste, smell and touch of earthly atoms.
- 'Causing magnitude' is the similarity among number, magnitude and loose conjunction.
- 'Being a cause of sound' is the similarity among conjunction, disjunction and sound.¹⁸⁰
- 'Being instrumental in causing impact' is the similarity among touch, weight, effort and velocity only.
- 'Producing attributes which subsist in more than one' is the similarity among singular number, single severalty, conjunction and disjunction only.
- 'Being produced by space, time and material objects' is the similarity between remoteness and proximity only.
- 'Being destroyed by the destruction of their efficient cause' is the similarity among remoteness, proximity, highest knowledge, dual number and dual severalty etc. only.

- Attributes other than those just mentioned above are similar in the sense that they are destroyed by the destruction of other attributes.
- Produced attributes are similar in the sense that they are destroyed by the destruction of their respective substrata.
- 'Eternity and not being produced' are the similarities among colour, taste, touch and smell of non-earthly atoms, natural liquidity, viscosity, weight, elasticity, eternal substances, singular number, single severalty, magnitude, cognition, desire and effort of God.
- The rest of the attributes are similar in the sense that they are non-eternal and are produced.¹⁸¹

Classical Vaiśeṣika scholars have followed Kaṇāda in adopting the twin methods of knowing suggested by him and have set a trend in this respect. There is no doubt that these methods can be elaborated further for knowing the true nature of reals as propounded by the system of Vaiśeṣika.

5 Modes and means of knowing (*jñāna-prakāra* and *pramāṇas*)

As already explained, Vaiśeṣika is primarily concerned with the essential knowledge of the six (or seven in the later tradition of Vaiśeṣika) categories. Hence a discussion on the nature and types of knowledge¹ is entirely relevant to the system of Vaiśeṣika. Kaṇāda has expounded that basically there are two types of knowledge: non-veridical (*avidyā*)² and veridical (*vidyā*).³ It should be clarified here that the term ‘*avidyā*’ does not denote ignorance (*ajñāna*) as held in the Vedāntic view. In Vaiśeṣika it simply suggests that type of knowing condition wherein the object could not be known properly:

Kaṇāda now sets himself to dealing with what he takes to be the main question regarding knowledge, after the digression he has allowed himself for explicating the conception of the self and the mind. He refers (VS, 8/1/1) the reader explicitly to the definition of knowledge (*jñānam vyākhyātam*) given while dealing with the substances (*dravṇṣu*) (*sic.*) (VS, 3/1/18). He makes it clear that he takes knowledge to initiate with the self by merely observing now, that the self and the mind (*ātmā manāṁsi*) are not evident to perception (*a-pratyakṣhē*) as the sense-organs obviously are. But this fact does not come in the way of our mapping out the field of knowledge, since what counts for the purpose, is the operative rule (*vidhih*) in terms of which knowledge results. Kaṇāda takes the main problem here to be, to mark the grounds of certainty in respect of the various types of knowledge. And for Kaṇāda the types of knowledge are determined by the categories.

(Gajendragadkar 1988, p. 246)

Kaṇāda does not define knowledge as such, nor does he dwell upon the types of non-veridical knowing in detail, but Praśastapāda has talked of four types of incorrect knowing and discussed their details even before the types of valid knowing are enumerated by him;⁴ his commentators have followed this pattern.⁵

Two modes of knowing: non-veridical and veridical (*avidyā* and *vidyā*)

Here a question might arise as to what is the reason for accepting so many types of knowledge? Praśastapāda anticipated this question and has answered that since

there are so many types of objects and each type of object is cognised independently, hence there have to be several types of knowledge too.⁶ It is therefore that although there can be innumerable types of knowing due to the diversity of knowable objects, Kaṇāda has talked broadly of two types of knowing – incorrect and correct. As regards the definition of cognition (*buddhi*), Praśastapāda has simply stated its synonyms.⁷ His commentator Udayana explains this by saying that it is sufficient to remark that ‘cognition is knowledge’, i.e. it is that cognition through which an after-cognition in the form of ‘I know’ takes place. Still its synonyms are given so as to reject the views of other philosophical schools in Indian philosophical tradition who define it in different ways. For example, the Sāṃkhyas say that ‘*buddhi*’ is the first transformation of primordial matter, i.e. ‘*prakṛti*’ which is termed as ‘*mahat*’ and is held to be a special sort of ‘*antaḥkaraṇa*’. It is emphasised, therefore, that this notion of cognition propounded by the Sāṃkhyas is not correct, while the four terms used by Praśastapāda – knowledge (*buddhi*), becoming aware (*upalabdhi*), knowing (*jñānam*) and understanding (*pratyaya*) – are synonyms and denote the correct notion of cognition in common parlance.⁸

Four modes of non-veridical knowing: *avidyā*

As mentioned above, Praśastapāda describes how out of the two types of knowledge enumerated by Kaṇāda, the former is again subdivided in four types:

- doubt (*saṁśaya*);
- error (*viparyaya*);
- irresolute cognition (*anadhyavasāya*);
- dream (*svapna*).⁹

Doubt (saṁśaya)

This is the first type of knowing classified under ‘invalid knowledge’ by Kaṇāda. According to the definition provided by him, doubt arises due to three reasons:

- when one can perceive only the general attribute of an object;
- when the specific properties of that particular object are not being perceived;
- but those imperceptible specific properties are recalled by the cogniser.¹⁰

All of the three factors listed above lead the agent of knowing to a consideration which is oscillating between two options so that he is not able to decide which one of the options is right. Such a doubtful cognition can be of two types, external and internal: the former depends on those features which are seen while the latter depends on unseen attributes.¹¹

Praśastapāda has revised the above definition of doubt and enumerated the three factors:

- when several specific attributes of the two objects are popularly known;
- but currently only the general similarities are visible;

- however, later on even when the cogniser recollects their specific attributes, he is still not able to decide about the real nature of the object in a case due to his own demerit (*adharma*).¹²

For example, when somebody goes to the forest and sees only the horns of an animal, but is not able to decide whether it is a cow or another animal who looks like a cow. Similarly when only the height of two objects, namely a pole and a human being is visible but their specific attributes are not, then the cogniser is in doubt: is it a pole or a person?

According to Kaṇāda, the internal doubt is caused due to the type of knowledge that inheres in the cogniser and one cognises the same object as a substratum of two contrary features.¹³ For example, there are divergent opinions regarding the eternity of self. So when any ignorant person hears contradictory views with reference to it, one is not able to decide and consequently is in doubt.¹⁴

Vyomaśiva has explained the nature of doubt by deriving an etymology for the word '*saṁśaya*', i.e. *saṁśaya* is the type of knowing in which the self is as if made to sleep. In this state the self is oscillating between two options as to whether this is so or not.¹⁵

Udayana says that doubt is always a cause of misery, otherwise there will be no ground for avoiding it and desiring to know the reality.¹⁶

According to Śaṅkara Miśra, doubt is the type of knowledge which has many contrary characters about a single object.¹⁷

Error (*viparyaya*)

As the original Sanskrit epithet '*viparyaya*' suggests, erroneous cognition is just the opposite of what it should have been. It also occurs in the case of the objects which could either be perceived or inferred.

Praśastapāda has defined error as the opposite cognition of an object which is otherwise totally different. In other words, knowing 'A' as 'B' because of several similarities between them is termed error by Vaiśeṣika scholars. It occurs either in cases of perception or of inference. This type of cognition is caused due to some defect/deficiency in the sense-organ which is the result of physiological imbalances. There are, in fact, three reasons for such contrary cognition: lack of proper understanding of the object, conjunction between the self and mind regarding a distant object which was cognised earlier but has left an impression and demerit of the agent.¹⁸ For example when there is no perception but one presumes to have perceived something¹⁹ like seeing of darkness in the night (which is actually imperceptible) to be a mass of collyrium; or when a person sees a cow but mistakes it for a horse then it is a case of error; or when somebody looks at steam but mistakes it for smoke and infers fire in the water. There are other cases of error when people misunderstand some notions in a way which is not according to the real nature of the object such as understanding the body, sense-organ or mind as substitutes for the conscious principle known as self etc.²⁰

Udayana has observed that there are two types of erroneous cognition:

- One that is experienced by ordinary persons.
- The other which is experienced by the wise.

He puts the examples cited in cases of error regarding cow and horse or smoke and steam under the former, while the error occurring due to incorrect notions of reality is classified under the latter.²¹

Irresolute cognition (anadhyavasāya)

This type of cognition takes place when we are not sure about the true nature of a thing and wonder as to what it can be. This also occurs in cases where perception or inference should otherwise have taken place, but could not, because either the cognising agent was engrossed in something else or did not have the prior specific knowledge of that particular object. For example, somebody who is carrying a cart full of jack fruits is not aware of the specific name or nature of the load, then one will be wondering ‘what could it be?’²²

Such an irresolute cognition is classified under imperfect knowledge according to Vaiśeṣika. In such cases as of perceptual nature, the agent is perceiving the object, as well as its attributes, and is also aware of its class character, but does not know its exact designation and relation between the name and the object. This is quite like the indeterminate perception.²³ In other instances where such cognition is of an inferential nature, a person who is staying in coastal areas and has never seen a cow and happens to see only the dewlaps of a cow for the first time, will obviously be wondering about the specific class of animal to whom it actually pertains.²⁴

Dream (svapna)

Kaṇāda says that the process of dream is just like that of memory.²⁵ In other words, just as memory occurs by a typical conjunction between self and the mind, similarly dream too follows this type of conjunction. Dream cognition takes place when the sense-organs have stopped functioning and have retired. Thereafter it is only the internal organ mind which becomes active and presents a mental universe wherein the individual self experiences several objects due to its own merits and demerits. The mental activity is supported by this unseen force of the self which activates vital airs within the body. In this state the self and mind are conjoined and a particular type of impression termed as ‘*svāpa*’, i.e. a special sort of conjunction between the self and the mind,²⁶ gives rise to dream which has the appearance of a perception but is different from it, because it pertains to the objects which are not present.²⁷

It is therefore that one dreams of those people as living who are not even born, and of those persons as dead who are still alive and as aged ones who are quite young.²⁸

Dreams have been classified in three types depending upon their causes:

- psychological (*saṃskārapātāvavajanya*);
- physiological (*dhātudoṣajanya*);
- occurring due to the unseen force (*adr̥ṣṭajanya*).²⁹

Detailed explanations with examples of all of the three types enumerated above have been provided in Vaiśeṣika texts:

- When somebody is constantly thinking about a particular person or object, then one also experiences, the same in one's dream. It so happens due to mental involvement and is covered under psychological disturbance.³⁰
- When there is inequality of wind, bile or phlegm respectively (*vāta*, *pitta*, *kapha*) within the body, then the person dreams as if one is flying in the sky, entering into fire or floating in the sea etc. Obviously, the three elements - air, fire and water – which are represented by the triple principles within the body give rise to such dreams which are rooted in physiological imbalance.
- Sometimes there are such strange dreams – both good and bad – which cannot be otherwise explained because they are never known by the experiencer. For example, riding an elephant or receiving a royal umbrella etc. These types of dreams may be ascribed to the merits (*dharma*) accrued by the agent and his mental impressions. On the other hand, there may be dreams like oil massage, riding an ass or a camel etc. which are ascribed to demerits (*adharma*) of the agent associated with his mental impressions. There is a third type of dreams which are totally unknown to anyone such as melting of the Sun which cannot be reasonably explained and so are characterised as being caused due to the unseen force (*adr̥ṣṭa*).³¹

Vaiśeṣika scholars have clarified that dream cognitions are different from other forms of non-veridical cognition.³² Kaṇāda has also mentioned 'svapnāntika', i.e. a 'dream within a dream'³³ while his commentators have explained this as a type of remembrance.³⁴

As regards the difference between experience of the waking state and dream, Vallabha has discussed the issue in detail and has stated that the above difference is known by the means of perceptive cognition.³⁵

Four modes of veridical knowing: (*vidyā*)

After delineating the details of incorrect knowing, Praśastapāda goes on to discuss the four types of correct cognition delineated by Kaṇāda³⁶ himself:

- perceptive cognition (*pratyakṣajñānam*);
- inferential cognition (*laiṅgikajñānam*);
- recollective cognition (*smṛtījñānam*);
- intuitive cognition (*āṛṣajñānam*).³⁷

Four modes of knowing are stated in classical Vaiṣeṣika but only two means of knowing are accepted therein: perception (*pratyakṣam*) and inference (*laiṅgikam*); the two accepted by Nyāya (analogy and verbal testimony) have been included in perception and inference only.

As already mentioned, Kaṇāda himself has enumerated these four modes of knowing, but the credit for presenting their systematic and detailed discussion in classical Vaiṣeṣika tradition goes to Praśastapāda. A brief description of the four modes is given below.

Perceptive cognition (pratyakṣajñānam)

Kaṇāda has discussed perceptive cognition in the eighth chapter of his aphorisms. According to one of the modern exponents ‘The most important sūtras on direct cognition are Vaiṣeṣika sūtras 8.5–9’,³⁸ where Kaṇāda describes the cognition of universals, particularity, substance, attribute and activity respectively. In these sūtras he has hinted at the ‘causal triad’ (*kāraṇatraya*) – the qualifier, the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand and the cognition of the qualified.³⁹

Accordingly, perceptive cognition⁴⁰ is defined as a cognition which arises out of any of the six sense-organs, since the sense-organs are already stated to be six in number:

- olfactory (*ghrāṇaja*);
- gustatory (*rāsana*);
- visual (*cākṣuṣa*);
- tactual (*tvāca*);
- auditory (*śrotraja*);
- internal one (*mānasa*).⁴¹

Perceptive cognition has also been stated to be sixfold in Vaiṣeṣika.⁴² The number six has been purposely mentioned because there are schools like Sāṃkhya in Indian philosophy which accept eleven types of sense-organs, and Buddhists who accept only five sense-organs.⁴³ The elucidation of perception comes first in order of preference, since it is the cause of all other types of cognitions; thereafter comes remembrance which is rooted in the experience of objects perceived or inferred. Intuition is discussed last because it pertains to extraordinary persons.⁴⁴

Perceptive cognition is in fact the direct and exact form of knowing⁴⁵ which pertains to categories like substance etc. The specific sense conveyed by the term ‘etc.’ is expressed by Śrīdhara, who clarifies that only four categories are perceptible: substance, attribute, activity and class character, and the remaining two categories, particularity and inherence, are only to be inferred.⁴⁶

Further, Praśastapāda says that the substances are perceived in two ways:

- mere apprehension (*svarūpālocanamātram*);
- true knowledge (*avitatathamavyapadeśyam*).

The first type of perceptive cognition takes place when the object is merely observed as undivided due to collocation of three conditions:

- manifested colour;
- light;
- contact among the individual self, mind, sense-organ and the object.⁴⁷

The latter type of perception occurs when all these conducive factors are already present, but when the common and specific attributes of the qualifications like substance, attributes and activity etc. are also taken into account.⁴⁸

As far as the distinction between the process and result of perceptive cognition is concerned, the Vaiśeṣika view is clearly formulated by Praśastapāda:

- When mere apprehension is the means (*pramāṇa*) for cognising the general and specific objects then those objects, i.e. substance etc. are to be cognised (*prameya*), individual self is the cogniser (*pramātā*) and the clear understanding (*savikalpaka*) of those objects is the result (*pramiti*) of knowing.⁴⁹
- When the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka*) itself is understood as the result of cognising, then the same undivided observation also acts as a means for cognition; there is no possibility of any other means being present because indeterminate perception is not the result of any other cognition.⁵⁰

Śrīdhara has further explained the above statement of Praśastapāda by saying that the understanding of a qualified object (*viśeṣyajñānam*) is the result of knowing its adjectival attribute (*viśeṣaṇajñānam*), but the latter cannot be taken to be a result of any other cognition, since this will lead to *infinite regress*. Therefore, it is more logical to hold that the only means for indeterminate cognition is the contact between sense-organ and object.⁵¹

Praśastapāda has also offered a third alternative in this regard: for directly cognising all the perceptible objects, it should be noted that after a contact among the four factors (individual self, mind, sense organ and the object) is established and an exact but inexplicable understanding arises, then the same understanding is the means for perception, the substances etc. being cognised are the objects, the individual self is the cogniser and the result of this cognition is an understanding which enables the cogniser to decide whether the object so known is worth acquiring, rejecting or indifference.⁵²

Praśastapāda has not used explicit terms such as indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) or determinate (*savikalpaka*) while discussing the types of perceptive knowledge, but his commentators of the later period have tried to incorporate the terminology as well as the concepts prevalent in the later period of Vaiśeṣika under the influence of Nyāya, as has been remarked by a later exponent of Vaiśeṣika: 'Here, we have at least the germ of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of a clear-cut distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*.'⁵³

Inferential cognition (laiṅgikajñānam)

The knowledge arising after the cognition of reason (*liṅga* or *hetu*) is known as inferential cognition. Kaṇāda has defined inferential cognition as the one arising out of prior knowledge of the reason; which may be in the form of an effect, a cause, a conjunct, contradictory, or an inherent.⁵⁴ Kaṇāda has also given details of all these conditions. In other words, when two things are invariably co-existent but only one of those two is to be seen, the unseen one is known through the seen object. Of these two, the former is termed as '*liṅga*' and the latter as '*laiṅgika*', i.e. a cognition which is produced after knowing the *liṅga*. Vaiśeṣika commentator Śaṅkara Miśra has clarified that since the definition deals with inferential cognition, it pertains to the mode of knowing rather than the means of knowing.⁵⁵

Although Praśastapāda has used the term '*darśana*', i.e. 'seeing' in his definition, Śrīdhara has explained that it signifies an understanding and should not be taken in its literal sense, i.e. visual perception only.⁵⁶ Moreover the prefix '*saṁ*', meaning 'properly', used in the definition wards off the possibility of implying doubt, error or memory. Inferential cognition is enumerated as a type of correct knowing because it is produced after a valid understanding of the object, and all forms of correct cognition naturally represent the real nature of the knowable object.⁵⁷

Evidently, doubt and error are excluded from the scope of inferential cognition, because they do not present the knowable object as it is; remembrance also does not present the object in its true nature, because it is not produced after cognising the reason, but is dependent on earlier experience.⁵⁸

As the inferential cognition is based on an understanding of the reason (*liṅga*), so an exposition of the same is required to be duly delineated. Therefore Kaṇāda has defined it as a reason, means or instrument of knowing.⁵⁹ Praśastapāda has explained that *liṅga*, signifying a valid reason, must fulfil the following three conditions:

- concomitant in time or place with the object to be inferred (*sādhya*);
- residing in either the whole or part of something in which the object to be inferred, *sādhya* or *liṅgī*, resides;
- validly known to be absent from the whole of that which is different from the object to be inferred (*sādhya*).⁶⁰

After expounding the nature of valid reason (*liṅga*), Praśastapāda also explains that the above three conditions laid out in the definition of valid reason are to be taken collectively and not individually. Therefore, if any one or two out of the designated three conditions are missing, the reason will become invalid or fallacious and it will not be able to lead one to the correct inferential cognition.⁶¹ In fact, inference is based on logical reasoning, so it is essential to take care in case of the reason, otherwise the inferential mode of knowing can become invalid.

In view of the above, Vaiśeṣika scholars have also discussed the types of fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*). Kaṇāda himself has clearly mentioned three

types of fallacies only⁶² as has also been stated by Praśastapāda.⁶³ But there are some later commentators who opine that the term *ca* used in the aphorism of Kaṇāda also implies other two kinds of fallacies,⁶⁴ accepted in the later combined tradition of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya.

Inferential cognition is again subdivided in two types by Praśastapāda: seen (*dṛṣṭa*) and generally seen (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*). Out of these, the former one occurs when the reason (*liṅga*) and the thing to be inferred (*liṅgī*) have absolutely same universals, e.g. when one has seen dewlaps only on cows and infers from a subsequent seeing of a dewlap to the presence of a cow.⁶⁵ On the other hand, the second type of inference takes place when the reason and the thing to be inferred have absolutely different universals, but the cognising agent infers the object from the general concomitance of a property with the reason as well as the thing to be inferred. For example, when it is seen that persons pursuing various vocations such as agriculture, trade and service etc. are working with a purpose, i.e. to earn money, then it is inferred that even those other persons who are working without any visible purpose must nevertheless have a purpose.⁶⁶

Elaborating upon distinctions in this regard, Praśastapāda has clarified that the knowledge of smoke as reason is the means (*pramāṇa*) for inferential cognition while the knowledge of fire as an unseen object is the result of inference (*pramiti*). Alternatively, the knowledge of fire can be taken to be means of knowing and the knowledge of fire being beneficial, harmful or worth ignoring may be the result of inferential cognition. In both these cases, inference is employed as a means for one's own understanding, so these have been characterised as inference as a means of knowing something for one's own sake (*svārthānumāna*).⁶⁷

The relation between reason (*hetu*) and the object to be inferred (*sādhya*) is very important for the process of inference; the same is expressed through several terms as repeated observation (*bhūyodarśana*), concomitance (*sāhacarya*), concurrence (*sahabhāva*), invariable relation (*vyāpti*) and necessary connection of one thing with another (*avinābhāva*). Kaṇāda has explained this relation as the one arising from a definite cognition of the components (*avayavas*);⁶⁸ these components are the well-known five factors in a logical process for expressing the inferential cognition to someone else (*parārthānumāna*).⁶⁹

Recollective cognition (smṛti-jñānam)

The third mode of correct knowing in Kaṇāda's view is remembrance; he has defined it as a type of knowledge which is produced from a particular kind of conjunction between the individual self and mind associated with the impression (of a previous experience).⁷⁰ In this type of cognitive process, conjunction between self and mind acts as the non-inherent cause, while mental impression is the instrumental cause (self being the inherent cause of all types of cognitions). Praśastapāda explains the process of remembrance and states that since it is classified by Kaṇāda under correct cognition, it is a type of valid knowledge (*vidyā*) and arises out of a specific sort of conjunction between the self and the mind, when the same is aroused by a mental impression of the object. The

particular conjunction between the self and the mind is caused by several factors such as seeing the reason, desire and recollection etc. However, a mere conjunction between the self and mind is not enough to generate remembrance of an object unless it is assisted by a previous impression of the same.⁷¹

According to Praśastapāda, there are three generating factors for an impression:

- vivid understanding (*paṭupratyaya*);
- frequently repeated understanding (*abhyāsapratyaya*);
- interesting understanding (*ādarapratyaya*).

In other words, when a person has previously perceived, heard or experienced any object vividly and has kept thinking of it repeatedly, then one forms a valuable image of that particular object, and after a provocative impression, one's memory of that particular object gets aroused. This memory in turn gives rise to inferential cognition (*anumiti*), desire (*icchā*), resultant recollection (*anusmaraṇa*) and aversion (*dveṣa*).⁷²

Significantly, remembrance always pertains to previous experiences, so it has been propounded by some of the Vaiśeṣika scholars that it cannot be held as a means of knowledge⁷³ while there are others who hold that one can also recollect the present objects, so being dependent on past objects should be taken in a broader secondary sense, not in its literal sense.⁷⁴ However, although it has been classified under modes of correct knowing by Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda, neither of them have accepted remembrance as a means of correct cognition.

Nonetheless, remembrance has been accepted as a mode of correct cognition in classical Vaiśeṣika. It is worth mentioning in this regard that there is at least one Vaiśeṣika scholar who clearly states that remembrance cannot be counted as a type of correct cognition because the same signifies an experience of the essential nature of an object; experience according to him is a kind of knowledge which is different from the remembrance.⁷⁵

On the other hand, there is another well-known Vaiśeṣika scholar who holds that remembrance is also a valid means of knowing because it leads one to a definite cognition of an object, although that object is a past one and not the present. But it cannot be brushed aside as an invalid means of cognition, because it is based on direct experience. Just as inferential cognition arises after a memory of the invariable relation (*vyāpti*) between the reason and the object to be inferred, similarly remembrance is also a means for valid cognition.⁷⁶ Moreover, just as verbal cognition is a means of valid knowledge, even though it is based on the previous direct experience of a reliable person, similarly memory is also a means of valid cognition.⁷⁷

Significantly there is a visible shift in the views about remembrance in the later tradition of Vaiśeṣika when it was completely amalgamated with the Nyāya school. Accordingly remembrance is separated from experience at the outset⁷⁸ and then classified in two types: valid and invalid;⁷⁹ when it is produced from valid (mnemonic) knowledge it is valid: when it is caused by invalid (non-mnemonic) knowledge it is invalid.⁸⁰

Intuitive cognition (ārṣajñānam)

Kaṇāda has not discussed intuition separately, but has delineated it while explaining extraordinary perception of the *yogins*. According to him, knowledge pertaining to the seers and sages is accomplished through their accumulated merit after practice of penances.⁸¹ His commentator Śaṅkara Miśra has quoted the view of an unknown Vaiśeṣika scholar who says that this type of knowledge is described under extraordinary perception, so it should be taken as a separate sort of correct cognition, but he has clarified that intuitive cognition is the fourth type of valid knowing.⁸²

Praśastapāda has also clearly mentioned it as the fourth type of correct cognition. According to him, it is an extraordinary, intuitive knowledge which is acquired by the seers of Vedas which pertains to objects of all times, i.e. past, present and future, and even imperceptible objects like merit etc. can be experienced by them due to extraordinary merits accrued to them; such direct and valid knowledge is stated to be intuitive (*prātibha*) knowledge of the seers (*ārṣa*). In other words, this type of knowledge is produced without the instrumentality of sense-organs (as in perception) or any other reason (as in inference) and is therefore rightly called intuitive. If it be asked what is the reason in such sort of extraordinary knowledge, the answer would be: 'a specific kind of merit' (*dharma-viśeṣa*) which is usually accrued to the extraordinary persons who perform abundant penances, self-denial etc.⁸³ In exceptional cases, some ordinary persons are also seen to have this type of intuitive knowledge, e.g. when a girl says simply: 'my heart tells me that tomorrow my brother will come'. In such cases, the intuitive feeling of ordinary persons is also validated, so it is proved that there is a kind of correct cognition which is not only different from perception, inference and remembrance but also distinct from doubt, error and irresolute cognition etc.

It is noteworthy that Praśastapāda emphatically rejects the view of those who hold that the sense-cognition of people who have accumulated extraordinary powers to cognise subtle or remote objects (*siddhadarśanam*) and says that it is not an additional sort of valid cognition but can be included in perception itself; even for those who engage in considerable effort and succeed in knowing the movements of planets etc.: their cognitions can be covered under inference only.⁸⁴

On the basis of the above brief delineation of the modes of knowing in classical Vaiśeṣika, it may be said that almost all forms of cognitive process have been covered in the four modes of knowing expounded by Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda. Nevertheless, a detailed and comparative study of all the Vaiśeṣika sources is worth exploring for a clearer and better comprehension.

Two means of veridical knowing (*pramāṇās*)

After discussing the four types of each class of cognition, both valid and invalid, it is appropriate to deliberate upon the means of knowing or *pramāṇās*: the faculties or capacities which lead to knowledge,⁸⁵ 'knowledge sources'⁸⁶ acceptable

in classical Vaiśeṣika. Accordingly, it may be said that although Kaṇāda has explicitly mentioned only two means of knowing, i.e. perception and inference, he has also talked of verbal testimony after explaining the first two. Praśastapāda has clearly stated that all other means of knowing, such as verbal testimony etc., are to be included under inference, because they follow the same inferential process.⁸⁷ There is a divergence of opinion among the Vaiśeṣika scholars regarding the number of means for knowing.

Traditionally, the classical Vaiśeṣika propounds only two means of knowing and has, therefore, been paired with the Buddhists. However, on closer analysis, it becomes clear that there is at least one commentator of Praśastapāda who appears to propound verbal testimony (*śabda*) as the third and independent means of knowing,⁸⁸ and there are several subsequent scholars who follow him. There is no doubt that from the tenth century onwards, when the Vaiśeṣika amalgamated with Nyāya, four independent means of knowing came to be accepted in the joint tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison.

Perception (pratyakṣam pramāṇam)

In classical Vaiśeṣika, Kaṇāda has classified the types of knowledge but has not distinguished between the means (*pramāṇa*) and modes of valid knowing (*pramā*) as such. Praśastapāda has of course differentiated between these two, but he also did not regard anything other than knowledge as means (*pramāṇa*) for knowing.⁸⁹ In other words, he did not mention the contact between sense-organ and the object (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*) as a means of knowing, nor did he refer to the six kinds of sense-object contacts, which are clearly stated in the later period.⁹⁰

However, one of the commentators of Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, who must have been influenced by the views prevalent in his time and has tried to incorporate these two aspects separately, says that mere apprehension (*ālōcana*) here means the sense-object contact which is the '*pramāṇa*' and the word '*avibhakta*' means alone, i.e. not dependent on knowledge (*jñānānapেকṣa*).⁹¹ Udayana has also echoed the view expressed by Śrīdhara in this case.⁹² It is difficult to take their interpretation seriously, as has been pointed out by a recent scholar.⁹³

What follows from the above is that the classical Vaiśeṣika has accepted perception as a kind of knowledge as well as a means of knowing, but has not delved deeper into the details of its processes as much as the later tradition of Vaiśeṣika has done.

Inference (laiṅgikam/anumānam)

Kaṇāda has used the term '*laiṅgikam*' to denote the second means of knowing, while Praśastapāda has used *laiṅgikam* and '*anumānam*' interchangeably.⁹⁴ As already explained above, '*anumāna*' literally connotes a means of knowing which follows some other knowledge.⁹⁵ Almost all systems of Indian philosophy (except Cārvāka) accept *anumāna* as a means of knowing not based on direct

observation but on the prior knowledge of a universal relation (*vyāpti*) between two things.

Śrīdhara, the commentator of Praśastapāda, elaborates on this and says that the very derivation of the term *anumāna* as a means of valid knowing (*pramāṇa*) presupposes that there should be a separate type of cognition which is accomplished through this means. Accordingly, both the *līṅga* and the *līṅgin* are caused separately, but they are co-extensive because they are not differently located. There may be an alternative way of considering the cognition of fire as a means of knowing, while various views regarding the usage of fire can be taken to be the result of this cognition.⁹⁶ He has also clarified a subtle distinction between the inferential mode and means of knowing when he says that the seeing of smoke (*līṅga*) is in fact the means of knowing while knowing fire (*līṅgin*) is the result of knowing in this process. Alternatively, he says that the very fact of knowing fire may be the means of knowing and the response to fire may be taken to be the mode of knowing.⁹⁷

Additional means of knowing

As already discussed, according to classical Vaiśeṣika tradition perception and inference are held to be the two means for valid knowing (*pramāṇa*); others have been said to be included in these two. It is therefore appropriate to refer to the remainder briefly:

Verbal testimony (śabda)

In one of his aphorisms, Kaṇāda has clearly stated that the process of verbal testimony should be understood as that of inference only.⁹⁸ Praśastapāda has reiterated this in more specific terms: the so-called other means of knowing can be covered under inference, because the same process is followed in all of them.⁹⁹ However, one of the commentators of Praśastapāda, Vyomaśiva, advocates verbal testimony as an additional source of knowledge that was acceptable to Kaṇāda himself; he has clearly stated in his aphorism that the process of verbal cognition is like that of inference and hence it should be explained on the same pattern.¹⁰⁰

Gesture (ceṣṭā)

There are some scholars who suggest that gesture is an additional means of knowing, for the movement of the hand towards oneself indicates calling someone and towards another person means sending somebody away. However, Praśastapāda clarifies that such indications implied within the physical movements are grasped only by someone who is already aware of the relation between such activity and its specific import, otherwise the other person cannot comprehend such a sense. Therefore it is not different from inference, which is also based on an invariable relation between the reason (*līṅga*) and the result of inference (*sādhya*).¹⁰¹

Analogy (upamāna)

As far as the means of analogy or comparison accepted by several scholars is concerned, it is also not different from verbal testimony and so can be covered under inference according to Praśastapāda.¹⁰² While explaining the process of analogy, Śrīdhara says that the understanding of an unknown object like a blue-bull (*gavaya*) is in fact based on the utterance of a reliable person who has already seen the same; therefore it is no different from verbal testimony. Consequently, comparison can also be covered under inference, just like verbal testimony.

Implication (arthāpatti)

The scholars of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta have argued that implication is an additional means of knowing. Long debates have taken place between them and the scholars of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. However, in the tradition of classical Vaiśeṣika, the seeds of this debate were perhaps sown in the time of Praśastapāda, who says that there is no need to accept presumption as an independent means of knowing because it is not different from inference to what is contrary, whether based on perception or verbal testimony.¹⁰³

Concurrence (sambhava)

An additional means of knowing, i.e. concurrence (*sambhava*), has been proposed by some scholars belonging to the school which follows the tradition of *Purāṇas*. Praśastapāda and his commentators have clarified that this too is not different from inference, because it is based on a relation between the two objects.¹⁰⁴

Non-apprehension (anupalabdhi)

Non-apprehension has been propounded as an additional means of knowing by the followers of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta schools. Vaiśeṣikas reject this proposition by saying that non-apprehension can be covered under inference: just as an effect, once it is produced, leads the cogniser to its cause, similarly an effect that is not produced leads to the non-existence of its cause. There is no need to accept non-apprehension as an extra means of knowing.¹⁰⁵

Tradition (aitihya)

Another means of knowing, accepted by the *paurāṇikas*, is tradition but Praśastapāda and his commentators say that if tradition is correct, then it is not different from trustworthy assertion, i.e. verbal testimony, which as already stated above can be covered under inference.¹⁰⁶

In refuting all the so-called means of knowing that have been propounded by different schools of Indian philosophical tradition, Praśastapāda and his followers have stated that there are, in fact, only two means of valid knowing, perception and

inference. All other means of knowing can easily be accommodated in perception or inference, one way or the other.

However, it needs to be reiterated that in later times, when the school of Vaiśeṣika joined the Nyāya school in principle and the two became one joint stream they accepted four means of knowing: perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison.

6 Agent of knowing (*ātman*)

The Vaiśeṣika system has enumerated self (*ātman*) as the eighth substance in its list of categories. Self has been defined as the substratum of knowledge or consciousness and its nature has mainly been expounded as the knowing agent.¹

Means for knowing the self

The existence of self has to be proved by implication or inference since it cannot be directly perceived by sense-organs, like mind, according to Kaṇāda.² Several signs have been offered by him to prove that there is something beyond body, mind and sense-organs, which acts as the subject in all cognitive, conative and affective processes.

Kaṇāda has listed 12 signs as reasons to argue for the existence of this subject of knowing, i.e. the self:

- breathing up (*prāṇa*);
- breathing down (*apāṇa*);
- closing of eyelids (*nimeṣa*);
- opening of eyelids (*unmeṣa*);
- auto-repairing of bodily parts (*jīvana*);
- activity of mind (*manogati*);
- modifications experienced by the sense-organs (*indriyāntaravikāra*);
- pleasure (*sukha*);
- pain (*duḥkha*);
- desire (*icchā*);
- aversion (*dveṣa*);
- effort (*prayatna*).³

Elaborating these arguments, several commentators of Vaiśeṣika philosophy have said that the existence of an intelligent controller in the form of an additional substance, i.e. the self; is inferred on these grounds:

- Breathing up and down is indicative of such a self, because the air has a curvilinear motion by nature but the air enclosed in the body of living beings

is seen moving vertically; from this we infer that there is a controller of the body. Just as a blower of the bagpipe controls the movement of air in the bagpipe, likewise this controller of the body controls the internal movement of air within living beings.⁴

- The closing and opening of the eyelid regularly also indicates a controller like the propeller of the pulley; the regularity of these actions points to their dependence upon someone's desire.⁵
- Moreover, it is a matter of common experience that the growth of the body and healing of its wounds must also be brought about by an intelligent agent, just as the growth and repairing of a house indicates the efforts of a conscious controller.⁶
- Existence of the self in a body is also indicated by the action of mind which brings about its connection with the eyes and other organs of perception that apprehend the objects desired to be perceived. An example is also cited here: just as a boy propels one lac ball against another one fixed in a corner of the room (the fixed ball resembling the eye, the propelled ball the mind and the boy the self); similarly, the mind is propelled to one object from the other by an intelligent agent, because it is the substratum of an action bringing about the connection with a desired object, like the ball in the boy's hand.⁷
- We often experience that the object of one sense-organ causes modifications in another sense-organ, e.g., after the visual perception of colour of an edible object, one experiences some changes in the organ of taste, based upon the remembrance of the taste of the object seen. From this we infer that there is a single agent who can cognise both colour and taste⁸ (as well as objects of other sense-organs) while the sense-organs, as instruments of cognition, are restricted to their respective objects only.⁹
- Moreover, other experiences like pleasure, pain, desire and aversion also lead to the inference of some substance to which all these properties belong, that is none other than the self, because each one of them is experienced by a conscious agent who expresses them with the 'I' statement.¹⁰

Besides the above it is to be remarked that the self is not only the subject of knowing but also the beneficiary of the highest good in the Vaiśeṣika view; it is the seeker as well as recipient of true knowledge which in turn results in final release. All the objects of the world are for the purpose of the self only.¹¹ Selfhood (*ātmatva*) is a medium class-character which distinguishes the self from all other substances.¹² Since the self cannot be perceived due to its subtle nature, cognition of the self is made possible through inference which is based on the means of knowing like auditory sense-organs etc.¹³ While explaining this statement of Praśastapāda, an objection is raised here by Śrīdhara on behalf of the opponent as to why one would bother about the class-character of a substance which is not even cognised by anyone as such, since all the cognised objects are invariably accompanied by the notion of form while nobody has ever cognised the same in case of the self. To this he has responded from the standpoint of Vaiśeṣika, saying that this objection is baseless because the self is stated to be subtle and imperceptibility is the very nature of subtle objects.¹⁴

Therefore, once it is established that the self cannot be perceived by external sense-organs due to its subtlety, an argument in the form of proper inferential reasoning is adduced to prove its existence:

Cognitions like (hearing of) sound etc. are made possible by some instrument in the form of sense-organs, since these cognitions are a form of human activity, and (all other forms of) activity is brought about through an instrument, like the action of cutting by an axe.¹⁵

However, some of the later Vaiśeṣika scholars like Śaṅkara Miśra have also argued that Kaṇāda had in fact accepted mental perception of the self by oneself.¹⁶ Otherwise the notion of 'I' consciousness cannot be explained just on the basis of inference, verbal testimony or analogy. On going deeper into the sources, it emerges that there is no doubt about the fact that every one cognises 'oneself' mentally, as has also been clearly accepted by the later scholars of the Vaiśeṣika tradition,¹⁷ but still the self is said to be imperceptible in the sense that the external sense-organs cannot directly perceive it due to its subtlety.¹⁸

Nature of the self

As regards the nature of self, besides being a knower/subject, it is stated to be the ground of all affections and conations in the form of 'I am' (*aham iti*) in Vaiśeṣika.¹⁹ This assertion of 'me' or 'I' in a cognitive act has no other substance as its basis except the self, due to the following reasons:

- The body cannot be accepted as the substratum of such cognition, because all the physical products are unconscious like their respective causes²⁰ while this type of assertion not only presupposes but also proves the existence of a conscious being. Moreover, if the body were the substratum of consciousness, then the dead body should also have been conscious.²¹ Evidently, this is not so. The body being a material produce like the pot etc. cannot be a substratum of consciousness since whatever is material, is not conscious. Further, if the physical body be accepted as the substratum of consciousness, then it should exist as long as the body does since it is the nature of specific attributes that they exist as long as their substratum does. The same is true of the material parts of the body. Besides, if all these bodily parts be accepted as conscious, then there will be more than one agent of knowing in one body and it will be impossible to fulfill the purpose of any one of the cognisers.²² Hence, one has to accept some other substance than the physical body which is the locus of consciousness.²³

In other words, it is a matter of common experience that all the sense-organs are instruments in a cognitive act: they grasp and illumine certain objects, like a lamp.²⁴ The cognition of sound etc. leads us to the existence of a cogniser in the form of the following inference: 'Cognition must inhere somewhere, since it is an act like the (cutting) act of an axe, and that in which it inheres, is the self.'²⁵

- The sense-organs can also not be said to be the substratum of knowledge/ consciousness, being the instruments of cognition like other instruments, they are unconscious by nature. Further, even when any one or two of the sense-organs is defunct or defective, memory of objects experienced by that particular sense-organ is still intact.²⁶ Therefore, it is proved that there is some other experiencer of objects as well as of their memory, otherwise the cases of blind people having a memory of colours etc. before their visual impairment cannot be reasonably explained.²⁷

Interestingly, Kaṇāda begins with positing the external world which is grasped through sense-organs and is well known to every person in the form of objects and instruments of knowing. He proceeds on this ground and argues that this very proposition leads us to the fact that there is some other substance which is beyond the realm of sense-organs and is actually the knowing subject/agent. It cannot be said that physical organism or body can act as the substratum of knowledge, since the term 'I' or '*aham*' which is the subject, cannot be directly used for the objects of knowing, both of these are of a different order:

Kaṇāda presents his view by considering two types of assertion in respect of the self, viz. (i) an apprehension expressing personal identity as e.g. 'I am Dévadatta' (*aham Dévadattaḥ*) and (ii) a judgment of fact expressing a particular action of a person as e.g. 'Dévadatta goes' (*Dévadattaḥ gacchati*) etc. The subject 'I' in it is construed in the sense of a substratum – '*adhiṣṭhātā*' as, Praśastapāda says – of consciousness in a general way and it is maintained that the complex unity that the name 'I' stands for, is presented to consciousness directly, giving it the character of self-consciousness. It is the fact of self-consciousness that according to this view is contravened, so to speak, in making assertion of the self depend on an act of inference. For example, under the influence of the Mīmāṃsā view of the self, particularly of Kumārila, Vāchaspati Misra strongly advocates the position that the self is established directly (*anvākṣham*) by virtue of the nature of self-consciousness.

(Gajendragadkar 1988, p. 268)

Continuing the above argument, one of the commentators of Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, says that just like the sense-organs, their objects can also not be taken to be the substratum of consciousness, first because they are not perceived to be so and second, memory of physical objects is possible in their absence.²⁸ Udayana clarifies further by saying that if the objects are accepted as conscious, then memory will not be possible in their absence, because memory cannot occur without an experience, just like an effect cannot take place without a cause.²⁹

- Consciousness can also not be ascribed to mind (*manas*) for the simple reason that if mind, independent of sense organs, be accepted as the inherent cause of knowledge, then the same knower should cognise an object as well as memorise it simultaneously, but obviously this is not supported by common

experience. Besides mind itself, being an instrument in the process of knowing, cannot be said to act as an agent.³⁰ Udayana explains the argument in detail and says that if mind is accepted as an agent of knowing, then two incongruities will arise: first, it cannot be an instrument and second, it would amount to generate several cognitions and memories simultaneously because like an instrument, it is not the nature of an agent that it can accomplish only one task at a time. Otherwise there will not be a possibility of distraction of thought (*vyāsaṅga*). To escape from the latter problem, if some other instrument is posited in place of mind, then it will be a difference in name only.³¹

Vyomaśiva sums up the issue by saying that consciousness is the primary activity, so it can inhere either in the subject or the object but it can never inhere in an instrument because of unavailability of such a situation. It means that the instrument is (always secondary and) never seen to be the substratum of primary activity, i.e. consciousness.³² Moreover, cognitive activity can take place only when there is cognitive consciousness, since the cause can produce a similar effect just as an object of white colour can give rise to a white product.³³

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, another Vaiśeṣika commentator, has clarified the issue on the same lines and stated that if mind be taken as the substratum of consciousness, then even without the contact between mind and sense-organs, rise of several cognitions simultaneously would have to be accepted, but this is not experienced by anyone.³⁴ So the mind cannot be accepted as a substratum of consciousness. Viśvanātha has given a new form to this argument saying that mind, being a minute substance, cannot be accepted as the substratum of consciousness because in that case, all the cognitive processes such as knowledge, pleasure etc. will become imperceptible because the gross magnitude is an essential condition for perceptibility.³⁵ In brief, the inference of mind as an instrument is undertaken only after the self as a substratum of consciousness is established, otherwise there will be contradiction.³⁶ Therefore it follows that an additional substance, other than mind, has to be accepted as the substratum of consciousness.

After refuting all the three positions forwarded by opponents as above, Vaiśeṣika scholars have concluded through the law of elimination that since knowledge is an attribute, it does need a substratum to inhere in, which is none other than the self.³⁷ In other words, self is the inherent cause of knowledge, which is beyond sense-organs, objects and physical bodies.³⁸

The authors of classical Vaiśeṣika tradition have referred to the above three viewpoints only regarding the substratum of consciousness. However, two more views have been quoted and rejected by some later interpreters of Vaiśeṣika.

- Vādi Vāgiśvara has presented and refuted a view of an unknown opponent that vital air (*prāṇa*) cannot be accepted as substratum of knowing because it is an effect of air just like the vital air in deep sleep.³⁹
- One of the recent exponents of Vaiśeṣika has referred to another view according to which brain is the substratum of consciousness (*mastiṣkātmavāda*). He has refuted this view on the same grounds as had been given to reject the view of

those who held the physical body as a substratum of consciousness. According to him, Tarkālaṅkāra has stated that brain is of course an instrument for manifestation of consciousness, but it cannot be accepted as the substratum of consciousness. It is said that this refutation of brain as a substratum of consciousness can be applied to ‘modern European theory of brain-selfhood’.⁴⁰

Definition of the self

After proving existence of the self as an additional substance in the above manner, the Vaiśeṣika scholars proceed to define it. Kaṇāda has merely mentioned that the substancehood and eternity of the self have already been explained in connection with (the atom of) air.⁴¹ Śāṅkara Miśra, the commentator of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, clarifies it by saying that just as airy atoms are proved eternal because there is no evidence to prove otherwise (i.e. the airy atoms have parts), similarly self is proved to be eternal, because there is no evidence to prove its parts; its being a substance is already shown above.⁴²

Praśastapāda has defined the self as a locus of ‘*ātmatva*’, i.e. self is inhered by a generic attribute or the class-character selfhood (*ātmatva*).⁴³ In other words, self is a substance and is different from other substances because it is inherently related to a limited universal character (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*).⁴⁴ Later scholars have defined self as the substratum of knowledge.⁴⁵ Evidently this applies to both the individual self (*jīvātman*), as well as the supreme self (*paramātman*). It is therefore further delimited as the substratum of ‘produced knowledge’ (and not of ‘eternal knowledge’ which is ascribed to the supreme self).⁴⁶

A different definition of the self has been provided by a later Vaiśeṣika scholar, Śāṅkara Miśra, who is clearly influenced by Nyāya scholars. According to him self is the employer of sense-organs in their respective objects, through whom it enjoys pleasure or pain.⁴⁷ The same has been succinctly stated by Viśvanātha as the ‘controller of sense-organs’.⁴⁸ Broadening the scope of this definition, Vādi Vāgīśvara has added that self is also the substratum of effort.⁴⁹

It is noteworthy that Vātsyayana, the commentator of *Nyāyasūtras*, had included all the above aspects of self expounded by several later scholars in his statement as follows: ‘Self is the observer, and enjoyer of everything, all-knowing and experiencer of all.’⁵⁰ An explanation of the above is given by Uddyotakara, who says that self is the recollector (*pratisandhātā*) of various experiences like desires etc.⁵¹

What follows from the above is that all these definitions elucidate one or other attribute of self, but since none of these incorporates all of its attributes, the complete nature of self is not yet clear.

Attributes of the self

It is therefore appropriate to discuss in detail the various attributes ascribed to the self as a substance. The Vaiśeṣika tradition admits 14 attributes pertaining to the self:⁵²

- knowledge (*buddhi*);
- pleasure (*sukha*);

- pain (*duḥkha*);
- desire (*icchā*);
- aversion (*dveṣa*);
- effort (*prayatna*);
- merit (*dharma*);
- demerit (*adharma*);
- impression (*saṁskāra*);
- number (*saṁkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- separateness (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*saṁyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*).

Of these the first nine are enumerated as specific attributes of the self, while the remaining five are stated to be common attributes (since they belong to all the nine types of substances enumerated earlier). It is worth dealing separately with all these attributes pertaining to the self.

Knowledge (buddhi)

Although the direct experience of everybody is itself perceptible evidence for proving the existence of knowledge in one's own self, Praśastapāda has quoted Kaṇāda to show his concurrence in this respect because there is no other means of knowing it as such.⁵³ It has been remarked by Kaṇāda that knowledge arising out of contact between the self and (internal) sense-organ, preceded by a contact between the (external) sense-organ and the object, is different than the knowledge arising out of signs for inference.⁵⁴ It means that there are four factors in a cognitive act and the contact among these four – self, mind, sense-organ and the object – gives rise to a direct cognition which is different from the inferential cognition, which in turn is indirect.

Udayana has clarified it further by stating that although Kaṇāda has not apparently mentioned cognition as an attribute of the self, it is implied by the enumeration of pleasure and pain etc. Besides, the term '*indriyāntaravikāra*' used by Kaṇāda elsewhere while providing several reasons for proving the existence of self also implies that knowledge belongs to self⁵⁵ and to no other substance.

However, it must be reiterated that knowledge (consciousness) in Vaiśeṣika (and in Nyāya) is held to be an attribute of the self and not its nature, as envisaged by other schools of Indian philosophy like Sāṁkhya and Vedānta. Jayanta has clearly stated this in his *Nyāya-Mañjarī*:

The self becomes conscious when it is conjoined with consciousness, but remains unconscious without that conjunction. (It is so), because we (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) do not hold consciousness to be anything else besides the manifestation/cognition of objects.⁵⁶

He has further argued that if the self is taken to be of the nature of knowledge/consciousness, then all living beings should have become omniscient, which is impossible. So, it is more logical to hold that although the property of knowledge inheres in the self, yet it is not a permanent attribute of the self, rather it is an adventitious one.

This brings us to the point already mentioned that knowledge pertaining to the self is not eternal (although knowledge pertaining to the supreme self, i.e. God, has been accepted as eternal in the tradition of Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika), but is produced by its contact with the sense-organs and objects. However, this non-eternity of knowledge pertaining to the self as advocated by the Vaiśeṣika school should not be mistaken as momentary as proposed by the Buddhists.

Pleasure and pain (sukha–duḥkha)

The nature of self as enunciated in the Vaiśeṣika texts reveals it as a doer and enjoyer⁵⁷ and also the experiencer of knowledge, pleasure and pain. Kaṇāda has made a significant statement here: pleasure and pain are different from each other.⁵⁸ This is because whatever is desirable and appealing to the self is stated to be its pleasure while all that is despicable and disliked is its pain.⁵⁹ Furthermore, Kaṇāda states that pleasure and pain are not only different from each other, they can also not be covered under cognition due to several reasons.⁶⁰

Śrīdhara has raised an interesting question here: how can pleasure and pain, which are transitory by nature, be ascribed to the eternal self as its attributes? If these are said to be attributes of the self, then the self will become non-eternal like skin etc. To this, he has responded by saying that the origin and cessation of pleasure and pain does not in any way affect the eternity of the self. If it be asked what good is achieved by the self in being a substratum of pleasure and pain etc., the Vaiśeṣika response would be that this explains the self as an experiencer of pleasure and pain.⁶¹

Here again, self is stated to be the enjoyer of pleasure and pain in Vaiśeṣika, not that these attributes are its nature. Śaṅkara Miśra has raised this question in his *Kaṇādarahasyam* on behalf of the opponent and refuted it by arguing that the nature of common experience is ‘I am happy’, i.e. I enjoy pleasure, and not that ‘I am pleasure’.⁶² Viśvanātha has also employed the same logic when he says that scriptural statements such as ‘*Nityam Vijñānamānandam Brahma*’ should be construed with the suffix ‘*ac*’ in the sense of possessing (*matup*), which would mean that the self is qualified with these epithets and is not identical with these attributes.⁶³

It is therefore clear that the self in Vaiśeṣika is held to be the subject or agent of cognition, conation and affection.

Desire (icchā)

The self is also an inherent cause of desire, which is defined as a craving for the unattained. It is generated by a contact between the self and mind, which in turn is

supported by pleasure or memory. Desire can be for oneself or for the other person.⁶⁴

Aversion (dveṣa)

Another specific attribute belonging to the self is said to be aversion, which makes a person furious as if one is burning; it is produced by a contact between the self and the mind which takes place due to pain or its memory.⁶⁵

Effort (prayatna)

Effort is synonymous with initiative and enthusiasm. It is also inherent in the self and is one of its specific attributes. It is said to be of two types: non-volitional and volitional. The former signifies involuntary activities like breathing in and out while a person is sleeping; the latter includes such activities that are produced by a contact between self and the mind and are activated by desire and aversion.⁶⁶

Merit–demerit (dharma–adharma)

Praśastapāda has explicitly mentioned that both of these are attributes of self.⁶⁷ If a question is posed about their connection with the self on the grounds that both merit and demerit are accrued by performing the enjoined and prohibited actions respectively, but their result is seen to be attained after a long period, both of these cannot be taken as attributes of the self, then the following statement of Kaṇāda answers the question: ‘the attributes of one self can not be the causal factor (for resulting in retribution) of another one.’⁶⁸

The implication of Kaṇāda’s statement is that merit and demerit pertaining to one’s self cannot give rise to pleasure and pain in another one, otherwise there will be a fallacy understood as loss of performed activity (*kṛtahāna*) or acceptance of the result of an activity not undertaken (*akṛtābhyaṅāgama*);⁶⁹ this also proves that merit and demerit are attributes of the self. Vyomaśiva has also quoted from scripture to strengthen this viewpoint.⁷⁰

Impression (saṃskāra)

According to Kaṇāda, memory is produced by mental impression, i.e. ‘*bhāvanā*’,⁷¹ hence this should also be ascribed to the self.⁷² Since memory in one self cannot be produced by mental impressions cumulated in another one, it has to be accepted that mental impression is co-extensive with experience, i.e. it also pertains to the self.

Number (saṅkhyā)

Number is a generic attribute according to Vaiśeṣika theory, so it belongs to all the nine substances. Therefore it is the tenth attribute of self, but the more important question is about the exact number of the self, i.e. is it one or many?

The Vaiśeṣika view in this regard is very clear: the number of self is multiple, because the order of the universe (*vyavasthā*) points to it.⁷³ This ‘order’ has been explained as the underlying law which formulates the ground for retribution of pleasure and pain to individual selves.⁷⁴ Udayana has explained this order in various ways and concluded that each body is endowed with an individual self, so the number inhering in the self has to be plural.⁷⁵

Kaṇāda has given another argument in support of his theory, that the scriptures also validate the plurality of individual selves.⁷⁶ Commentators have clarified that as regards the scriptural statements which propound oneness of the self, those should be taken to signify the supreme self which is undoubtedly One;⁷⁷ in other words, these could be explained metaphorically⁷⁸ and not literally. Śrīdhara has raised another interesting point here from the opponents’ view that if there are multiple number of selves, then by gradual liberation for all of them, the world would perish. But he provides a logical argument from Vaiśeṣika to reject the above possibility and says that the question of last, less or more in number does not arise in case of infinite and innumerable objects. He also quotes two verses from Vārtikakāra Miśra in support of his view.⁷⁹

The Vaiśeṣika theory of rebirth⁸⁰ and also the concept of *viśeṣa* can be more logically upheld if the plurality of individual selves is accepted. Thus the number pertaining to the self is held to be multiple in Vaiśeṣika.

Magnitude (parimāṇa)

Magnitude pertaining to the self has been accepted as the most pervasive (*vibhu*) one.⁸¹ It is so because effects of the self like knowledge, pleasure and pain etc. are available everywhere.⁸² Further, an unseen factor (*adr̥ṣṭa*) is an attribute of the self according to Vaiśeṣika and is causally responsible for the upward movement of fire and curvilinear motion of air etc. Since corporeal substances like fire or air cannot be held as substrata for such movements, an all-pervasive substance has to be accepted which is none other than the individual self;⁸³ all-pervasiveness by definition is ‘being conjoined with all the corporeal substances’.⁸⁴

Separateness (pr̥thaktva)

The substance called the self is also inhered in by a generic attribute named ‘separateness’⁸⁵ since it is multiple in number and is separate from all other substances.⁸⁶

Conjunction (saṃyoga)

Pleasure and pain are produced only when there is a contact between body and the self; they are experienced by the self when there is conjunction between mind and the self.⁸⁷ So it follows that contact or conjunction is also an attribute of the self.⁸⁸ Relation between body and self and between self and mind is stated to be conjunction because it is intersubstantial.

Disjunction (vibhāga)

Disjunction is also a common property of the self, since it is dependent on conjunction and follows it almost invariably.⁸⁹ If disjunction is not accepted as inherent in the self, then conjunction between mind and the self will have to be accepted as ever-present because both the substances, being eternal, are non-perishable.⁹⁰ Therefore, the fourteenth and last attribute pertaining to the self is said to be disjunction.

On the basis of the above, the self in Vaiśeṣika is the substratum of consciousness and is not only the agent of knowing, but also an experiencer of emotions and feelings and also the doer of actions. It is endowed with 14 attributes in all, as stated above. Significantly, the knower self is known through three modes: mental perception in the case of one's own self, inference and verbal testimony in the case of others' selves. There are several signs which lead to the inferential cognition of self in others' bodies.⁹¹

Types of the self

Further, the Vaiśeṣika school has also discussed two types of the self:

- individual self;
- supreme self.

Kaṇāda has not explicitly referred to the notion of God as supreme self.⁹² His commentator Praśastapāda also does not talk of these two types of self directly, but there is an implicit acceptance of God in his text, at least in two places: first, when he begins his work with an invocation to Lord Maheśvara, and thereafter when he explains the process of creation and destruction.⁹³

However, two of the commentators of Praśastapāda have clearly accepted the will of God as an instrumental cause in creation and have also referred to him as creator.⁹⁴ The third commentator, Udayana, authored an independent treatise titled *Nyāyakusumāñjali* for proving the existence of God and initiated a logical discourse on theism in the Indian philosophical tradition after refuting all the opponents' views, and has also not discussed God under the ninth substance, self, although this was expected of a staunch theist such as himself.⁹⁵

In the Vaiśeṣika tradition, it was perhaps Śivāditya who made the first mention of God as a type of self, although he does not deliberate in details about Him.⁹⁶ In the combined Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika tradition, it was first Uddyotakara and then Vācaspati Miśra who initiated this discussion.⁹⁷

Later, Śaṅkara Miśra in his treatise *Kaṇādarahasyam* also divided the self into two types, individual self (with a limited cognitive capacity) and supreme self (with an unlimited cognitive capacity).⁹⁸ It is worth mentioning here that God cannot be an object of ordinary sense-perception, so He can only be known either through reasoning or verbal testimony for ordinary human beings. For extra-ordinarily gifted ones, He may be an object of direct experience.

A brief enumeration of the eight arguments provided by Udayanācārya for proving the existence of God is as follows:

- producedness of the world (*kārya*);
- creative movement of the atoms (*āyojana*);
- sustenance of the universe (*dhṛti*);
- usages pertaining to the things in the world (*pada*);
- validity of knowledge (*pratyaya*);
- authorship of scriptures (*śruti*);
- scriptural statements (*vākya*);
- particular number (*saṅkhyāviśeṣa*).⁹⁹

The sum of these arguments is that God is the creator, controller, sustainer and manager of this world, author of the Vedas and original teacher of mankind. Significantly these arguments have also been analysed in comparison with contemporary theistic discussion.¹⁰⁰

As regards the nature and attributes of God in Vaiśeṣika, the following points are noteworthy:

- God is the efficient cause of the universe, while atoms are its inherent cause and conjunction between individual selves and atoms is the non-inherent cause.¹⁰¹
- God is the creator as well as destroyer of the universe. He is the greatest Lord of the world and it is his will, supported by merit and demerit of individual selves, which activates the process of creation and destruction of worldly effects.¹⁰²
- God is the controller of world; the objects of the world, being insentient, cannot serve any purpose in the cosmic design unless they are activated by a sentient being.¹⁰³
- God is the substratum of eternal knowledge¹⁰⁴ while individual selves are the substrata of temporally limited knowledge.
- God is eternal as well as omniscient. No ordinary being can know all the worldly objects, while God knows everything, i.e. from dyad to the whole cosmos.¹⁰⁵

On the basis of the above, it may be concluded that the Vaiśeṣika view of self is based on this realistic standpoint that the subject of knowing is different from the object of knowing. Accordingly, the substance which is the abode of consciousness and acts as the agent of knowing the objects, comprehending them and attaining and acquiring his desired goals through this knowledge, is stated to be the self.¹⁰⁶

7 Abode and faculties of knowing (*śarīra* and *indriyas*)

The Vaiśeṣika world-view propounds that the four substances enumerated in its list, namely earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*jala*), fire (*tejas*) and air (*vāyu*), are of two types – eternal and non-eternal. The former kind of these four substances is held to be atomic; atoms (*paramāṇus*) are held to be the ultimate, eternal parts of these four substances and are of four types – earthly, watery, fiery and airy. They are eternal, since they are not produced by any cause and are ever-existent.¹ All the multifarious objects of the gross, visible world are held to be the products of these four types of atoms only.

Kaṇāda has stated that each of the four elemental substances, i.e. earth, water, fire and air, gets manifested in three forms of the produced material, the body, the sense-organ and the material objects.² Out of these, the body is in fact the abode for all sorts of experience while the sense-organs are the faculties for the same. Accordingly, the Vaiśeṣika view of knowing encompasses the notion of body also because it is only in an embodied self that the process of knowing can take place: ‘The self can not know anything if it is disembodied’ is the statement of Śrīdhara,³ an exponent of Vaiśeṣika. Besides, the body is not only an abode of voluntary action, but also of sense-organs and their objects, according to Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika. Therefore a discussion of the sense-organs, which operate as faculties and facilitate the process of knowing, is called for.

Abode of knowing (*śarīra*)

Etymologically the term ‘*śarīra*’ is derived from the verb square root *śr-* ‘*śīryata iti śarīram*’, i.e. body (*śarīra*), that which is decaying every moment. In other words, the body in its literal sense is impermanent and perishable. According to Vaiśeṣika, body is the (non-eternal) abode of eternal self so that the latter can experience pleasure and pain accruing from its own actions performed in earlier births.⁴ Therefore the other term used for the body in Vaiśeṣika texts is ‘*bhogaśyatana*’,⁵ meaning abode for experiencing the fruits of its actions. However, it has also been clarified therein that several parts of body like hands, feet etc. cannot be called *śarīra* because these are only parts and cannot be the abode of experience while the body being a final whole, i.e. *antyāvayavī* can become an abode of experience.⁶ In other words, *śarīra* is the final whole (*antyāvayavī*)⁷ which acts as an abode of voluntary action, sense-organs and their objects.⁸ In the

Nyāya school, body (*śarīra*) is enumerated as the second of the twelve objects of knowing and mentioned after the first one, i.e. the self.⁹ In fact it is in the body itself that the self can enjoy the objects of sense-organs and experience the pleasures and pains which result from its own actions.¹⁰ The self is eternal and pervasive by nature, but its knowledge, effort and will are delimited when it is embodied. Not only this, but the consciousness in the self is also accepted on its being associated with the body according to Vaiśeṣika, so the body has a significant role in its worldview.

Nature of body

The nature of human body according to Vaiśeṣika is held to be earthly (*pārthiva*) only, while most other schools of Indian philosophy hold that the human body is constituted of five elemental substances, *pañcabhūtas*. This assertion of Vaiśeṣika philosophy is grounded in one of its metaphysical presuppositions. Accordingly, because the human body is perceptible, it has to be earthly only because the products which are born out of conjunction between perceptible and imperceptible substances are held to be imperceptible.¹¹ On the basis of this argument, Kaṇāda has clearly stated that five substances collectively cannot be the inherent cause for any product, that is simply forbidden.¹² Further, body cannot be accepted to consist of three elements, earth, water or fire, since it is marked with the emergence of different set of attributes.¹³ Gautama, in his *Nyāyasūtras*, has rejected the possibility of the body being constituted of four elemental substances¹⁴ on the same grounds.

As stated above, there is a subtle underlying principle of causation due to which the Vaiśeṣika school has insisted on this theory regarding the nature of organic body. Accordingly, there is no doubt that various types of atoms do combine and co-ordinate to produce an effect, but all of them cannot be accepted as material cause of a product, there has to be only one inherent cause for an effect. This is so because although attributes of all these elemental substances are available in a living body, only smell (the property of earth) is found in a dead body. So, the body has to be accepted as earthly only.¹⁵

In other words, the combination among these five elemental substances is not negated,¹⁶ because the body cannot be produced only with earthly atoms and without the help of water, air or fire. What is intended here is that there cannot be multiple inherent causes for an effect, so bodies of ordinary mortals like us are the products of one inherent cause, i.e. earth.

In brief, the body of ordinary mortals such as human beings is held to be earthly because it is produced out of earthly atoms as its inherent cause, although other elemental substances are also its auxiliary causes. This theory of Vaiśeṣika is founded on the simple logic that such a body is inherently related to the property of smell, while all other properties like liquidity, heat etc. are only supplementary to it. In other words, 'being the substratum of smell' (*gandhavattva*) is the valid reason for proving the earthliness (*pārthivatva*) of the body of ordinary mortals.¹⁷ Otherwise, there will be the problem of cross-division (*jātisamkara*)¹⁸ of class characters.

To put it in simpler terms, the Vaiśeṣika theory propounds that the combining atoms in the creation of an object must be homogenous in character.¹⁹ When productive action starts in an earthly atom, it then has to unite with another atom of its own class and an earthly atom can never combine with a watery atom to form a dyad (*dvyaṇuka*). Therefore, the body being produced only out of earthly atoms has to be earthly. As far as the popular notion regarding the body of human beings being constituted of five elements is concerned, that is based on five grounds – smell, moisture, circulation, heat and space.²⁰ But Udayana says that all other features (except smell) do not last as long as the body does; so even if any of these is removed, body can still be recognised while the smell cannot be dissociated from the body even after death. Hence it is proved that body is constituted of earthly atoms only.²¹

Types of body

As stated above, the Vaiśeṣika system has propounded an atomic theory according to which all the worldly products are constituted of four types of atoms. These products are also classified in three kinds: *śarīra*, *indriya* and *viṣaya*. ‘The term *śarīra* signifies the organic structure of the body, rather than the matter it consists of, but at the same time, it can also not be denied that the body is constituted of atomic matter.’²²

Accordingly, four types of bodies are discussed in Vaiśeṣika texts:

- earthly (*pārthiva*);
- watery (*jalīya*);
- fiery (*taijasa*);
- airy (*vāyavya*).

The bodies of ordinary human beings, as also of animals and birds, are primarily held to be earthly as they are constituted of earthly atoms while the watery, fiery and airy bodies are said to be constituted of their respective atoms and exist in the watery, fiery and airy regions respectively. Although these four types of bodies are stated to be produced out of their respective atoms only, this is meant to denote their inherent causes only, otherwise the so-called watery, fiery or airy bodies cannot sustain themselves without the earthly atoms.²³

The four types of bodies listed above are again classified in two categories, i.e. womb-born (*yonija*) and the ones that are not womb-born (*ayonija*).²⁴ It is interesting to note that Kaṇāda accepts the possibility of ‘non-natural or celestial’ (*ayonija*) birth in the case of the gods and sages and even advances arguments for it as follows:

- Non-womb-born bodies do exist because they have antecedents of indeterminate time and space.²⁵ In other words the atoms of all the four types accepted in Vaiśeṣika philosophy exist in all quarters and all places and so there is no local determination for these.²⁶

- The non-womb-born bodies are created also because of a peculiar type of merit.²⁷ It means that the creative motion in atoms is generated due to conjunction of a particular self with the respective results of actions performed in prior lives. This is made possible by a peculiar kind of merit accrued by the divine sages and others. In case of non-womb-born bodies of mosquitoes and other insects, the same is produced by a peculiar kind of demerit.²⁸
- The existence of non-womb-born bodies is also proved by the fact that names or terms, denoting the persons or objects, do exist²⁹ even though there is no ancestor or father to bestow them. It may therefore be deduced that the same God who imposed names on such objects, also imposed the names like *Manu* and *Mārīchi* on non-womb-born bodies.³⁰
- The above premise can also be substantiated from the fact that the name (of non-womb-born bodies) is without beginning.³¹ It means that the names of primordial beings like *Brahmā* etc. are beginningless, for there are no parents of *Brahmā*, who invented the name for him.³²
- From the above four arguments, it is proved that the non-womb-born bodies do exist.³³ It is due to the fact that the bodies of *Manu* and *Mārīchi* etc. also existed.³⁴
- Last but not least, existence of non-womb-born bodies is also proved from the evidence of *Veda*.³⁵ It means that in the *Veda* itself, there is a mention that God created the *Brāhmaṇa* from his mouth. Therefore it may be said that there exist particular non-womb-born bodies.³⁶

It signifies the distinction between naturally born or womb-born (*yonija*) beings. It means that the former are those which are born due to combination of semen from the father and blood from the mother,³⁷ while the latter are those which do not require this physical combination and are caused directly from the earthly atoms, assisted either by the special kind of merit in the case of bodies of sages or gods or by a particular type of demerit in the case of small creatures who are born for experiencing pain only (*yātanaśarīra*).³⁸ This type of classification does not imply any difference between the bodies as such, because both form a part of the physical order in Kaṇāda's view.

The womb-born (*yonija*) earthly bodies are again subdivided in two categories: embryonic (*jarāyuja*) and egg-born (*aṇḍaja*).³⁹ In the later tradition of Vaiśeṣika, we also find mention of bodies born due to perspiration or heat (*sveda*) and bodies sprouting from the soil (*udbhija*).⁴⁰ The former are represented by the bodies of lice and mosquitoes etc. while the latter are held to be those of trees, grass and herbs. Both these forms have been classified under the '*ayonija*' type of bodies.⁴¹ One of the later commentators has again classified the *ayonija* type of bodies in three categories: '*sveda*', '*udbhija*' and '*dharmādharmajanya*' bodies born due to merit or demerit of self respectively.⁴²

The earthly bodies are of four types – bodies of human beings and quadrupeds are enumerated as '*jarāyuja*', bodies of birds and reptiles are termed *aṇḍaja*, of worms and insects as *sveda* and of grass and herbs as *udbhija*. Significantly Praśastapāda has not put the trees etc. under the *udbhija* category of bodies, rather he has described them under the third type of earthly objects, i.e. the *sthāvara*. However, one of his

commentators, Udayana, has mentioned that the trees etc. also sprout from earth, therefore those should also have been discussed under *udbhija* types of bodies, but perhaps the preceptor (*ācārya*) wanted to emphasise the lesser manifestation of consciousness and immobility as well as utility of trees etc. for those who are mobile and so has discussed them under the earthly objects.⁴³ Other Vaiśeṣika scholars such as Śaṅkara Miśra have followed him and clearly stated that although the trees etc. are also types of bodies because growth, decay, repairing of wounds, conjunction with vital air etc. and, above all, scriptural testimony all prove the same; yet they are not treated as (living beings with) bodies, because being endowed with voluntary action and sense-organs is not clearly seen in trees etc.⁴⁴

In other words, it is true that the trees etc. do not have clear signs like sense-organs and they cannot undertake voluntary action for acquiring something desirable and avoiding something undesirable. Therefore they are not treated as living bodies.⁴⁵ However, this is clear proof to suggest that the classical Vaiśeṣika scholars had, in ancient times, intuitively realised that the trees etc. have life and therefore they are stated to possess bodies in Vaiśeṣika texts.

As regards the evidence for proving the existence of *ayoniya* bodies, the Vaiśeṣika sources of later periods suggest that neither perception nor inference can prove them, only scriptural testimony can be quoted in this case because the bodies like those of '*Hiraṇyagarbha*' are known through the Vedas,⁴⁶ while Manu etc. are said to be the mental progeny of the sage '*Brahmā*'. The logic behind these two types of bodies, given in the commentaries of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, is that the *yonija* type of bodies are born for experiencing the suffering of staying in the womb; otherwise the *ayoniya* types of bodies become the abode of experiencing all other forms of suffering except that of staying in the womb.

What follows from the above brief description is that according to the Vaiśeṣika (and Nyāya) view, body is not just a material product, there is also an input of merit and demerit accrued during previous births.⁴⁷ It means that the respective bodies are granted to each living being as per their merit earned through past actions.⁴⁸ In other words, one who has performed good, better or best deeds in their previous lives will get a good, better or best body⁴⁹ like that of a human being, sage or a divine being such as *Brahmā*, *Indra* and *Prajāpati*.⁵⁰ Similarly, one who has acquired more negative residual in one's account will get a lesser body of a ghost or an animal like that.⁵¹

In other words, although the body is non-abiding (*anitya*) in nature, yet its birth and death are dependent upon the unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*), which is the result of past actions. So it may be said that the body, though material in nature, is based on non-material, unseen forces (*adṛṣṭa*); therefore description and classification of body as per Vaiśeṣika sources is also based on the underlying principle of *karma* and rebirth.

Subtle body (sūkṣma śarīra)

The Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools do not discuss details of subtle body as conceived in the Sāṅkhya or Vedānta systems in the name of '*liṅga śarīra*'. Therefore, it may

be presumed that the Vaiṣeṣika scholars have mainly discussed the gross body (*sthūla śarīra*) only. Interestingly, Potter has credited Vyomaśiva as the single Vaiṣeṣika scholar for recognising the existence of subtle body on the basis of Vedic authority.⁵² However, on closer study it is revealed that Praśastapāda himself has hinted at a transportive or etheric body (*ātivāhika śarīra*) while discussing involuntary action (*apratyaya karma*);⁵³ in fact it is his clue on this aspect of body which has been elaborated by Vyomaśiva who even uses the term 'sūkṣma śarīra'.⁵⁴ Śrīdhara has also explained the idea of Praśastapāda in his commentary.⁵⁵

Accordingly, when death takes place, in close proximity of the dead body a subtle and imperceptible transportive or etheric body is produced from atoms, activated by the unseen force (*adrṣṭa*) of the particular soul.⁵⁶ In this state, mind becomes separated from the body and the action of the mind that disjoins it from the body is called *apasarpaṇa*.

After leaving the previous dead body, mind (*manas*) comes in contact with a fresh, subtle body called 'ātivāhikaśarīra' which is produced by a fresh set of merits and demerits. The existence of such a subtle and imperceptible body has to be accepted because mind (*manas*), being atomic, cannot come into motion without the help of an organism. The motion which brings mind (*manas*) in contact with this subtle body known as *ātivāhika śarīra*, is called going upwards, i.e. 'upasarpaṇa'.

Dead body (mṛta śarīra)

This leads us to the conception of 'dead body' in Vaiṣeṣika. Śrīdhara says that 'being an abode of experiencing pleasure and pain etc.' this definition of body is also applicable to the dead body because of its (earlier) capability to do so.⁵⁷ In other words, just as the sleeping body is known as 'body' because of breathing and digesting processes being caused by a special kind of effort (*jīvanayoni prayatna*), although there is no voluntary action, similarly the dead body is also termed as body due to its being a substratum of effort and experience.⁵⁸

God's body (īśvara-śarīra)

It is not out of place to mention here that the Vaiṣeṣika texts have also briefly discussed the issue of God's body. God is never embodied in Vaiṣeṣika view. Although He is stated to be the creator of the world, it has been argued that it is not essential for an agent to be embodied. A conscious agent can activate insentient objects even without bodily activity,⁵⁹ because agency does not necessarily mean being associated with a body. Moreover, if it is still insisted that God has to be embodied, then the body being an effect will require another body as its cause and this will lead to *infinite regress* (*anavasthā*). Therefore it is more logical to hold that God does not have a body, or even if He has to have some object as an abode of action, then atoms can be taken to be the abode.⁶⁰

Faculties of knowing (*indriyas*)

The act of knowing cannot be accomplished without the faculties or instruments of knowing, i.e. the sense-organs (*indriyas*). The sense-organ (*indriya*) has been defined by Śrīdhara as a substance which subsists in the body and is instrumental in direct perception for the agent of knowing.⁶¹

Udayana explains a sense-organ as that which is conjoined with the body, is a means of direct cognition but is itself imperceptible.⁶²

Śaṅkara Miśra has given two definitions of sense-organ:

- A substratum of mental conjunction which is the cause of cognition, but not of memory.
- A substratum of mental contact which gives rise to cognition, but is not the seat of manifest specific attributes except sound.⁶³

Types of organs of knowing: external and internal

Accordingly there are six types of sense-organs; five external sense-organs and one internal organ which is not physical – these six organs have been accepted as six faculties of direct cognition in Vaiśeṣika.

The details of these five external sense-organs⁶⁴ are defined as follows. The five external sense faculties (*bāhyendriyas*) are named respectively as olfactory (*ghrāṇa*), visual (*cakṣu*), gustatory (*rasanā*), tactile (*tvak*) and auditory (*śrotra*) (while the sixth, internal faculty is termed as mind, i.e. *manas*). Of these, the first four sense-faculties are said to be constituted of the respective atoms (*paramāṇus*) of their elemental substances, namely earth, fire, water and air, while the fifth is just a delimitation of all-pervasive ‘*ākāśa*’ in the eardrum.⁶⁵ This is so because ‘*śrotra*’ cannot be said to be a product of ‘*ākāśa*’ as other sense-faculties are of their respective substances; *ākāśa*, being one and indivisible, does not have atoms as its parts. The sixth and internal faculty of knowing, i.e. the mind (*manas*) is itself a minute substance which is a direct instrument in the process of knowing when it is in conjunction with the body.⁶⁶ The Vaiśeṣikas have propounded it as an internal organ and the Naiyāyikas have also accepted this.⁶⁷

As already mentioned, *indriya* has been defined as an imperceptible instrument of knowing, in conjunction with the body.⁶⁸ It means that the sense organs cannot cognise themselves, even though everything else is cognised by the embodied self with the help of these sense-organs – external as well as internal.

Further, the knowledge which arises out of a sense-organ and object is characterised as perception (*pratyakṣa*) in Vaiśeṣika.⁶⁹ It is stated to be of six types:

- olfactory (*ghrāṇaja*);
- gustatory (*rāsana*);
- visual (*cākṣuṣa*);
- tactile (*tvāca*);

- auditory (*śrāvaṇa*);
- mental (*mānasa*).

In this regard, it is interesting to quote a modern exponent of Vaiśeṣika:

Kaṇāda alone seems to stress the fact that each of the elemental substances gets expressed in the three spheres of matter (*viśaya* i.e. material entities), life (*śarīra*) and the senses (*indriya*) as the instruments of mental experience (V.S., 4/2/1). *Śarīra* speaks of the form and the location of the primal form of the element as e.g. fire (*tejas*) is said to belong to the solar system (*āditya-loke*) (T.S., 12.) and it is said to be manifest in the form of luminous objects, earthly, celestial, physiological and mineral. That is to say, the term '*śarīra*' signifies the bodily form including the organic. '*Indriya*' refers to the specific sense-organ to which a given element is perceptible. The three fold ordering in terms of matter, life and the sense-organs or the instruments of mental experience spells out what is commonly spoken of as the world of existence and experience.

(Gajendragadkar 1988, p. 286)

In Vaiśeṣika (and Nyāya's) view, the sense-organs are held to be physical in nature, because they are constituted of physical elements.⁷⁰ It has also been clarified that if the sense-organs were accepted as non-physical in character, there would be a problem of simultaneous cognitions of all the objects in the world. Since this is not the case and each sense-organ is capable of revealing the existence of any object of one particular class of objects, it therefore has to be accepted that each sense-organ is constituted by the physical element whose respective qualities are grasped by it. But it also needs to be clarified that the Vaiśeṣika view of sense-organs does not, in fact, denote a bodily organ in the physiological aspect, rather it is a peculiar faculty, for receiving the specific attributes pertaining to their respective causes.

Accordingly a separate account of each of the five external sense-organs is given below according to Vaiśeṣika sources.

Olfactory sense (ghrāṇa indriya)

Kaṇāda has clearly stated that the sense of smell is capable of grasping the property of smell only which is a specific attribute of earth, hence it is produced out of earthly (*pārthiva*) atoms. Although being earthly in nature, it has all the properties attributed to earth, yet smell is its most significant property.⁷¹ It means that the faculty of smelling cannot manifest any other property except odour. Therefore Praśastapāda asserts that the sense-organ which is constituted of pure earthly atoms only, and not of watery or other types of atoms and enables everyone to experience the property of smell, is to be known as '*ghrāṇa*'.⁷² Śrīdhara has clarified the nature of *ghrāṇa* on the basis of derivation of the term. Accordingly the faculty which is responsible for enabling the self to experience smell, is termed *ghrāṇa*.⁷³

As regards the evidence for proving the existence of olfactory sense-organ, Vaiṣeṣika scholars have posed the following inference: each action requires an instrument, and since the experience of smell is an action, it should also have an instrument, and that instrument is the faculty of smell (*ghrāṇendriya*).⁷⁴

It also needs to be noted here that the sense faculty of smell, being earthly according to Vaiṣeṣika, is itself endowed with the property of smell, but it cannot manifest its own smell, because by definition, all the senses are held to be imperceptible. In other words, although the human body is stated to be constituted of earthly atoms, yet no other part of the human body except the sense of smell can manifest the property of odour. At the same time, the sense of smell can also not manifest smell when it is overpowered by watery elements like phlegm etc. It is therefore correct to say that the faculty of smell which is constituted only of earthly atoms, when unobstructed by watery effects, can grasp the property of smell.⁷⁵ Moreover just as the faculty of smell is imperceptible, likewise its own smell is also imperceptible according to Vaiṣeṣika.⁷⁶

The faculty of smell is said to be located in the tip of the nose, but the same should not be mistaken to be the olfactory sense organ itself, since *ghrāṇa* as such is not a physical part of the gross body, rather it is the imperceptible capability to smell.

Last but not least, the faculty of smelling does not reach out to the property of smell, it only manifests the odour of any object when the latter comes in contact with it. In technical terms of Vaiṣeṣika, this is known as ‘manifesting an object after receiving it’ (*prāpyaparakāśakāritva*).⁷⁷

In brief, the sense of smell is an earthly substance, in which the property of smell inheres with several other properties but manifests smell only.⁷⁸

Gustatory sense (rasanā indriya)

The sense of taste is an instrument for enabling people to experience the property of taste (*rasa*).⁷⁹ It is termed as *rasanā* because it is constituted of watery atoms, unobstructed by other substances.⁸⁰ It is said to be situated in the frontal part of the tongue.⁸¹

Visual sense (cakṣu indriya)

According to Vaiṣeṣika, the visual sense is the instrument for receiving colour and is itself constituted of the third substance, fire, i.e. *tejas*, which is stated to be the substratum of luminous white colour and hot touch.⁸² The visual sense does not contain manifest form and touch and is held to be located in the black ball of the eye.⁸³

Tactile sense (tvak indriya)

The faculty for grasping sensations of touch in the human body is termed as ‘*tvak indriya*’ in Vaiṣeṣika sources. It is held to be constituted of air atoms and is located

in the skin which covers the whole human body.⁸⁴ However, it should not be confused with the outer skin, because the cold or hot touch is not only experienced externally but also up to the core of the heart.⁸⁵

Auditory sense (śrotra indriya)

The fifth physical faculty of knowing is defined in the Vaiśeṣika view as ether (*ākāśa*), itself, of course, delimited in the eardrum because it is there that the sensation of sound is received.⁸⁶ The peculiarity of this particular sense, i.e. 'śrotra', is its identity with the physical element ether (*ākāśa*), which is held to be one and partless, and it has already been proved (while delineating the nature of the fifth substance) that ether (*ākāśa*) is the substratum of sound, since no other substance can be comprehended from that aspect. Nonetheless, it must also be clarified that the auditory sense, although held to be identical with the substance ether, should not be mistaken as being co-extensive with it, since ether as a substance is all-pervasive, but sound is not heard everywhere by everybody. It is only in the limited portion of the eardrum that the sound is heard by a particular individual – so ether, only in the form of *śrotra*, i.e. enclosed within the aural cavity, is an instrument for receiving the quality of sound.⁸⁷

What follows from the above is that the Vaiśeṣika worldview envisages the body of living beings as an abode of knowing, but the process of knowing cannot be accomplished without the faculties or sense-organs. The five external sense-organs have also been discussed here. In fact the act of cognising begins with the external world in the form of objects which are grasped by their respective sense-organs. In brief, the significance of body, as well as sense-organs, is accepted in the classical Vaiśeṣika tradition.

8 Instrument of knowing (*manas*)

The ninth and last substance in the list of Vaiśeṣika philosophy is termed as mind (*manas*) and has been described as an internal organ.¹ Ordinarily, mind in Indian tradition has been enunciated as a means for meditation,² and the significance of the Vaiśeṣika view lies in the fact that here it is accepted not only as an instrument for experiencing internal emotions such as pleasure and pain but also as an essential instrument for cognition of external objects by other sense-organs.³

Means for knowing of mind

Kaṇāda has argued for proving the existence of mind by citing an inferential reason. Although the self and the sense-organs are in contact with their objects at all times, the occurrence of cognition takes place at some times only and not always: this is evidence that there is something other than these entities which acts as an instrument of knowing. It is due to the absence of this mediator that the ever-presence of ubiquitous self and its continuous contact with the external objects cannot generate a cognition.⁴

Gautama, the author of *Nyāyasūtras*, has explained the process for proving the existence of mind in another way. Accordingly, cognitions are always successive in nature and are not simultaneous. It suggests that there has to be some minute substance which is instrumental in the cognitive process but is missing at times, because the self, being eternal and all-pervasive, is always in contact with all the external sense-organs and all the external objects. We can vouch from our own experience that we do not cognise all the objects simultaneously, but successively.⁵ Therefore, it follows that neither the contact between sense-organs and the objects, nor the contact between the self and the sense-organs, is enough for producing a cognition: rather it is a third contact between mind and the sense-organs which when present generates a cognition and when absent, bars it from taking place.⁶ The minute mind is held to come in contact with each of the sense-organs successively and its existence has been proved as an 'inter-sensory switching device'.⁷

Praśastapāda has given two more reasons that prove the existence of mind:

- Mind is the reason for memory.⁸ Śrīdhara elaborates this argument further and explains that just as other cognitions arise out of a sense-organ, similarly

memory also requires some organ other than the external sense-organs because even a deaf person has the memory of sound, although at present his audio faculty is not in any contact with the external sound.⁹ Therefore it is proved that mind is the internal organ due to which memory is possible.

- The experience of other internal properties such as pleasure, pain etc. is also made possible by the internal organ mind,¹⁰ because these are not perceptible by external sense-organs, yet it is not to be doubted that we do experience these.¹¹

Therefore it may be stated that in classical Vaiśeṣika, the existence of mind as an internal organ is proved through the three arguments explained above. However, Vātsyāyana, the commentator of *Nyāyasūtras*, has adduced more arguments such as occurrence of cognitions like doubt, intuition, dream, desire etc.¹² Udayana has proved the existence of mind by posing an argument that the internal cognition of oneself being direct experience, like the perception of colour etc., requires an internal instrument which is the mind.¹³ Vallabha has also posed similar arguments.¹⁴ Viśvanātha has proved the existence of mind on the basis of inference¹⁵ and Nṛsiṃhadeva, in his commentary titled *Prabhā* thereupon, has elaborated this argument in a different manner.¹⁶ This has been further explained by the author of *Siddhānta-Candrodaya*, a commentary on *Tarkasamgraha*.¹⁷

Note that mind, being minute in size, cannot be perceived by external sense-organs and so is held to be imperceptible in the Vaiśeṣika tradition. In view of this, it is clear that it can be known only through inference. Various reasons and arguments, as described above, have been given in ancient and later texts of Vaiśeṣika to prove that mind acts as an instrument in the process of knowing.

Definition of mind

Kaṇāda has not given any specific definition of mind, just the inferential argument for proving its existence, and has also enumerated its substancehood (*dravyatva*), eternal nature, (*nityatva*) and number (*saṅkhyā*).¹⁸

Praśastapāda has defined mind as a substance in which inheres the generic character called 'mindness' (*manastva*).¹⁹ In the words of Udayana, 'mind is the corporeal substance, which is devoid of touch'.²⁰ Śivāditya has repeated this and added one more epithet: mind is the substratum of activity as well.²¹ Vallabha, the author of *Nyāyalīlāvati*, has stated that the internal organ which is responsible for all internal experiences such as pleasure etc. is mind.²² According to Vātsyāyana, mind is the instrument for all kinds of cognition.²³ Later scholars like Vādi Vāgīśvara have further given several definitions of mind which do not offer any fresh insights but rather repeat the aspects cited above.²⁴

What follows from the above is that in Vaiśeṣika mind is held to be an internal organ and an instrument for all types of cognitions.²⁵

Attributes of mind

Because mind has been accepted as a substance in Vaiśeṣika (and the substance according to Vaiśeṣika is already defined as a substratum of attributes), it is useful

to discuss the number of attributes pertaining to it. In all, eight attributes have been ascribed to the mind:

- number (*saṅkhyā*);
- magnitude (*parimāṇa*);
- severalty (*prthaktva*);
- conjunction (*saṁyoga*);
- disjunction (*vibhāga*);
- proximity (*paratva*);
- remoteness (*aparatva*);
- velocity (*vega saṁskāra*).²⁶

Of these the first five, being common attributes, pertain to all the nine substances, while the remaining three are ascribed to their respective substances. Significantly, mind does not have any specific attributes according to Vaiśeṣika.

Details of the eight generic attributes belonging to the mind are now discussed.

Number (saṅkhyā)

Mind as a substance has plural number, i.e. there are as many minds as selves, since each self is said to be conjoined with an independent mind. Kaṇāda has stated that each body is related to an independent mind, because two cognitions or two efforts cannot be produced simultaneously in one body.²⁷

This statement needs to be explained on two counts. First, there are as many minds as the selves or bodies. In other words, the very epithet expressing the class character of mindness (*manastva*) can only be inferred if the minds are held to be innumerable, because each self/body is endowed with a different mind;²⁸ a mind pertaining to a particular body cannot function on behalf of the other body.²⁹

Second, each body is endowed with one mind only; multiplicity of minds should not be misconstrued to convey that there is more than one mind pertaining to one body.³⁰ In fact, this view pertains to Gangesa, the author of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, and has been quoted by Śāṅkara Mīśra, the later commentator of Kaṇāda.³¹ According to some scholars, there is more than one mind in each body which are in turn related to different sense-organs; so there can be more than one cognition at the same time. However, on closer scrutiny, it becomes clear that Vaiśeṣika scholars such as Udayana have rejected this view by saying that of course at times we feel as if we are having simultaneous cognitions, but actually they are occurring in succession only; due to their speed we do not feel their succession and mistake them as being simultaneous.³²

Therefore mind is said to be multiple in number, since each self is associated with a separate mind.³³

Magnitude (parimāṇa)

The size of mind, according to Vaiśeṣika, is minute.³⁴ Kaṇāda has stated that mind is minute because it is not all-pervasive; that mind is a substance and is eternal

goes without saying.³⁵ Śrīdhara clarifies that there is no discrepancy in the rule that an eternal substance which is not pervasive has to be minute.³⁶

Vaiśeṣika scholars have argued that the self has already been accepted to be pervasive, now if mind is also held to be of the same magnitude, there will be no possibility of conjunction between the two, and consequently no cognition can take place because two pervasive substances cannot conjoin according to Vaiśeṣika.³⁷

There are a few scholars from other schools of Indian thought, such as that of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, who hold that mind is of pervasive magnitude. Their viewpoint has been quoted in Vaiśeṣika sources as the opponents' view (*pūrvapakṣa*)³⁸ but has been rejected on two grounds: first, if the self and mind are both held to be pervasive there cannot be any conjunction as clarified above. Hence, cognition and pleasure etc. cannot take place since there will be no non-inherent cause to produce them.³⁹ Second, if the self and mind both be accepted as pervasive, then it will lead to a situation where a discrepancy would arise in the sense that a contact between two pervasive substances would have to be assumed, which is not acceptable. Moreover, if the mind be accepted as a pervasive substance, then it would always be in contact with the self (which is also a pervasive substance according to Vaiśeṣika). Consequently, there would be constant cognitive activity due to which there will be no possibility of sleep. Therefore it is more logical to hold that mind is minute.⁴⁰

It has also been suggested by some opponents that keeping in view the above problems, mind should be accepted as of medium magnitude⁴¹ rather than a pervasive one. Vaiśeṣikas have rejected this suggestion due to several inconsistencies and have concluded that mind is undoubtedly of minute magnitude.⁴²

Severalty (prthaktva)

Since mind has an attribute of number, so it also has to have separateness⁴³ because wherever there is the notion of number, separateness invariably co-exists in that substance⁴⁴ according to Praśastapāda and his commentators.

Conjunction and disjunction (saṃyoga and vibhāga)

Kaṇāda has stated that since mind moves out of one body (*upasarpaṇa*) and moves into (*apasarpaṇa*) another body at the time of death, hence it is proved that this is caused due to an unseen force (*adrṣṭa*) and is made possible due to conjunction and disjunction.⁴⁵ Praśastapāda has accepted this and Udayana has clarified it by saying that moving out of one body is in fact the motion of mind which affects its disjunction, while moving into another body is also the motion of mind leading to its conjunction. So these two attributes have to be accepted as pertaining to the mind, otherwise there will not be any logical explanation for rebirth.⁴⁶

Proximity, remoteness and velocity (paratva, aparatva and vega saṃskāra)

In Vaiśeṣika, mind is also held to be the substratum of these three attributes because it is stated to be a corporeal substance.⁴⁷

Nature of mind

Besides the eight attributes ascribed to mind, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya scholars have also suggested other characteristics which help in understanding the nature of mind. Some of these are listed below:

- Mind, being a minute substance, is not perceptible through external sense-organs because perceptibility is possible only when the substance is gross, has many parts and has colour.⁴⁸
- Mind is not a causal substance. In other words, mind cannot be an inherent cause for producing any other substantial effect, because only tactile substances can cause similar effects.⁴⁹ Since mind is not a tactile substance, it cannot give rise to any effect.⁵⁰
- Since mind is the substratum of motion, it is already proved that being of minute magnitude, mind is a corporeal substance.⁵¹ Another reason in the form of 'being a substratum of motion' (*kriyāvattva*) has also been adduced.⁵²
- Mind is not conscious in Vaiśeṣika, so it is not held to be a knower like the self, otherwise there will be a problem of two agents operating in one body,⁵³ but since it is not the case and it is observed that the body indulges in or abstains from certain objects due to the intention of a single self, mind is proved to be unconscious;⁵⁴ but of course it operates as an instrument in the process of knowing.

Udayana has further clarified that the body of living beings is seen working in accordance with a single conscious agent, i.e. the self, while mind acts as an instrument in the cognitive process: both of these are not contradictory in nature but two different and complementary entities in the sense that one is the subject while the other is an instrument which is in turn engaged by the subject. If mind is also accepted as a substratum of consciousness there will be the discrepancy of accepting two substrata of experience, which is not the case in everyday life. Otherwise, there will be a peculiar situation where neither inactivity nor activity will be possible.⁵⁵ Interestingly Jayanta, the author of *Nyāyamañjarī*, has pointed out that in such a situation, not only will the possibility of cognition be ruled out but there will also be contradiction with the commonsensical experience.⁵⁶

Another commentator of Vaiśeṣika has explained this by saying that mind cannot be held to be a knower like the self, since it is in fact like the physical body which is controlled by the self. If it is accepted, as some have suggested, that the mind along with the self controls the physical body, then a body which is controlled by the self titled '*Caitra*', will not be able to act according to its own will, because there is another controller in the form of mind within that body. In that case, it will be impossible for any body to function. Hence it is more logical to accept that mind is the instrument for knowing, while self is the agent of knowing.⁵⁷

This is clearly stated by Frauwallner:

The psychical organ is unspiritual, because otherwise one body would shelter two spiritual entities and it would lead to a schizophrenia or splitting of the personality. Thus it is mere tool or instrument and stands as such in service to another, namely the soul.

(Frauwallner 1973, p. 152)

- Existence of mind, being an instrument, is for accomplishing the task of someone else, i.e. the self. Just as other material instruments like an axe etc. exist for being used by someone else to accomplish his task, likewise mind exists for the experience of pleasure and pain by the self,⁵⁸ of course when it is embodied.
- Mind does not have any specific attribute⁵⁹ out of the list of 16 such attributes⁶⁰ enumerated in the Vaiśeṣika texts.
- Mind moves very fast because of the effort during life and merit as well as demerit of the self after death of its respective body.⁶¹
- Mind is different from the five material substances (*bhūṭadravyas*) and can therefore grasp any object, unlike the external sense organs which, being material, can only grasp their respective objects.⁶²
- It is also worth mentioning here that Ragunātha Śiromaṇi, one of the later scholars of the combined Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, has deviated from the classical theory enunciated above and said that mind is also a material substance (*bhūṭadravya*) which does not inhere in any other substance.⁶³
- Mind is the ground for bondage. Since each mind is associated with a particular body and acts as an instrument for experiencing of pleasure and pain by the self, hence it is in fact the main reason for existence of the practical world; therefore it is said to be the cause of bondage.⁶⁴
- The relation between mind and body (though it is held to be conjunction which is by definition temporary) has been said to be beginningless.⁶⁵
- Mind is the substratum of attributes (and activities), so it is stated to be a substance in the Vaiśeṣika scheme of things.⁶⁶
- Like other Navya Naiyāyika scholars, Raghunātha also claims that mind is not minute (*aṇu*) as proposed by classical Vaiśeṣika scholars, but is of the magnitude of a triad (*truṭi*),⁶⁷ which is held to be of the basic gross magnitude (*mahat*).

Significantly, the followers of classical Vaiśeṣika do not agree with Ragunātha and his followers who hold the view that mind is of minute magnitude. They have argued that if mind be accepted as that of basic gross magnitude like a triad, then it would have to be accepted as perishable.⁶⁸

One of the later Vaiśeṣika authors has talked of an inactive mind '*pañḍa manas*' in the state of liberation when the self is disembodied and free of all types of activating forces (*adṛṣṭa*), or in any other situation in which mind does not generate any cognition.⁶⁹

The Vaiśeṣika view of mind has been propounded in the form of an independent substance which is minute in magnitude and permanently associated with a particular self until such time as it is liberated finally.

Mind and activity

Kaṇāda has also described in detail the activity pertaining to mind. Accordingly, the first motion in mind is produced by the unseen force (*adr̥ṣṭa*) at the time of creation.⁷⁰ At all other times, i.e. during the continued cosmic activity, mental motion can be understood just like any other form of motion such as the movement in hand. It means that due to a desire of the individual self, an effort is produced which in turn causes motion in mind and subsequently physical activity takes place. Then follows the rise of pleasure and pain, which is made possible through a contact amongst the four: self, mind, sense-organ and the object.⁷¹ Out of these four the latter two are external; of the remaining two internal ones the first, being the substratum of consciousness, is the agent, while the remaining one, mind, is a mediator between the external and internal world.

Obviously, mind cannot conjoin with the external world on the one hand and internal self on the other hand, if it does not have any motion. In fact mind has been stated to possess motion in the fastest possible velocity, since it is minute in size and has no weight. Therefore various texts of Indian philosophy describe mind as extremely active. The Vaiśeṣika view also proclaims that the ultimate aim of knowing can only be achieved when mind is quietened through practice of austerities and there is no mental motion which causes pleasure and pain to the individual self.⁷²

Various types of motion pertaining to the mind have been discussed in source texts of Vaiśeṣika, particularly moving out of one body (*apasarpana*) and moving into the other (*upasarpana*). One significant assertion about this aspect of mind is that although there are several metaphorical statements for the motion of mind, ordinarily it can move only when it is associated with an individual self which is embodied. Moreover, it cannot go out of the physical body of a living being except in the state of final universal destruction (*mahāpralaya*).⁷³ It is true that extraordinary persons like the *yogins* have unique powers to send their mind to desired places so that it can go out of their living bodies and return to it, but that is due to a special sort of merit and demerit only; in the case of ordinary persons, it is not possible for their mind to go out of the living organism because there is no activity associated with it.⁷⁴

Production of a non-physical, subtle body is envisaged by Vaiśeṣika scholars and is said to be produced by the activity in atoms. The same is in turn caused through the merit and demerit accumulated by the self in its past body. This subtle body is characterised as '*ātivāhika śarīra*' in Vaiśeṣika texts because it carries the merit and demerit of the self and enables the mind to move, so that it can reach out to other regions such as heaven or hell and become associated with a new body for experiencing the results of its past actions.⁷⁵ This has been explained accordingly because mind cannot move without a body except at the time of final dissolution.

Here a question arises as to when the ordinary causes of motion, namely weight, fluidity and elasticity, are not associated with the mind, how can there be any motion in it?⁷⁶ Also it cannot be sufficient to say that mind is active because it is corporeal, it has been rightly stated that motion in mind is sometimes generated through effort and sometimes through unseen force (*adr̥ṣṭa*).⁷⁷

In brief, the following three types of mental motion have been discussed in Vaiśeṣika sources:

- The initial motion at the beginning of creation which is caused due to unseen force (*adr̥ṣṭa*).
- The continuing mental motion within living beings during waking, dream and sleeping stages.⁷⁸
- The final motion at the time of death, when the present body has fallen dead, and the mind moves out of it to follow the self and become associated with another body according to the unseen force (*adr̥ṣṭa*) of the self.

Mind and universal (*manas* and *sāmānya*)

As already stated, the ninth substance, mind, being multiple in number and eternal in nature, is inhered with a universal called ‘mindness’ (*manastva*).⁷⁹ This has been defined as a class pertaining to all the minds which are qualified with producing a particular type of motion that gives rise to a contact (between self and mind) and cognition takes place.⁸⁰

Once it is proved that minds are multiple in number, and each one of them (even though of the same type) is separate from one another, it is logical to infer that they are inhered with a particular class, i.e. mindness (*manastva*).

As regards the knowability of this particular class character, mindness (*manastva*) is not perceptible and has to be inferred because its substratum itself is imperceptible. It is so because, as already established, all the individuals pertaining to a particular class are inhered in by a class character, for example as a pot is inhered in by potness (*ghaatva*). Since all the minds are essentially of the same type (substance) and their functions are also similar, hence they are all inhered in by a class character, i.e. mindness (*manastva*).⁸¹

Mind and particularity (*manas* and *viśeṣa*)

Mind as a substance has been held to be eternal and multiple, so each mind is also inherently related to its own particular (*viśeṣa*) according to Vaiśeṣika; there are as many minds as individual selves and all the innumerable minds are of the same type, so a question naturally arises as to what is the basis for their independence and distinctness? The magnitude of mind is accepted to be minute and it does not have any form or parts of its own, so it is not perceptible to the external sense-organs which can only grasp gross objects that are constituted of several parts and have colour.⁸² The problem of maintaining the distinctness of each mind is crucial

for Vaiśeṣika, not only in the present life, but also for future lives to come and even in the state of liberation⁸³ when each individual self devoid of all other attributes is associated with its own mind and stays in a distinct manner.

Hence it is accepted in Vaiśeṣika that each of the individual selves and minds is endowed with a particularity (*viśeṣa*) of its own, which distinguishes it from other individual entities of the same class, of course at the ultimate level of being, where all other types of differentiating factors do not work.⁸⁴

Mind and inherence (*manas* and *samavāya*)

As explained above, mind is related to its attributes (*guṇas*), activity (*karma*), class character (*jāti*) and particularity (*viśeṣa*) through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Inherence operates between five pairs of relata which have already been discussed elsewhere,⁸⁵ it will suffice to state here that mind as an eternal substance is inherently related to all these aspects. Moreover, it also enters into another type of relation accepted in Vaiśeṣika, conjunction or contact (*samyoga*), which operates only between two substances. Accordingly, mind is in contact with the external sense-organs on the one hand and with the individual self on the other.

In this way, mind acts as a mediator between the visible and invisible, gross and the subtle, matter and the spirit. The significance of mind is paramount in Vaiśeṣika, as in other schools of Indian philosophical thought.⁸⁶ Broadly speaking, the basic difference of the Vaiśeṣika view from the Sāṃkhya school in this regard is that while the latter accords mind a more active and participatory role in the process of knowing, the former posits it only as an instrument which cannot act independently on its own.⁸⁷ Nonetheless, since no cognition can take place without the instrumentality of mind, its essentiality remains undoubted. As regards the contemporary discussions on mind and cognition, both the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya views admit mind as an internal sense-organ which is different from the external sense organs as well as the self.

The inner sense accounts for inattention in such cases as when one fails to hear a clock ticking away nearby while one is absorbed in reading a book although the sound has reached the ear. The inner sense also accounts for one's direct awareness of internal states such as pleasure. A direct awareness, the Nyāya claims, is always sensory and, since the external senses are ruled out and since no sensory awareness can take place without a sense organ, an inner sense should be admitted. The inner sense coordinates the external senses and in this respect has some of the functions generally attributed nowadays to the brain.

(Chakrabarti 2001, p. 210)

9 Goal of knowing (*niḥśreyasa*)

Almost all of the schools of Indian philosophical tradition agree in accepting an ultimate goal (*parama puruṣārtha*) of life which signifies complete cessation of all kinds of pain and is variously expressed as *svarga*,¹ *apavarga*,² *mukti*,³ *vimukti*,⁴ *nirvāṇa*,⁵ *kaivalya*⁶ and *mokṣa*.⁷ In several schools the nomenclatures vary and the nature of this ultimate goal is conceived differently, although all schools are unanimous in holding a hopeful, perfect and positive conception of the final aim. In fact, this idea is a unique contribution of Indian philosophy to the world of thought. Accordingly, the Vaiśeṣika system has also posited an ultimate goal, which can be accomplished by knowing the true nature of reals.

***Niḥśreyasa*: the ultimate goal of knowing**

Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school, proclaims in the beginning of his discourse that he is going to explain the nature of that particular aspect of knowable objects, by knowing which, the ultimate goal of knowing, i.e. '*niḥśreyasa*' can be accomplished.⁸ The proclamation promises aspiring seekers of the highest good that the knowledge of this branch of learning will lead them to the fulfilment of twin objectives, namely: exaltation (*abhyudaya*) and liberation (*niḥśreyasa*), the latter being the higher and greater goal.

Although Kaṇāda has termed the ultimate goal *niḥśreyasa*, different Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya scholars have since used various epithets such as *mukti*,⁹ *mokṣa*,¹⁰ *apavarga*,¹¹ and of course *niḥśreyasa*,¹² interchangeably. Praśastapāda has even used a novel term – *mahodaya*¹³ – to denote the ultimate goal and this has been elaborated on by his commentators.¹⁴ Udayana says that *mahodaya* is the great gain, i.e. the source or knowledge which is the aim of human beings.¹⁵ While explaining the term, Śrīdhara has clarified that it indicates a great gain, i.e. the ultimate goal wherein all sorts of undesired elements are warded off for ever.¹⁶

In this connection, the following three aspects need to be discussed:

- the nature of the ultimate goal;
- proofs for positing the ultimate goal;
- means for attaining the goal.

The nature of the ultimate goal

It is worth noting at the outset that according to Vaiśeṣika, the nature of the ultimate goal is not different from the nature of *apavarga* conceived in the Nyāya school of Gautama.¹⁷ Kaṇāda has defined the final goal as liberation of self (*ātman*) from conjunction with all its attributes and there being no scope for further bondage.¹⁸ Significantly, he has here used the term *mokṣa* in place of *niḥśreyasa*. Praśastapāda, the commentator of Kaṇāda, elaborates the same and states that the self becomes free from the bondage of body and sense-organs etc. due to the cessation of merit and demerit (*dharma–adharma*), consequently, when there is no scope for acquisition of new organism, the state of *mokṣa* follows wherein all the passions are quietened like a fire whose fuel is consumed.¹⁹

The Vaiśeṣika view of an ultimate aim is distinct in the sense that it is not conceived as a state of eternal bliss, but rather as negation/absence of all attributes of the self.²⁰ In other words, it is the highest aspiration of all human beings to get rid of all kinds of suffering for ever, because nobody accepts the recurrence of pain after the state of final release.²¹ If all the attributes of self (*ātman*) including knowledge are annihilated in the state of liberation, then the self (*ātman*) itself will have to be accepted as extinct because the self, being eternal, does not get destroyed.²²

In view of the above, it is clear that the goal of knowing according to Vaiśeṣika is not only the cessation of pain but also all other attributes of the self, including knowledge and pleasure etc. It is therefore intriguing that while all the effort for knowing the true nature of objects in the world is directed towards attainment of an ultimate goal (*niḥśreyasa* or *mokṣa*), the same in turn is held to be devoid of 'knowing' itself in Vaiśeṣika.

Because of this very fact, it has been said that the Vaiśeṣika conception of liberation is negative in nature because it denies the existence of knowledge as well as pleasure in its ambit. The opponents of Vaiśeṣika and its sister school, Nyāya, have argued that it posits a goal which is no better than being a stone²³ since it does not attribute any consciousness or feelings to the liberated self (*ātman*).

Vaiśeṣika scholars have responded to such objections in the following way:

- There are people who think that it is better to enjoy the worldly pleasures while avoiding the pain rather than aspiring to such a negative goal. To them, it may be said that worldly pleasures are invariably mixed with pain and are not to be sought by wise persons. In fact, this system (*śāstra*) of Vaiśeṣika is meant for such wise seekers only, who reject the material pleasure and aspire to the highest goal.²⁴

Nonetheless, it may be alleged that such a negative state of liberation cannot be the goal of aspiration for anyone wise enough. Since the ultimate aim of all living beings is not only the total cessation of all sorrow but also the attainment of pleasure, a concept which denies the possibility of all pleasure will not be a desirable aim for any intelligent seeker. According to Udayana this allegation is

untenable, because pleasure is also transient, full of obstacles and not easily available; pleasure is invariably mingled with pain and therefore is to be abandoned like pain, just as food mixed with honey as well as poison is to be thrown away and not to be tasted.²⁵

Proofs for positing the ultimate goal

As far as the issue of proofs for positing the goal of *niḥśreyasa* is concerned, perception is out of the question in this case because there is no possibility of direct sense-organ contact. Therefore the next logical evidence, i.e. inference (*anumāna*), is used by most scholars of the Vaiśeṣika school to prove the existence of an ultimate goal which promises to provide complete freedom from all forms of suffering. Accordingly, it has been argued that ‘the series of pain being qualified, is destroyed completely, since it is a series, like the series of light rays emitted by the lamp’.²⁶

However, it is worth mentioning that counter-arguments have also been discussed with appropriate rejoinders from within the tradition.

Means for attaining the ultimate goal

Next comes the question of means for accomplishment of *niḥśreyasa*. Kaṇāda stated that the essential knowledge of reality through twin methods of scrutinising similarities (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarities (*vaidharmya*) is the valid means in this case.²⁷ To this, Praśastapāda has added that such type of essential knowledge is possible only when it is accompanied with a special sort of merit (*dharma*) that is ordained by the will of God.²⁸ It means that not just an ordinary awareness of facts, but an extraordinary sort of knowing coupled with appropriate ethical practices can lead the aspirant on his path to perfection.

Elaborating further on this issue, Kaṇāda discusses the path to perfection elsewhere and mentions that the mind needs to be quietened for attainment of this aim. The mind is usually attuned to focus on the external objects and helps the individual self in seeking pleasure of life which is essentially mixed with pain. When the same mind is trained to deactivate and focus on the self itself, it is not affected by bodily afflictions. Such a mental state has been defined as *yoga*.²⁹

In other words, the most important means for accomplishing the ultimate goal of *niḥśreyasa* is controlling one’s own mind according to Kaṇāda. This can be achieved by practising to fix one’s mind on the own inner self rather than the external world, beginning from the body and sense-organs.³⁰ When the mind is in its natural state, it mediates between self and sense-organs for experiencing worldly objects; this invariably results in pleasure and pain. If one aims to get rid of these afflictions, it is essential to overcome the physical level and contemplate the spiritual aspect. Udayana follows Kaṇāda in this respect and makes a significant statement that the means for accomplishment of the highest goal is the knowledge of reality.³¹ It is so because the root cause of bondage is the incorrect knowledge which can be countered only by its opposite, i.e. correct knowledge. Once it is removed, the attitude of attachment is extinguished, therefore the cycle

of birth is broken and finally the series of suffering is destroyed. In this way, correct knowledge can be attained by human effort.³² From this it follows that each one has to strive for his own betterment so as to ascend to the highest goal of liberation.

Here the next query crops up as to whether this state of liberation is achieved only through knowledge (*jñāna*) or through a combination of knowledge and action (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*). Śrīdhara differs from Udayana on this point and gives a straight answer to this question: it is the latter alternative that is acceptable to Vaiśeṣika.³³ This has been succinctly stated by him: ‘The mind is cleansed with the constant performance of actions while the true nature of self is realized with knowledge; liberation is achieved by practising action as well as knowledge.’³⁴

It is also interesting to compare and contrast the Vaiśeṣika view of *niḥśreyasa* with the views of other schools in this regard. Some of the commentators of *Praśastapādabhāṣya* discussed this point at the beginning of their texts. A brief outline of their observations follows: Vyomaśiva, the earliest exponent of *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, has quoted eight viewpoints in this regard including the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the Buddhists, the Yoga, the Jaina, the Advaita, the Śabādvaita of the grammarians and the Śaivas,³⁵ but rejected each of them and finally upheld the Vaiśeṣika view.

Another commentator, Śrīdhara, has also discussed the issue in detail:

- Some of the scholars (the *yogācāra* Buddhists) have propounded that the extinction of all mental impressions and cessation of all cognitions is the ultimate goal (*nirvāṇa*). They also quote some scriptural statements in support of their views.³⁶ But the Vaiśeṣikas refute this proposition on two counts: first, because no sane person is seen to strive for destruction of his own self which is dearest to one and all; second, the very word release (*mukti*) which is a synonym to the term great gain (*mahodaya*), denotes liberation from bondage rather than destruction of one’s own self.³⁷
- Others (*kṣāṇika-vijñāna-vādins*) might contend that the ultimate goal (*mahodaya*) is nothing but the rise of pure cognition, which is devoid of any affliction due to form of objects and which arises only when all mental impressions have ceased to exist. But this view is also not acceptable to Vaiśeṣika, because it does not follow the basic rule of causality.³⁸ The upholders of this view are the upholders of the momentary existence of everything, so they do not believe in any permanent entity. In such a situation, how can the so-called ‘pure cognition’ which is the result of accumulated mental impressions take place? Therefore, the theory of momentary cognitions cannot reasonably explain the concept of ultimate goal (*nirvāṇa*).
- The third group of scholars (the Sāṃkhyas) may propose that liberation of the self (*puruṣa*) takes place when the material world (*prakṛti*) withdraws itself due to the rise of discriminating knowledge within the self.³⁹ The Vaiśeṣikas have rejected this on the grounds that if the matter (*prakṛti*) by nature is active, how can it become indifferent on its own? The so-called activity of

matter is explained as leading to the ultimate goal, which is to be realised by the conscious self (*puruṣa*). If it is retorted that the matter withdraws its activity after realisation by the self, how can the unconscious matter understand this and withdraw itself?⁴⁰

- There are others (*advaita*-Vedāntins) who say that liberation is the manifestation of eternal, unparalleled bliss, which is the very nature of the self.⁴¹

However, this view is also not tenable, because it is inconsistent on the following counts: first, the above view does not properly explain why if in fact eternal bliss is the nature of self, is it not experienced during lifetime? Moreover, how is the so-called bliss experienced by the self during liberation when there is no mind, body etc.? If it is not experienced, then there is no purpose in accepting it.⁴²

It is more logical to hold that eternal bliss is not the nature of self and so the state of liberation is not an experience of the said bliss; rather it is the cessation of all the specific attributes ascribed to the self. In short, liberation is the state in which the self stays in its own nature, i.e. devoid of all its attributes, according to Vaiśeṣika. It has already been established (while expounding the nature of the ultimate goal) that such a state of self is in fact the final goal of knowing according to Vaiśeṣika.⁴³ Consequently, there is no further possibility of rebirth because all of the factors essential for its being embodied are already extinct, just as a fire is quietened when all the fuel has been burnt. In other words, when all the present factors such as body, sense-organs etc. are destroyed due to the cessation of all actions and the self has become, so to say, without any seed, i.e. *nirbhīja*, and there are no more causal components for future acquisition of body, sense-organs etc., then it is the state of liberation (*mokṣa*) for the self.⁴⁴

Udayana, the third commentator of Praśastapāda, has argued to prove that the Vaiśeṣika view of liberation is, in fact, mostly acceptable to all the exponents of this issue, since it propounds that liberation is the final cessation of suffering.⁴⁵ Accordingly, even the Sāṃkhyas and the Vedāntins agree upon one point: that it is the eternal self which stays in the state of liberation while the root cause of suffering, i.e. ignorance, is extinguished for ever.⁴⁶

Liberation while living (*jīvanmukti*)

Significantly, it also needs to be remarked here that there seems to be agreement among scholars of classical Vaiśeṣika regarding the final release or liberation of the self after the cycle of life and death has stopped. However, there is one visible exception to this position of Vaiśeṣika, when Śrīdhara openly declares (like the Sāṃkhyas and the Vedāntins) that a person can attain liberation while living (*jīvanmukti*). He goes on to quote from scriptures as well as *Sāṃkhyakārikā* to support his view⁴⁷ and clearly says that even he, who has already accomplished true nature of the self, has to live and perform his actions until the journey of his life is over.⁴⁸ Śrīvallabha seems to support the view of Śrīdhara in this case.⁴⁹

Liberation for all (*Sarvamukti*)

Udayana has raised another important issue regarding the possibility of liberation of all, i.e. *sarvamukti*,⁵⁰ traces of which are not available either in Kaṇāda or in Praśastapāda. This idea is of course discussed in Mahāyāna Buddhism wherein the *bodhisattva* defers his own liberation for the sake of liberation for all.⁵¹ However, Śrīdhara⁵² and also Śrīvallabha⁵³ of the Vaiśeṣika tradition have rejected this view.

To conclude, it may be stated that several Vaiśeṣika scholars have discussed the nature of the ultimate goal and have also tried to examine various views current in their time. During the course of this delineation, they have also discussed numerous related issues such as the means for achieving the ultimate goal, the nature of the ultimate goal etc. All of the terms used for denoting the idea of liberation, for example *mukti*, *mokṣa* and *niḥśreyasa*, have also been interchangeably used by them. Despite this they have adhered to the basic standpoint of Vaiśeṣika which holds that after achieving the ultimate aim, there is no pleasure or pain to be experienced by the self. It is the true nature of self which remains forever.

10 An overview

What emerges from the foregoing enunciation of Vaiśeṣika views ‘On Knowing and what is to be Known’ is summarised here:

- The system of Vaiśeṣika, propounded by an ancient Indian sage Kaṇāda, holds an important place in Indian philosophy not only owing to its realistic standpoint, but also because it deals with the basic human predicament as to how one can both attain material progress (*abhyudaya*) and accomplish the highest good (*nīḥśreyasa*).¹
- The Vaiśeṣika school embarks upon the journey of human understanding with the simple but significant premise of explaining the nature of ‘*dharma*’, which is the theme of knowing but is so wide in its scope that it cannot be defined in a precise manner, nor can it be rendered precisely in any other language.²
- Accordingly the objects of knowing (*padārthas*) in Vaiśeṣika are discussed with the objective of ascertaining the true nature of reality. Reality in turn is so vast and variegated that it is almost impossible to know each and every object in its own nature. Therefore, all the objects of the world are classified in six categories in classical Vaiśeṣika.³ Later a seventh category, negation or non-being (*abhāva*), was added to the list so as to make it more comprehensive and it was claimed that there is nothing in the universe which does not fall under any one of these categories:

The project of a comprehensive inventory, not just of a particular type of entities but of whatever there is, and the idea of an enumeration that includes and supersedes all other enumerations are central to this self understanding.

(Halbfass 1993, p. 70)

- It is worth emphasising that the Vaiśeṣika list of categories envisages a co-extensive presence of each individual entity, from the innumerable and most minute atoms to the most pervasive single substances like ether, space, time and multiple number of selves as well as God.
- More importantly, it has also been suggested that in the Indian philosophical

tradition this ‘enumerative description of world constituents’ can be of a different pattern altogether:

It may be an enumerative description of cosmic schemes, that is, a ‘vertical’ enumeration of stages of evolution, or a ‘horizontal’ classification of ultimate entities and classes of entities. In the history of classical Indian philosophy, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika exemplify these different types of cosmological enumeration.

(Halbfass 1993, p. 48)

- Once the scope of a study is set, the question of methods to be employed in undertaking the study must be mentioned. Kaṇāda has elucidated twin methods of knowing, similarity (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*), at the beginning of his discourse. These methods in turn are only suggestive, and an application of these may be extended further as has been demonstrated by Udayanācārya, an exponent of Vaiśeṣika philosophy.⁴
- Next comes the question of types of knowing and ways of knowing. The Vaiśeṣika philosophy, like all other schools of Indian philosophical tradition, has accepted that true knowledge of the reals (*tattvajñāna*) accepted here is in fact the path to perfection. Therefore defining and classifying the cognition is of paramount importance for classical Vaiśeṣika scholars. Kaṇāda classifies cognition primarily in two types; these two are again divided into four types of each:
 - non-veridical (*avidyā*):
 - i doubt (*saṁśaya*);
 - ii error (*viparyaya*);
 - iii irresolute cognition (*anadhyavasāya*);
 - iv dream (*svapna*).
 - veridical (*vidyā*):
 - i perceptive cognition (*pratyakṣajñānam*);
 - ii inferential cognition (*laiṅgikajñānam*);
 - iii memory (*smṛtījñānam*);
 - iv intuitive cognition (*ārsajñānam*).

Praśastapāda has simply characterised cognition (*jñāna*) as a synonym of knowledge (*buddhi*), understanding (*upalabdhi*) and becoming aware (*pratyaya*), but in the later tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a subtle distinction has been drawn between cognition (*jñāna*) and true cognition (*pramā*).⁵ Divisions and subdivisions of these two types of knowing have already been discussed in this book according to the sources of classical Vaiśeṣika.

All forms of cognition – eternal (*nitya*) and non-eternal (*anitya*), reproductive (*smṛti*) and productive (*anubhava*), direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*), determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*), external (*bāhya*) and internal (*āntara*), sensory and non-sensory⁶ – have been covered under the types of cognition in Vaiśeṣika.

Further, only two means of knowing (*pramāṇās*) have been accepted in classical Vaiśeṣika: perception (*pratyakṣapramāṇam*) and inference (*anumānam*). Later, two more were added to the list: analogy (*upmāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*), in the combined tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.⁷

- In the realistic worldview, knowledge in any form presupposes a knower or an agent who undertakes all the cognitive acts with a specific purpose in mind. Hence Vaiśeṣika philosophy propounds the existence of a knowing self (*jñātṛ*) with great rigour.⁸ Several signs have been given by Kaṇāda to prove that there is a self (*ātman*) within each living being, therefore plurality of selves is accepted.
- However, the self, being pervasive in magnitude, is motionless. It cannot operate without a body and the sense-organs. Therefore, self and its abode (body) as well as the faculties (sense-organs) of knowing have been expounded by Kaṇāda and his followers. Four types of body and five types of external sense-organs are enumerated in Vaiśeṣika. The body and the sense-organs are in fact the ground for all kinds of experiences.⁹
- Even though the individual self is endowed with a body and sense-organs, it cannot cognise anything unless there is a connecting link between the external objects and the internal world. Therefore, the ninth substance in the list of Vaiśeṣika, the mind, has been accepted as an instrument of knowing.¹⁰
- Indian philosophical tradition has broadly been teleological in its orientation. Accordingly every human action has to be purposive. Four human pursuits (*puruṣārthas*) have been accepted in Indian thought: *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. Therefore, all philosophical schools propound an ultimate aim as the highest good. The Vaiśeṣika system sets *nihīśreyasa* as the final goal of all endeavours, in which all kinds of suffering as well as pleasure will be warded off. The special feature of the Vaiśeṣika view in this regard is that there is no idea of permanent bliss in this goal, rather it is a state in which the self attains its true nature and is devoid of all attributes, good or bad.¹¹
- Last but not least, a summary of basic issues discussed in this book has been presented in a nutshell in the concluding chapter.¹²

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the contemporary relevance of Vaiśeṣika lies in the fact that the system emphasises the individual identity of each entity in the universe and brings into focus the distinctness (*viśeṣa*) among innumerable atoms, minds and selves, rather than the fundamental unity of all. Thus one of the later exponents of Vaiśeṣika has proclaimed that ‘There is no cognition whatsoever where distinctness does not shine forth. Just for this reason there is no proof for anything that is not a proof of distinctness.’¹³

To conclude, the following words of a recent exponent of Vaiśeṣika are worth quoting:

Vaiśeṣika, the most important of the systems of Nature-philosophy, brought forth with its doctrine of the categories a creation which represents an

important constituent of the thought-wealth of Indian Philosophy. Wide layers of later Indian Philosophy are formed through the manner of thought of the Vaiśeṣika and are dependent on it. They would be as little understood without the knowledge of this system as the scholastics of the Middle Ages without the philosophy of Aristotle.

(Frauwallner 1973, p. viii)

Notes

1 Introduction

- 1 *Śāstarūpārthe Vaiśeṣikaśabdasya vyutpattiḥ. Viśeṣaṁ padārthabhedamadhikṛtya kṛto granthaḥ. Nyāyakoṣa or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy* of Bhīmācārya Jhalkīkar, Reprint, Vāsudeva Śāstrī Abhyankar (revised and re-edited) Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1996, p. 812.
- 2 B. Faddegon, *The Vaiśeṣika System*, Amsterdam: Johannes Muller, 1918, p. 12.
- 3 *Kaṇān-attīti Kaṇādaḥ. Vyomavati* of Vyomaśivacārya, Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhundhiraj Shastri (eds), Benares: Chowkhamba, 1930, p. 20.
- 4 *Dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇa-karmasāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānām padārthānām sādharma-vaiddharmyābhyām tattvajñānānīḥśreyasam. The Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda* with the comments from the *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra and the *Vivṛtti* of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, A.E. Gough (English translation), New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975, 1/1/4.
- 5 *Śaṅṇāmapi padārthānāmastitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni. Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ (Padārthadharmaśāstrahākhyaṁ)* of Praśastapādācārya, 2nd edn, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 41.
- 6 *Abhidheyaḥ padārthaḥ. Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayanācārya, Shashinatha Jha (ed.), Darbhanga: Mithila Vidyapeetha, 1973, p. 1.
- 7 *Abhidheyaṭvaṁ padārthasāmānyalakṣaṇam. Tarka-Saṁgraha (TS)* of Annarībhāṭṭa, Y. V. Athalye (ed.) and M.R. Bodas, (English translation) 2nd edn, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974, p. 2.
- 8 *Pramitivaiśayāḥ padārthāḥ. Saptapadārthī* of Śivāditya, D. Gurumurti (ed. and English translation) Adyar: Theosophical Society, 1932, p. 2.
- 9 S.N. Bhaduri, *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Reprint, 1975, p. 7.
- 10 Vide M.R. Bodas, 'A Historical Survey of Indian Logic', Introduction to *TS*, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv.
- 11 *Artha iti dravyaguṇakarmasu. VAK*, 8/2/3.
- 12 Harsh Narain, *Evolution of The Early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology*, Varanasi: Bharati Prakashan, 1976, p. 86.
- 13 *Vaiśeṣikadarśanam* with the *Avijñātakartṛkavyākhyā*, Anantalal Thakur (ed.), Darbhanga: Mithila Vidyapeetha, 1957.
- 14 *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda, with the commentary of Candrānanda, Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji (ed.), Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1961.
- 15 Erich Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy* vol. II, trans. from German to English by V.M. Bedekar, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973, pp. 79–80.
- 16 *Setu* of Padmanābha Miśra, Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhundhiraj Shastri (eds), Benares: Chowkhamba, 1930, pp. 67–68.

- 17 A.N. Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature* (quoted by S. Radhakrishnan in *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 228), New Delhi: Oxford University Press (seventeenth imprint), 1999, p. 185.
- 18 *Kāṇādānāmīśvaro' stiti Yūktidīpikā*, quoted by Anantalal Thakur in Introduction to *Avijñātakarṭṭkavyākhyā*, p. 16.
- 19 *Kāśyapa ityapi Kāṇādasyaiva nāmāntaramataḥ Kāṇādasya darśanam Kāśyapīyaṁ darśanamapyabhidhīyate*. Muni Śrī Jambuvijaya in his introduction to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kāṇāda, 1961, p. 4.
- 20 Vide *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* of Madhavācārya, E.B. Cowell and A.E. Gough (eds), Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2007, p. 145.
- 21 *Pailukena Kāṇāda-śiṣyeṇa. Nyāyabindutīkā* of Dharmottara, Candrashekhara Shastri (ed.), Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1954, p. 88.
- 22 *Kāṇādena tu samproktaṁ sāstraṁ Vaiśeṣikaṁ mahat. Padmamahāpurāṇa*, Uttarakhaṇḍa, Chapter 236, verse 4.
- 23 *Samyuktasamavāyādaghnervaiśeṣikam*. VAK, 10/2/7.
- 24 *Viśeṣo vyavacchedaḥ, tattva-niścayaḥ tena vyavaharātīyarthah. Kiraṇavālī* of Udayanācārya, J.S. Jetly (ed.), Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971, p. 227.
- 25 M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1932, p. 225.
- 26 *Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. X, Benton: Helen Hemingway, 1973–74, p. 327.
- 27 *Ślāghyā viśeṣa-sthitiḥ. Nyāyalīlāvātī* of Vallabhācārya, 2nd edn, Harihara Śāstrī (ed.), Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1991, verse 2, p. 5.
- 28 See B.V. Subbarayappa, 'An estimate of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra in the history of science', *Journal of History of Indian Science*, 2.1, 1967, 22–34.
- 29 Vide H.N. Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, London: Oxford University Press, 1930, p. 16.
- 30 Vide *Avijñātakarṭṭkavyākhyā*, Anantalal Thakur (ed.), pp. 80–102 and *Commentary* of Candrānanda, Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji (ed.), pp. 77–140.
- 31 B.K. Matilal, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977, pp. 50–51.
- 32 *Sūtrārtho varṇyate yatra padaiḥ sūtrānusāribhiḥ. Svapadāni ca varṇyante taṁ bhāṣyaṁ bhāṣyavido viduḥ*. Quoted by Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra in *Vaiśeṣika Darśana* (Hindi), Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1968, p. 15.
- 33 *Vistareṇopadiṣṭānāmarthānāṁ sūtrabhāṣyayoḥ. Nibandho yaḥ samāsena samgrahaṁ taṁ vidurbudhāḥ*. Ibid. p. 16.
- 34 B. Faddegon, *The Vaiśeṣika System*, Amsterdam: Johannes Muller, 1918, pp. 32–33.
- 35 B.K. Matilal, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, 1977, p. 68.
- 36 Ibid, p. 69.
- 37 Ibid, p. 71.
- 38 Gopinath Kaviraj, *Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature*, Reprint, Calcutta: Indian Studies: Past and Present, 1961, p. 65.
- 39 Anantalal Thakur, *Origin and Development of the Vaiśeṣika System*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2003, p. 303.
- 40 Kaviraj, p. 45.
- 41 Vide ShashiPrabha Kumar, *VaiśeṣikaDarśana mein Padārtha-Nirūpaṇa* (Hindi), Delhi: Publications Division, University of Delhi, 1992, pp. 12–15.
- 42 Y.J. Padmarajah, *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1963, pp. 25–26.
- 43 Umesh Mishra, *Conception of Matter According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, Allahabad, 1936, pp. 18–21.
- 44 ShashiPrabha Kumar, 'Veda and Vaiśeṣika' in *Nigamakalpataru*, Part I, Kanjibhai Patel et al. (eds), Ahmedabad: Sanskrit Seva Samiti, 2011, pp. 226–38.
- 45 Anantalal Thakur, *Origin and Development of Vaiśeṣika System* (ODVS), pp. 367–72.
- 46 Bodas, Introduction to *TS*, p. xxviii.

- 47 See S. Sankaranarayanan, 'Śāṅkara and the Vaiśeṣika-Naiyāyika School' in *Perspectives of Śāṅkara*, R. Balasubramanian and Sibajiban Bhattacharya (eds), New Delhi: Department of Culture, Ministry of Human Resource Development Government of India, 1989, p. 147.
- 48 S.N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975, p. 280.
- 49 Vide *Śāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathi Miśra, Dharmadatta Jha (ed.), Varanasi: Krishnadas Academy, 1988, p. 73 (1.1.4), p. 115 (1.1.5).
- 50 Vide *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śāṅkaracārya, translated into English by Swāmī Gambhīrānanda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1996, II.2.11–17.
- 51 H. Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy According to the Daśapadārtha-Śāstra*, F.W. Thomas (ed.), Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1999.
- 52 Eli, Franco, 'Vaiśeṣika or Cārvāka? The mysterious opponent in Pramāṇavārttika, 2.36–72', *Asiatische Studien*, XLVIII.2.1994, pp. 683–98.
- 53 See Dharmendra Nath Shastri, *Critique of Indian Realism*, Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1976.
- 54 Anantalal Thakur, *ODVS*, pp. 7–8.
- 55 Anantalal Thakur, *ODVS*, pp. 367–450.

2 Theme of knowing in Vaiśeṣika

- 1 Frauwallner 1973, p. viii.
- 2 Jonardan Ganeri (2009) 'Analytic Philosophy in Early Modern India', <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/early-modern-india/> p. 1 (accessed 27 June 2012).
- 3 It should be remarked here that some of the modern scholars have tried to give religious colour to the Vaiśeṣika view of *dharma*, but as the definition of *dharma* provided by Kaṇāda suggests, this does not sit well with the basic thought structure of Vaiśeṣika. Vide Jan H. M. Houben, 'Liberation and natural philosophy', *Asiatische Studien*, XLVIII.2, 1994, p. 730.
- 4 *Athāto dharmam vyākhyāsyāmaḥ*. The *Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda* with comments from the *Upaskāra* of Śāṅkara Miśra and the *Vivṛtti* of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, translated into English by A.E. Gough, New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975, 1/1/1.
- 5 The Sanskrit term *dharma* is itself so wide in its connotation that it is almost impossible to render it in a single word of any other language. Although the translator of *Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda*, A.E. Gough has translated it as merit, yet that is only one aspect of it and not complete. The original term *dharma* has been retained here.
- 6 *Atheti śiṣyākāmṅkṣānantaryamāha. Ata iti. Yataḥ śravaṇādipatavo' nasūyakāścantevāsina upsedurīyarthāḥ*. *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* of Śāṅkara Miśra on the above, Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra (ed.) and Dhunḍhirāja Śāstrī (trans. Hindi), 2nd edn, Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 2002, pp. 5–6.
- 7 *Yato' bhyudayanīḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmāḥ*. VAK, 1/1/2.
- 8 *Svargāpavargayormārgamāmananti manīṣiṇaḥ*. *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana, A. Viśveśvara (ed.), Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1978, p. 13, 1.2.
- 9 *Athāto Dharmajijñāsā. Codanā lakṣaṇo'rtho dharmāḥ*. *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* of Jaimini (revised edition), N.V. Thadani (text with translation in English), Delhi: Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, 2001, 1.1.1–2.
- 10 Vide K.T. Pandurangī, 'Exposition of dharma as the central theme of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā', *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā from an Inter Disciplinary Point of View*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2006, pp. 182–84.
- 11 *Abhyudayaḥ svargādisukhaṁ nīḥśreyasaṁ muktiḥ*. In *Vaiśeṣikadarśanavārtikam* of Kṛṣṇa Bhūpāla, Anantalal Thakur (ed.), Darbhanga: Kameshwar Singh Darbhanga Sanskrit University, 1985, p. 8.
- 12 *Abhyudayastatvajñānam nīḥśreyasamāntyantikī duḥkhanivṛttiḥ tadubhyaṁ yataḥ sa dharmāḥ*. VSUp., 1/1/2, p. 11.

- 13 *Evam puruṣārthāsādhārāṇakāraṇaṁ dharma iti. Upaskāra* on VAK, 1/1/2, Ibid. p. 13.
- 14 *Nanu nivr̥ttilakṣaṇo dharmastattvajñānadvārā niḥśreyasaheturiti. Ibid.*
- 15 *Dharmaviśeṣaprasūṭād dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānaṁ padārthānām sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām tattvajñānānniḥśreyasā. VAK, 1/1/4.* It is worth reiterating here that a few scholars have raised doubts regarding the authenticity of this *sūtra*. Neither Candrānanda nor Vādīndra accepts this *sūtra* to be original in content. M.R. Bodas supports them, while Śāṅkara Miśra holds the opposite view and takes it to be authentic.
- 16 *Tatra dharmaviśeṣo nivr̥ttilakṣaṇo dharmah. VSUp.*, on the above, pp. 29–30.
- 17 Anantalal Thakur, *Origin and Development of the Vaiśeṣika System*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilization, 2003, p. 13.
- 18 *Āraṁ siddhadarśanaṁ ca dharmebhyaḥ. VAK 9/2/13.*
- 19 *Yogini sakalakalpanāvikalāṁ jñānamutpadyate. Vyomavatī* of Vyomaśivacārya, Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhundhiraj Shastri (eds), Benares: Chowkhamba, 1930, p. 20.
- 20 *Yoginastvanabhivyaktamapi paśyantīti bhāvaḥ. Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā* of Vācaspatimiśra, Anantalal Thakur (ed.), New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996, p. 168.
- 21 *Tadevaṁ kṣīṇadoṣānām dhyānāvahitacetasām. Nirmalaṁ sarvaviśayaṁ jñānaṁ bhavati yoginām. Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Part II, reprint, Surya Nārāyana Śukla (ed.), Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 1998, p. 98.
- 22 A detailed discussion of these two will be carried out in a separate chapter.
- 23 *Tacceśvaracodanābhivyaktāddharmādeva. Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ (Padārthadharma saṅgrahākhyam)* of Praśastapādācārya, 2nd edn, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 18.
- 24 *Dharmo'pi tāvanna niḥśreyasaṁ karoti yāvadāśvarechhayā nānuḡrhyate. Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), 1997, p. 19.
- 25 *Rūparasagandhasparsāḥ saṁkhyāḥ parimāṇāni prthaktvaṁ saṁyogavibhagau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādvēṣau prayatnāśca guṇāḥ. VAK, 1/1/6.*
- 26 *Dharmaḥ puruṣaguṇaḥ. Kartuḥ priyahitamokṣahetuḥ atīndriyo'ntya sukhasaṁvijñānāvirodhī. PPB, p. 660.*
- 27 *Yo dharmaḥ sa puruṣaguṇo na karmasāmarthyamityarthaḥ. Nyāyakandalī (NK), p. 660.*
- 28 Shashiprabha Kumar, 'Moral foundations of social order in Vaiśeṣikasūtras', in *Self, Society and Value*, Delhi: Vidyānidhi, 2005, pp. 137–48.
- 29 *PPB, pp. 666–72.*
- 30 Shashiprabha Kumar, 'Obligations Towards Others' in *Breaking Barrier* F.J. Hoffman and G. Mishra (ed.) Santa Clara, CA: Asian Humanities Press 2003, pp. 219–22.
- 31 *Yato' bhyudayasiddhiḥ sa dharma iti vadatā yato'nabhyudayasiddhiḥ so' dharma iti sūcitam. Vaiśeṣikadarśanavārtikam, p. 12.* See note no. 11 above.
- 32 *Adharmo'pyāmaguṇaḥ. Karturahitapratyavāyaheturatīndriyo'ntyaduḥkhasaṁvijñānāvirodhī. PPB, p. 677.*
- 33 *Dharmaṁ vyākhyātukāmasya ṣaṭpadārtha-nirūpaṇam. Samudraṁ gantukāmasya himavadgamanopamam.* Quoted by S. Śāṅkaranārāyaṇa, in *Vaiśeṣika Catuḥsūtrī, a historical perspective*, Chennai: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 2003, p. 42.
- 34 *Yathā dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāma iti prastutya dravyādyupadeśaḥ tatpratipattereva (dharmatvāt). Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* of Bhartṛhari, Johannes Bronkhorst (ed.), Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1987, p. 2.
- 35 *Tasya tu sādhanāni śrutismṛtivilīṭāni varṇāśramaṇāṁ sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvenāvasthītāni dravyaguṇakarmāṇi. PPB, p. 660.*
- 36 *Na hyāgamādeva dharmādviniścayo'tvavigitād vyavahārādapi ... yathā kanyāpariṇayana-vidhau purandhrīṇāmācāraḥ. Nyāyavārtikatātparyapariśuddhi* of Udayanācārya, Anantalal Thakur (ed.), New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996, p. 80.

3 Objects of knowing

- 1 'Primitive types' or 'presences'. Vide Stephen H. Phillips, *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997, p. 45.
- 2 *Na dharmitādātmyān dharmānāmīti*. Vyomavatī of Vyomaśivācārya, Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhundhiraj Shastri (eds), Benares: Chowkhamba, 1930, p. 20.
- 3 *Ṣaṇṇāmapi padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni*. *Prasastapādabhāṣyam* (*Padārthadharmasaṅgrahāḥkhyam*) of Prasastapādācārya, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), 2nd edn, Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 41.
- 4 *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayanācārya, J.S. Jetly (ed.), Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971, p. 19.
- 5 *Saptapadārthī* of Śivāditya, D. Gurumurti, ed. and translated into English, Adyar: Theosophical Society, 1932, p. 2.
- 6 *Siddhāntacandrodaya*, quoted in *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, Y.V. Athalye (ed.) translated by M.R. Bodas, 2nd edn, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974, p. 73.
- 7 Kapil. Kapoor, 'Concept of Padārtha in Language and Philosophy', *Bulletin of the Deccan College Post Graduate & Research Institute*, No. 54–55, 1995, pp. 197–221.
- 8 *Kriyaṅavāt samavāyikāraṇamīti dravyalakṣaṇam*. *The Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda* with the comments from the *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra and the *Vivṛtti* of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, translated into English by A.E. Gough, New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975, 1/1/15.
- 9 *Atha ke dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ, na santītyāha tadabhāvānna sādharmyaṁ nāpi vaidharmyamīti*. *Tathāhi cakṣuḥ-sparśanābhyām rūpasparśayoḥ pratibhāsanāt-na tadvyatiriktam dravyamasti*. *Yuccedam ghaḍījñānam tanna pramāṇam, kalpanājñānatvāt*. Vyomavatī of Vyomaśivācārya (Vyo.), p. 44.
- 10 *Astu tarhi guṇaguṇinorabhedānnairātmyam, kṣaṇikajñānamātra-pariśeṣāt*. *Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayanācārya, Dhundhirāja Śāstrī (ed.), Benares: Chowkhamba, 1940, p. 320.
- 11 A 'connective cognitive act'. Vide B.K. Matilal, *Perception, An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 264.
- 12 *Kaḥ punaratra nyāyaḥ? Pratisandhānam*. *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 342.
- 13 *Dvīndriyagrāhyaṁ tu dravyam*. *Kathametat ? Pratisandhānāt*. *Tathāhi yamahamadrākṣaṁ cakṣuṣā tameva sprśāmi yaṁ cāsprśam tameva paśyāmīti*. *Na ca dvābhyāmindriyābhyām ekarthagrahaṇam bina pratisandhānam nyāyyam*. Vyo., p. 44.
- 14 Sadananda Bhaduri, *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, reprint, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1975, pp. 35–36.
- 15 *Svapṛādhānyapratītiṛeva dravyatvapratītiḥ*. *Nyāyakandālī* of Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), 2nd edn, Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 34.
- 16 *Jinawardhanī* (a commentary on the *Saptapadārthī*) of Jinawardhana Sūri, quoted in *Saptapadārthī*, p. 5.
- 17 For details see ShashiPrabha Kumar, *Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha Nirūpaṇa*, Delhi: Publications Division, University of Delhi, 1992, pp. 49–52.
- 18 *Gandhavatī prthivī*. VAK, 2/1/2.
- 19 *Rūparasagandhaparśasaṅkhyā parimāṇaprthaktvasamīyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvagur utvadratvasamskāravatī*. PPB, p. 71.
- 20 *Bhogaśādhanaṁ viśayaḥ*. *Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayanācārya, Shashinatha Jha (ed.), Darbhanga: Mithila Vidyapeetha, 1973, p. 6.
- 21 (i) *Viśayastūpabhogya indriyagrāhyo vā smadādeḥ*. Vyo., p. 234. (ii) *Gandhavatve satī upabhogaśādhanaṁ pārthivaviśayatvam*. *Prabhā* (Commentary on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* [NSM]), 2nd edn, Nṛsiṁhadeva, Lahore, 1929, p. 99.
- 22 *Rūparasasparśavatya āpo dravāḥ snigdhaḥ*. VAK, 2/1/2.
- 23 *Apvajātimatyāḥ śītasparśavatya āpaḥ*. *Saptapadārthī* (SP), p. 63.
- 24 *Viśiṣṭayorvāyoh sannipātāt khalvāpa utpādyante iti*. *Vaiśeṣika Darśanam along with Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra, *Kaṇādasūtravivṛtti* of

- Jayanārāyaṇatarkapañcānana Bhattācārya and *Vaiśeṣika Bhāṣya* of Candrakānta Bhattācārya, Bakre Mahadeva Sharma (ed.), reprint, Jaipur: Rashtriya Sanskrit Sahitya Kendra, 2004 (on *Vaiśeṣika Bhāṣya* of Chandrakānta Bhattācārya, 1/1/5), p. 19.
- 25 *Rūparasasparśadravatva-snehasamkhyāparimāna-prthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāp-aratvaguruvasaṃskāravatyah. PPB*, p. 91.
- 26 *Kaṇādarahasyam* of Śaṅkara Miśra, Vindhyeswari Prasad Dwivedi (ed.), Benares: Chowkhamba, 1917, p. 14.
- 27 *Snehavad dravyamudakam. Mānāmanohara* of Vādi Vāgīśvara, Swāmī Yogindrānanda, ed. and translated into Hindi, Varanasi: Śaddarsana Prakashan Pratiṣṭhana, 1973, p. 18.
- 28 *PPB*, and *NK*, p. 94; *Kiraṇāvalī*, (*Kir.*), p. 48; *Lakṣaṇāvalī* (*Lak.*), p. 8.
- 29 *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (*Pratyakṣa Khaṇḍa*), Dharmendra Nath Shastri, Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971, p. 202.
- 30 *Vaiśeṣikasūtrapaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra ed. and translated into Hindi by Dhuṇḍhirāja Śāstrī, 2nd edn, Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2002, pp. 465–66.
- 31 *Indriyaṃ rasagrāhakaṃ rasanāṃ jihvāgravartī. TS*, p. 7.
- 32 *Viśayastu saritsamudrahimakarakādīh. PPB*, p. 96.
- 33 *Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha Nirupāṇa* (*VDMPN*), p. 98.
- 34 *Indriyaṃ sarvapṛāṇāṃ rūpavyañjakamānyāvayavānabhibhūtaistejo'vayavairārabdham cakṣuḥ. PPB*, p. 99.
- 35 *Tathā hi īṣatpārthivāvayaśaṃyuktairanabhibhūtaistejo'vayavairārabdham cakṣuriti rūpasyaiva vyāñjakam. Athetthaṃbhūtārambhe kiṃ pramāṇam? Kāryaniyamah. Vyo.*, p. 257.
- 36 *Ibid.*
- 37 *Tatra bhaumaṃ kāṣṭhendhanaprabhavamūrdhvajvalanasvabhāvaṃ pacanasvedanādisamartham. Divyamabindhanaṃ sauravidyudādi. Bhuktasyāhārasya rasādi-pariṇāmārthamudaryam. Ākarajañca suvarṇādi. PPB*, p. 101.
- 38 *Vide Setu* of Padmanābha Miśra, Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, pp. 253–55.
- 39 For details see ShashiPrabha Kumar, 'Vaiśeṣikanaye Suvarṇādīdhātūnām Taijasatva-Siddhiḥ', *Viśva Saṃskṛitam*, Hoshiarpur, Vishvesvaranand Vedic Research Institute, 30.2, 1993, pp. 49–54.
- 40 *Vide Udayaveera Shastri, Vaiśeṣika Darśanam: Vidyodayabhāṣyasahitam* (Hindi), Ghaziabad: Virajananda Vaidika Shodha Sanstana, 1972, pp. 426–27.
- 41 *Vāyutvābhisambandhādvāyuh. PPB*, pp. 100–101.
- 42 *Nirūpaḥ sparśavān vāyuh. Mānāmanohara (MM)*, p. 22.
- 43 *Tacca marutāṃ loke siddhamāgamāt. Atha vāyostiryaggatiśīlatvāt kṣaṇikatvācca tadārabdha-śarīramupabhogajanakaṃ na syādityāha- pārthivāvayavopast-ambhāccopabhogasamarthamiti. Vyo.*, p. 271.
- 44 *Bhūyasām pārthivāvayavānāṃ nimittakāraṇabhūtānāmupaṣṭambhāt saṃyogaviśeṣāt sthiraṃsaṃhataśvabhāvamutpannam pārthivaśarīravadupabhogasamartham. NK*, p. 113.
- 45 *Tvagiti na ca bāhyameva carma kevalamucyate apitu sakalaśarīravayūpi tuhinakaṇa-śīrasaśīlilapānasamaye' ntarhrdaye'pi śītasparśopalambhādīti. Nyāyamanjari* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Part II, 3rd edn, Surya Nārāyaṇa Śukla (ed.), Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 1998, p. 48.
- 46 *Indriyaṃ tvagadhiṣṭhānaṃ śarīrasya saḥajāvaraṇaṃ tvak vāyūpādānamindriyaṃ tvagindriyaṃ. Kaṇādarahasya (KR)*, p. 22.
- 47 *Viśayo vṛkṣādīkampajanakaḥ. SP*, p. 15.
- 48 *Prāṇo'ntaḥśarīre rasamaladhātūnām preraṇādiheturekaḥ san kriyābhedādapānādisaṃjñāṃ labhate. PPB*, p. 120.
- 49 *Eka eva prāṇasteṣāṃ malādīnāṃ kāryabhedāt pañca saṃjñāḥ labhate. Na tu saṃjñābhedāt saṃjñā bhidyata ityārthaḥ. Mukhaṇāsikābhyāṃ niṣkramaṇapraveśanāt prāṇaḥ. Teṣāmeva malādīnāmadhonyānādapānaḥ. Samāṇaṃ nayanāt samānaḥ. Ūrdhvaṇaṃ nayanādudānaḥ. Nāḍīmukheṣu vitananād vyāna itī. Kir.*, p. 60.
- 50 *Hṛdi prāṇo gude'pānaḥ samāno nābhisaṃsthiṭaḥ. Udānaḥ kaṇṭhadeśasthaḥ vyānaḥ sarvaśarīragaḥ. Amarkaśa* of Amara Singh, Bombay: Nirṇaya Sagar Press, 1961, 1/1/63.

- 51 *Śrotramātrendriyagrāhyaḥ śabdaḥ śabdatvajātimān. Dravyaṃ sarvagato nityaḥ Kumārilamate mataḥ. Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Kunhan Raja and Surya Narayana Shastri (eds), Adyar: Theosophical Society, 1933, p. 22.*
- 52 *Ekadriyatvāna dravyam. VAK, 2/2/23.*
- 53 *Parīṣeṣāllīṅgamākāśasya. VAK, 2/1/27.*
- 54 *Vide Vyo., pp. 329–30; Kir., p. 11; NK, p. 151.*
- 55 *Kṣityādi pañca bhūtāni. Bhāṣāparichheda/Kārikāvalī of Viśvanātha, Harirām Śukla Śāstrī (ed.), Varanasi: Chaukhambha, reprint, 2005, verse 26.*
- 56 *Śrotraṃ punaḥ śravaṇavivarasamjñako nabhodeśaḥ. PPB, p. 152.*
- 57 *PPB, p.152; Vyo., pp. 331–32.*
- 58 *Tasya guṇāḥ samkhyāparimāṇaprthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgāḥ. PPB, p. 159.*
- 59 *KR, p. 32.*
- 60 *Evañcūṭādr̥ṣamekaṃ dravyaṃ svikāryaṃ yat yāvatapiṇḍasūryasambaddham. Kir., p. 77.*
- 61 *Na ca tat prthivyādi tathā bhaviturmahati, aprāptervyabhicārācca. Kirāṇāvalī Bhāskara of Padmanābha Miśra, Benares: Saraswati Bhavan, p. 137.*
- 62 *Ato yaddvāreṇa saṃyuktasaṃyuktasamavāyalaḥṣaṇayā pratyāsattyā ādityagatiḥ-sthāviramupārvartate taddravyamasti. Kir., p. 77.*
- 63 *Yuvasthāvirayoh śarīravasthābhedenā tatkāraṇatayā kālasaṃyoge'numite sati paścāttayoh kālaviśiṣṭatāvagatiḥ. NK, p. 158.*
- 64 *Evam kālō'pi sarvatrābhinnākāravartamānapratyayavedyaḥ. Astitvaṃ vartamānatvamīti cenna, tad vastūnām (sva) rūpaṃ vā sattāsāmānyaṃ. Nyāyilīlāvatī of Vallabhāchārya, Harihara Śāstrī (ed.), 2nd edn, 1991, Varanasi: Chowkhamba, pp. 310–11.*
- 65 *Iha idamīti yatastaddiśyaṃ līṅgaṃ. VAK, 2/2/10.*
- 66 *Dik pūrvāparādipratyayalīṅgā. PPB, p. 162; NK, pp. 162–63.*
- 67 *Paratvāparatvalīṅgaṃ diśaḥ. Kir., p. 81.*
- 68 *Prācyādivyavahāraheturdik. TS, p. 12.*
- 69 *Tasyāstu guṇāḥ saṃkhyā- parimāṇaprthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgāḥ kālavadete siddhāḥ. PPB, p. 164.*
- 70 *Niyatopādhyunnāyakaḥ kālaḥ, aniyatopādhyunnāyikā dik. VSUp., (2/2/10), p. 168.*
- 71 *Janyamātraṃ kriyamātraṃ vā kālōpādīḥ, mūrtamātraṃ digupādīḥ. Siddhānta-Candrodaya (A commentary of Tarka-Saṃgraha), quoted by Athalye-Bodas, TS, p. 132.*
- 72 *Also expressed as soul. Details about the same (ātman) will be discussed in Chapter 6.*
- 73 *Jñānādhikaraṇamātmā. TS, p. 12.*
- 74 *Tatrātmā manaścāpratyakṣe. VAK, 8/1/2. Also Ātmā tāvatpratyakṣato na gr̥hyate. The Nyāyadarśanam (Nyāyasūtra) of Mahārṣi Gautama and Bhāṣya of Vātsyayana, unique edition, Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī (ed. & trans. Hindi), Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1999, 1/1/10.*
- 75 *Prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣapratyānāścātmāno līṅgāni. VAK, 3/2/4.*
- 76 *Saukṣmyadapratyakṣatve sati. PPB, p. 167.*
- 77 *Ātmanyātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣādātmāpratyakṣam. VAK, 9/1/11.*
- 78 *Tasmājjñānāśraya ātmeti siddham. MM, p. 41.*
- 79 *KR, p. 36.*
- 80 *Vyavasthāto nānā. VAK, 3/2/20.*
- 81 *Kā punariyaṃ vyavasthā? Sukhaduḥkhādīnām niyamaḥ. Vyo., p. 408.*
- 82 *Na śarīrasya caīanyaṃ, ghaṭādivad bhūtakāryatvāt, mṛte cāsambhavāt. PPB, p. 171.*
- 83 *Indriyānyacetanāni karaṇatvādāṇḍavat. NK, p. 171.*
- 84 *Tathātvaṃ cedindriyāṇāmupaghāte katham smṛtiḥ? Pūrvam cakṣuṣā'nubhūtanām cakṣurabhāve smaraṇam na syāt, Anubhaviturabhāvāt, anyenā' nubhūtasyānyena smaraṇāsambhavāt. BP, verse 48 and NSM on the above, pp. 157–58.*
- 85 *Nāpi manasaḥ, karaṇāntarānapekṣitve yugapadālocanasam̐ptiprasaṅgāt, svayaṃ karaṇabhāvācca. PPB, p. 173.*
- 86 *NK, pp. 172–73.*

- 87 *BP*, verse 49 and *NSM* on the above, pp. 157–58.
- 88 *Yugapajñānānutpattirmanaso līgam. NS*, 1/1/16.
- 89 *Tasya guṇāḥ saṅkhyāparimāṇaprthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasaṃskārāḥ. PPB*, p. 221.
- 90 *Dravyāśrayyaguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣvakāraṇamanapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam. VAK*, 1/1/16.
- 91 *Rupādīnām guṇānām sarveṣāṃ guṇatvābhisambandho dravyāśritatvaṃ nirguṇatvaṃ niṣkriyatvam. PPB*, p. 227.
- 92 *VDmPN*, p. 255.
- 93 *Tadārabdhastvayavī guṇāvayavabhedavān. Naivopalabhyate tena asiddhyatyapramāṇakaḥ. Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī (ed.), Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968, 555, p. 234.
- 94 *VSUp.*, p. 367.
- 95 *Rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-saṅkhyāḥ-parimāṇāni-prthaktvaṃ-saṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatve-buddhyādayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe-icchādveṣau-prayatnāśca guṇāḥ. VAK*, 1/1/6.
- 96 *Ca śabdasamuccitāśca gurutvadratvasnehasaṃskārādṛṣṭaśabdāḥ saptaivevaṃ caturviṃśatirguṇāḥ. PPB*, p. 27.
- 97 *Vide PPB and NK*, pp. 229–47.
- 98 *Gurutvadharmādharmabhāvanā hyātīndriyāḥ. PPB*, p. 236.
- 99 *PPB*, p. 232; *Vyo.*, p. 433; *Kir.*, p. 107.
- 100 *Buddhisukhaduḥkheccchādveṣauprayatnāstvantahkaraṇagrāhyāḥ. PPB*, p. 232.
- 101 *Buddhiranumeyā nāntahkaraṇena grhyate iti kecī, tadayuktam, līgābhāvāt. NK*, p. 232.
- 102 Also rendered as action, motion and movement.
- 103 *Ekadravyamaguṇaṃ saṃyogavibhāgeṣvanapekṣakāraṇamīti karmalakṣaṇam. VAK*, 1/1/18.
- 104 *Ekam karmaikasminneva dravye varttate tathāikamevaikasmīnīti. Kuta etad? Ekasminścalite sarveṣāṃ calanānupalabdheḥ. Vyo.*, p. 653.
- 105 *Saṃyogavibhāgavegānām karma samānam. VAK*, 1/1/20.
- 106 *Aguṇavattvaṃ guṇavattvarahitvatvaṃ. PPB and NK*, p. 698.
- 107 *Saṃyogavibhāganirapekṣatvaṃ. PPB*, pp. 697–98.
- 108 *Kāryaṃ virodhi yasyeti svajānyottarasamyanāśyatvāt karmaṇaḥ. VSUp.*, p. 50.
- 109 *Yathā guṇānām nimittakāraṇatvamapi naivaṃ karmaṇām, kintvasamavāyīkāraṇatva-meveyarthaḥ. NK*, p. 696.
- 110 (i) *Dravyāni dravyāntaramārabhante guṇāśca guṇāntaram. (ii) Karma karmasādhyaṃ na vidyate. VAK*, 1/1/10–11.
- 111 (i) *Na dravyānām karma. (ii) Vyatirekāt. VAK*, 1/1/21–22.
- 112 *Kṣaṇikatvaṃśūtaravināśītvam. PPB and NK*, p. 698.
- 113 *Vide Roer's translation, BP*, p. 4.
- 114 *Mūrtadravyavṛttitvaṃ avacchinna-parimāṇadravyavṛttitvaṃ. PPB and NK*, p. 698.
- 115 *KR*, p. 152.
- 116 *Karmapratyakṣamīti na mṛṣyāmahe, gacchati dravye saṃyogavibhāgātiriktapadārthāntarānupalabdheḥ . . . tadaśāram. NK*, p. 460.
- 117 *Utkṣepaṇamavakṣepaṇam ākuñcanaṃ prasāraṇam gamanamīti karmāṇi. VAK*, 1/1/7.
- 118 *Utkṣepaṇādīnām pañcānāmapi karmatvasambandhaḥ. PPB*, p. 697.
- 119 *Udādyupasargaviśeṣātteṣāṃ parasparaviśeṣaḥ. Vyo.*, p. 658.
- 120 Brajendranath Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, Reprint 1991, pp. 131–34 and p. 443.
- 121 *NK*, pp. 729–32.
- 122 Also rendered as class character, generic property and commonality.
- 123 *VAK*, 1/1/4.

- 124 *Svaviśayasarvagatamahinnāmakamanekavṛtti ekadvibahuśvātmavarūpānugamapratyayakāri svarūpābhedenādhrēṣu prabandhena vartamānāmanuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam. PPB*, p. 742.
- 125 *Nityamekamanekānugataṁ sāmānyam.TS*, p. 60.
- 126 *Nyāya Bodhinī* (A commentary on *TS* of Govardhana), p. 61.
- 127 *Ibid.*
- 128 *Ibid.*
- 129 Although the earliest exponent of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, Praśastapāda has followed its propounder Kaṇāda and used the term ‘sāmānya’, but his commentators have used both terms interchangeably. So, in the later tradition, this came to be used indiscriminately. In fact, it is Gautama who first used the appellation ‘jāti’ in his *Nyāyasūtras* and his commentator Vātsyāyana has even explained the subtle difference between these two.
- 130 Victoria Lysenko, ‘Origin of the Idea of Universals’, *Classical Indian Philosophy Reinterpreted*, Victoria Lysenka and Michel Hulin (eds), New Delhi: Decent Books in collaboration with Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 2007, p. 29.
- 131 For details see D.N. Shastri, *Critique of Indian Realism*, Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1976, pp. 306–73.
- 132 For details see *Śloka-Vārtika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, particularly the chapters titled *Ākṛtīvāda* and *Apohavāda*, Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī (ed.), Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978.
- 133 *Bhāvo’ nuvṛttereṇa hetuvāt sāmānyameva. VAK*, 2/1/3.
- 134 *Sāmānyaviśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam. VAK*, 2/1/4.
- 135 For details see *Parābhinnā tu yā jātiḥ saivāparatayocyate. Dravyatvādikajātistu parāparatayocyate. BP*, verse 9, p. 60.
- 136 For an explanation of this term vis-a-vis real, see B.K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2008, pp. 272–73.
- 137 *Saditi yato dravyaguṇakarmasu sā sattā. VAK*, 1/2/7.
- 138 *Dravyāditrikavṛttistu sattā paratayocyate. BP*, verse 8, p. 55.
- 139 *Samānānām bhāvaḥ sāmānyam. NK*, p. 747.
- 140 *Vyakterabhedastulyatvaṁ saṅkaro’thānavasthitiḥ. Rūpāhānirasambandho jātibādhakasamgrahaḥ. Kir.*, p. 23. For detailed explanation see, *The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy*, R.R. Dravid, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972, pp. 25–29.
- 141 Also translated as individuality or individuators.
- 142 *Anyatrāntyebhyo viśeṣebhyaḥ. VAK*, 1/2/6.
- 143 *Anteṣu bhavā antyāḥ svāśrayaviśeṣakatvādvīśeṣāḥ. PPB*, p. 765.
- 144 *Viśeṣāstu yāvannityadravyatvāt anantā eva. SP*, p. 8.
- 145 *Rūpāhāniḥ-niḥsāmānyatvaḥgarbhalakṣaṇavyāghātarūpā viśeṣasya jātimatve. Dinakarī (NSM)* of Mahādeva Bhāṭṭa and Dinkara Bhāṭṭa, Harirām Śukla Śāstrī (ed.), Reprint, 2005, Varanasi: Chaukhambha, p. 58.
- 146 *Svatovyāvṛttatvaṁ ca svabhinnalīṅgakam- svaviśeṣyaka-svasajātīyetaṛabhedānumityaviśayatvam. Dinakarī. (NSM)*, pp. 62–63.
- 147 It needs to be mentioned here that the Vaiśeṣika school (and Nyāya also) has accepted extraordinary perception, which is of three kinds: *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, *jñānalakṣaṇa* and *yogaja*. The last of these three is stated to be operative in the case of perceiving the *viśeṣas* and atoms by the *yogins*. However, as already stated, questions have been raised against this, not only from the opponents, but also from within the school. Vide *VDmPN*, p. 506.
- 148 *PPB*, pp. 767–69.
- 149 *Yogino’ tiriktaṁ viśeṣmīkṣante. Evaṁ tarhi ta eva saśapatham pricchantāmkimete’ tiriktaṁ viśeṣamīkṣante na veti. Padārthatatvanirūpaṇam* of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi, Karl H Potter (ed.), Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 43.
- 150 S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, Seventeenth Impression, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 216.

- 151 *Sarvasya ca vastuno dvāvākārau sāmānyākāro viśeṣākāraśca. Nyābhāṣyavārttika* of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara, Anantlal Thakur (ed.), New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997, p. 40 (NS, 1/1/4).
- 152 *Anugatākāra buddhivedyāni dravyatvādīni, vyāvṛttibuddhivedyāśca dravyādivyaktayaḥ, tasmādeśām dravyatvādīnām lakṣaṇabhedāt pratītibhedāt dravyaguṇakarmabhyaḥ padārthāntaratvam. NK, p. 748.*
- 153 *Vināśārambharahiteṣu nityadravyeṣvaṇvākāśakāladigātmamanassu pratidravyamekaikaśo vartamānā atyantavyāvṛttibuddhihetavaḥ. NK, p. 766.*
- 154 *Vyo.*, p. 692.
- 155 *Viśeṣāstu nityadravyasamavetā eva. SP, p. 143.*
- 156 *Athāntyviśeṣānām paramāññāmiva vyāvṛttajñānaviṣayatvādiviśeṣāntarasambandhe tatrāpyanyo viśeṣaḥ tatrāpyanya ityanvasthā syāt. Vyo. p. 694.*
- 157 *Ihedaṁiti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ. VAK, 7/2/26.*
- 158 *Avayavāvayavinoḥ, jātivyaktyoḥ, guṇaguṇinoḥ, kriyākriyāvatoḥ, nityadravyaviśeṣayośca yaḥ sambandhaḥ sa samavāyaḥ. NSM, p. 65.*
- 159 *Yayormadhye ekamavinaśyadaparāśritamevāvatīṣhate tavayutasiddhau. Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, 10th edn, Viśveśhwara (ed.), Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2000, p. 26.
- 160 'In the first five categories, substance, qualities etc. are the bricks of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika structure, the mortar to unite them is provided by the sixth category-samavāya'. Shastri, *CIR*, p. 375.
- 161 *Kāryam prāgabhāvapratiyogi. TS, p. 26.*
- 162 'The problem of causation always loomed large in ancient Indian thought; and the Vaiśeṣika, in contradistinction to the other schools maintaining identity in some sense or other between the material cause and the effect, formulated absolute distinction (*atyanta-bheda*) between them, devising Samavāya at the same time as their connecting link'. – Mysore Hiriyanna, *Indian Philosophical Studies*, vol. I, Mysore: Kavyalaya, 1967, p. 113.
- 163 *Samavāyastveka eva. TS, p. 6.*
- 164 *Tattvaṁ bhāvena. VAK, 7/2/28.*
- 165 *PTN*, p. 87 and *PM*, p. 35.
- 166 *TB*, p. 84.
- 167 Also rendered in English as non-being, non-existence and absence.
- 168 *Abhāvastu prāgabhāva pradhvaṁsābhāva atyantābhāva anyonyābhāva-lakṣaṇaḥ caturvidhaḥ. SP, p. 10*
- 169 *Abhidheyaḥ padārthaḥ. Sa dvividhaḥ- bhāvābhāvabhedāt. Tatra nañarthaviṣayatvara hitapratyayaviśayo'bhāvaḥ sa ṣoḍhā dravyādivibhedāt. Tathā-nañarthapratyayaviśayo'bhāvḥ. Lak.*, pp. 1–2.
- 170 'Strictly speaking 'absence' is a word which is used in an ontological context whereas 'negation' has its application in the field of logic. . . (Non-apprehension is a word used in an epistemological discourse)', S.R. Bhatt, 'The Concept of Negation (Niṣedha)', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, V-1, October, Poona: 1971, 473–76.
- 171 *VAK*, 9/1/1–10.
- 172 *VAK*, 121/ and 9/1/3.
- 173 *Abhāvasya prthagānupadeśo bhāvapāratantryāt na tvabhāvāt. NK, p. 18.*
- 174 *Anādi sāntaḥ prāgabhāvaḥ. Utpatteḥ pūrvam kāryasya. Sādiranantaḥ pradhvaṁsaḥ. Utpattyanantaram kāryasya. Traikālikasaṁsargāvaccinnapratiyogitāko'tyantābhāvaḥ. Yathā bhūtale ghaṭo nāstīti. Tādātmyasaṁbandhāvaccinnapratiyogitākononyābhāvāḥ yathā ghaṭaḥ paṭo na bhavātīti. TS, p. 62.*
- 175 *Asadīti bhūtapratyakṣābhāvāt bhūtasmtēvirodhipratyakṣavat. Tathā bhāve bhāvaprayakṣatvācca. Etenāghaṭo' gauradharmāśca vyākhyātaḥ. Abhūtaṁ nāstītyanarthāntaram. VAK, 9/1/6–9.*
- 176 *Abhāvo' pyanumānameva. PPB, p. 542.*

- 177 *Api cendriyasannikarṣād upalabhyamāne bhūtale' bhāvajñānamapi bhavati 'aghaṭam bhūtaṭam' iti tatra bhūtalasyevābhāvasyāpi pratyakṣatā kim neṣyate.* NK, p. 544.
- 178 *Gṛhītvā vastusadbhāvaṃ smṛtvā ca pratiyoginam. Mānasam nāstitājñānam jāyate'kṣānapekṣayā.* SV, verse 21, p. 342. and *Pramāṇapañcakam yatra vasturūpe na jāyate. Vastusattāvabodhārtham tatrābhāvapramāṇatā.* SV, verse 1, p. 335.
- 179 NK, p. 547–49; also see NM, Part II, pp. 48–49.
- 180 NSM, p. 75 and TD, p. 63.
- 181 *Ādāu dravyasyoddeśaḥ sarvāśrayatvena prādhānyāt. Guṇānāṅca karmāpekṣya bhūyastvād dravyāntaramabhidhānam. Niyamena guṇānuvidhāyitvāt karmaṇām guṇānantaramuddeśaḥ. Karmānvitatvāt sāmānyasya karmānantaramabhidhānam. Pañcapadārthavṛtteḥ samavāyasya sarvaśeṣeṇābhidhāne prāpte viśeṣaṇam madhye kathanam.* NK, p. 17.

4 Methods of knowing

- 1 *Athāto dharamaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ.* The *Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda* with the comments from the *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra and the *Vivṛtti* of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, A.E. Gough (trans. Eng), New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975, 1/1/1.
- 2 *Dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād darvyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānām padārthānām sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām tattvajñānānīhshreyasam.* VAK, 1/1/4.
- 3 Vide K. Srinivas and V. Kutumba Sastri, *A Concise Dictionary of Philosophy*, New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, 2007, p. 32.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 136 and p. 232.
- 5 *Sādhāraṇo dharmāḥ sādharmyam asādhāraṇo dharmo vaidharmyam, sādharmyavaidharmya eva tattvam sādharmyavaidharmyatattvam tasya jñānam niḥshreyaśhetuḥ.* Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), 2nd edn, Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 16.
- 6 For details see ShashiPrabha Kumar, 'Concept of categories in Vaiśeṣika philosophy' in *Thinking Inside the Box: The Concept of Categories in Indian Philosophy*, Jessica Frazier (ed.), Farnham: Ashgate, forthcoming.
- 7 *Evam sarvatra viparyayāt sādharmyam vaidharmyam ca vācyamiti. Praśastapādabhāṣyam (Padārthadharmasaṅgrahākhyam) of Praśastapādācārya, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), 2nd edn, Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 68.*
- 8 *Sādharmyamanugato dharmāḥ vaidharmyaṅca vyāvṛtto dharmāḥ yadyapi kvacit sādharmyamapi kutaścid vaidharmyam kutaścidvaidharmyamapi keṣāñcit sādharmyam, tathāpi tādrūpeṇa jñānam vivakṣitam. Vaiśeṣikasūtrapaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra (ed.) and translated into Hindi by Ḍhuṇḍhirāja Śāstrī (trans. Hindi), 2nd edn, Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2002, p. 27.*
- 9 *Artha iti dravyaguṇakarmasu.* VAK, 8/2/3.
- 10 *Sadantīyam dravyavat kāryam kāraṇam sāmānyaviśeṣamiti dravyaguṇakarmaṇāmaviśeṣaḥ.* VAK, 1/1/8.
- 11 *Dravyaguṇakarmabhyo'rthāntaram sattā.* VAK, 1/2/8.
- 12 *Dravyaguṇayoḥ sajātīyārambhakatvaṃ sādharmyam.* VAK, 1/1/9.
- 13 *Karma karmasādhyam na vidyate.* VAK, 1/1/11.
- 14 *Dravyādīnām trayāṇāmapi sattāsambandhaḥ, sāmānyaviśeṣavattvam, svasamayārthaśabdābhidhēyatvam; dharmādharmakartṛtvañceti.* PPB, pp. 43–44.
- 15 *Vaiśeṣikāḥ svayam vyavahārāya yaḥ saṅketāḥ kṛto'smin sāstre arthaśabdād dravyaguṇakarmāṇi pratipattavyāni, iti, tena dravyādīni trīṇi nirupapadenārthaśabdenocyante.* NK, p. 45.
- 16 *Dharmādharmanimittatvam trayāṇām.* NK, p. 45.
- 17 *Svātmasattvaṃ sattāviraḥaḥ. Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya, J.S. Jetly (ed.), Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971, p. 21.*

- 18 *Buddhimātramamīṣāṁ lakṣaṇaṁ pramāṇam, na tu dravyādivatpramāṇāntaramastīyarthah.* Ibid.
- 19 *Akāryatvam-anāditvam.* Ibid.
- 20 *Kāraṇānāmabhavo'kāraṇatvam-samavāyīyasamavāyīkāraṇatvābhāvaḥ. Nīnīttakāraṇatvaṁ ca jñānotpattaviśyata eva.* Vyomavātī of Vyomaśivacārya, Kaviraj and Shastri (ed.) 1930, p. 143.
- 21 *Asāmānyaviśeṣavattvamāparasāmānyavirahaḥ, sa ca sāmānyeṣvanavasthānāt, viśeṣṣvapi sāmānyasadbhāve guṇatvāpattau, punaḥ samānaguṇeṣu samavāyīyasyaikatvāt samavāyīntarāpekṣāyāmanavasthānācceti.* Kir., p. 22.
- 22 (i) *Nityānāṁ bhāvo nityatvamavināśītvam.* Vyo., p. 143. (ii) *Nityatvamanantatvam, taccākāryatvāt.* Kir., p. 22.
- 23 *Svasamayārthaśabdānabhidheyatvam.* Ibid.
- 24 *Ṣaṇṇāmapi padārthānāmastītvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni.* PPB, p. 41.
- 25 (i) *Astitvaṁ vidhimukhapratyayaṁviśayatvaṁ; pratiyogyanapekṣanirūpaṇatvamiti.* Kir., p. 19. (ii) *Astitvaṁ svarūpasattvam.* Sūktī of Jagadīśa Tarkālakāra, Kaviraj and Shastri (ed.) 1930, p. 114.
- 26 (i) *Abhidheyatvamabhidhānayogyatā. Śabdena saṅgatīlakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ.* Kir., p. 19. (ii) *Abhidheyatvamiti . . . taccapadaśaktiṣayatvaṁ. Setu* of Padmanābha Miśra, Kaviraj and Shastri (ed.) 1930, p. 115.
- 27 (i) *Jñeyatvaṁ jñānayogyatā; jñāpyajñāpakalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ.* Kir., p. 19. (ii) *Jñeyatvaṁ-jñānaviśayatvaṁ.* Sūktī, p. 114.
- 28 *Āsritatvaṁcānyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ.* PPB, p. 42.
- 29 *Dravyādīnām samavāyītvaṁmanekatvaṁca.* Ibid.
- 30 (i) *Guṇādīnām pañcānāmapi nirguṇatvaṁniṣkriyatve.* PPB, p. 43. (ii) *Nirguṇatvaṁ guṇābhāvaviśiṣṭatvaṁ. Niṣkriyatvaṁ kriyāyā asamavāyīyaḥ.* Kir., p. 19.
- 31 Quoted earlier, see note no. 14 of this chapter.
- 32 *Kāryatvānityatve kāraṇatvātameva.* PPB, p. 46.
- 33 (i) *Kāraṇatvaṁcānyatra pārimāṇḍalyādibhyaḥ.* PPB, p. 47. (ii) *Pārimāṇḍalyabhinnaṁ kāraṇatvamudāhṛtam. Bhāṣāparichheda/Kārikāvalī* of Viśvanātha, Harirām Śukla Śāstrī, reprint, Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 2005, verse 15.
- 34 *Dravyāśritatvaṁcānyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ.* PPB, p. 48.
- 35 *Svātmaiva sattvaṁ svarūpaṁ yatsāmānyādīnām tadeva teṣāṁ sattvam, na sattāyogāḥ sattvam.* NK, p. 49.
- 36 *Buddhireva lakṣaṇaṁ pramāṇaṁ yeṣāṁ te buddhilakṣaṇāḥ.* NK, p. 50.
- 37 *Akāryatvaṁ kāraṇānapekṣasvabhāvatvam.* NK, p. 51.
- 38 NK, pp. 50–52.
- 39 *Akāraṇatvaṁātmadharmetarakāryāpekṣayā.* Kir., p. 22.
- 40 *Asāmānyaviśeṣavattvam aparajātīrahitatvamīyarthah.* NK, p. 52.
- 41 *Nityatvaṁ vināśarahitatvam.* NK, p. 53.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 *Nirupapadenārthaśabdena dravyādayastraya evābhidhīyante nāpare. Eṣa eva svasamayo vaiṣeṣikānāṁ svaśāstre lāghavāya.* Kir., p. 20.
- 44 *Cakārat kāraṇānapekṣatvam. Upalakṣaṇaṁ cūtat. Evamanyadapyūhanīyam.* Kir., p. 22.
- 45 *Tadyathā-anityadharmatvamaviśeṣānāmeva.* Kir., p. 22.
- 46 *Nityatvamaḥkarmaṇāmeva.* Ibid.
- 47 *Ayogipratyakṣatvaṁ dravyādīnām caturṇāmeva.* Ibid.
- 48 *Asamavāyīkāraṇatvaṁ guṇakarmaṇoreva.* Ibid.
- 49 *Asamavetatvaṁ nityadravyasamavāyayoreva.* Ibid.
- 50 *Prthivyādīnām navānāmapi dravyatvayogāḥ. Svātmanyārambhakatvaṁ guṇavattvaṁ kāryakāraṇāvirodhitvam antyaviśeṣavattvam.* PPB, p. 54.
- 51 *Dravyatvena yogo dravyatvopalakṣītaḥ samavāya iti.* Vyo., p. 149.
- 52 (i) *Svasamavetakāryajanakatvamīyarthah.* NK, p. 55. (ii) *Svasamavetakāryakāritvaṁ samavāyīkāraṇatvamīyarthah.* Kir., p. 23.
- 53 *Guṇavattvaṁ guṇasamavāyīyaḥ.* Ibid.

- 54 *Tadetaddvayaṃ nimittavyavasthāpakam. Dravyatvaṃ tu dravyavyavahāranimittamitya-
vadheyam. Ibid.*
- 55 NK, pp. 55–56.
- 56 *Evamantyaviśeṣā vidyante yeṣāṃ te tadvantaḥ teṣāṃ bhāvo'ntyaviśeṣavattvam
antyaviśeṣopalakṣitaḥ samavāyaḥ samavetā vā'ntyaviśeṣāḥ. Vyo., p. 152.*
- 57 *Anāśritatvanityatve cānyatrāvyavidravyebhyaḥ. PPB and NK, p. 50.*
- 58 *Cakārad viparyayaṇa viśeṣarahīta dravyatvaṃ, āśritadravyatvaṃ, anityadravyatvaṃ
cānyatra niravayavadravyebhya iti. Kir., p. 23.*
- 59 *Prthivyudakajvalanapavanātmamanasāmanekatvāparajātimatve. PPB, p. 56.*
- 60 *Saṃskāravattā ceti draṣṭavyam Kir., p. 24.*
- 61 *Kṣījalajyotirānilamanasām kriyāvattvamūrtattvaparatvāparatvavegavattvāni. PPB,
pp. 56–57.*
- 62 *Ākāśakāladīgātmanām sarvagatatvaṃ paramamahattvaṃ
sarvasaṃyogisamānadeśatvaṇca. PPB, pp. 58–59.*
- 63 *Yadyapyākāśādikaṃ sarveṣāṃ saṃyogināmādhāro na bhavati,
ādhārabhāvenānavasthānāt, tathāpi sarvasaṃyogādhārāt vāt sarvasaṃyogināmādhāra
ityucyate, upacārāt. Ata eva sarvagatatvamityanenāpunaruktatā. Tatra tu sarvair saha
saṃyogo'stītyuktam. Iha tu sarveṣāmādhāra ityucyate. NK, p. 59.*
- 64 *Cakārāt kriyāparatvāparatvavegavirahaḥ. Kir., p. 24.*
- 65 *Prthivyādīnampañcānāmapibhūtatvendriyaprakṛitvabāhyaikaikendriyagrāhyaviśeṣag-
uṇavattvāni. PPB, p. 59.*
- 66 *Caturnām dravyārambhakatvasparśavattve. Ibid.*
- 67 *Upalakṣaṇam caitat. Avāntarānutvamahattve, sthititthāpakasaṃskārayogaḥ,
śūrtendriyārambhakatvaṃ ca ityapi draṣṭavyam. Kir., p. 25.*
- 68 *Trayānām pratyakṣatvarūpavattvadravatvāni. PPB, p. 63.*
- 69 NK, pp. 63–64.
- 70 *Dvayorgurutvaṃ rasavattvaṇca. PPB, p. 64.*
- 71 *Rasavattvaṇca rasasamavāyaḥ, na kevalam tayorgurutvaṃ rasavattvaṇceti cārthaḥ.
NK, p. 64.*
- 72 *Ālokaprakāśyatvamabhāsvavararūpavattvaṃ ceti cārthaḥ. Kir., p. 26.*
- 73 *Bhūtātmanām vaiśeṣikaguṇavattvam. PPB, p. 64.*
- 74 *Viśeṣo vyavacchedaḥ viśeṣāya svāśrayasyetarebhyo vyvacchedāya prabhavantīti
vaiśeṣikā rūpādayastadyogo bhūtātmanām. NK, p. 64.*
- 75 *Svāśrayavyavacchedaupayikāvāntarasāmānyaviśeṣavanto vaiśeṣikā guṇā rūpādayo
buddhyādayaśca tadvattvam. Kir., p. 26.*
- 76 *Kṣītyudakātmanām caturdaśaguṇavattvam. PPB, p. 65.*
- 77 *Atra cānyaguṇānāmanyatrāvr̥tteḥ saṃkhyāmātraṃ sādharmyaṃ vivakṣitamiti jñeyam.
Vyo., p. 165.*
- 78 *Sambhāvitaṃ caitat sādharmyaṃ na tu vyāpakaṃ parameśvarātmanyasambhavāt.
Kir., p. 26.*
- 79 *Ākāśātmanām kṣaṇikaikadeśavṛttiviśeṣaguṇavattvam. PPB, p. 65.*
- 80 NK, p. 65.
- 81 *Dikkālayoḥ pañcaguṇavattvaṃ sarvotpattimatāṃ nimittakāraṇatvaṃ ca. PPB, p. 65.*
- 82 *Samkhyā-parimāṇa-prīthakva-saṃyogavibhāgāḥ pañcaiva guṇāḥ diśi kāle ca. Kir., p. 26.*
- 83 *Na kevalamanayoḥ pañcaguṇavattvam sādharmyaṃ sarvotpattimatāṃ
nimittakāraṇatvaṇca sādharmyam . . . Idameva ca deśasya kālasya ca nimittatvaṃ,
yadekatra kāryotpattiranyatrānutpattiriti. NK, pp. 65–66.*
- 84 *Kṣītejasornaimittakadravatvayogaḥ. PPB, p. 67.*
- 85 *Agnisaṃyogānnimittādutpadyate yad dravatvaṃ tatsamavāyaḥ suvarṇādaḥ tejasi,
ghṛtādaḥ pārthive. Kir., p. 27.*
- 86 NK, pp. 67–68.
- 87 Quoted earlier see note 7 of this chapter.
- 88 *Evamanena nyāyena sarvatra sādharmyaṃ yattadeva viparyayād vyāvṛtteḥ
vaidharmyam, vaidharmyaṃ yattadeva viparyayādanuvṛtteḥ sādharmyam. Athavā*

- 107 *Amurtānāmeva guṇā na tveta eva saṁkhyādīnāmapī tadguṇatvāt. Buddhyādayo bhāvanāntīḥ puruṣe śabdaścākāśa iti. Vyo., p. 431.*
- 108 *Samkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṁyogavibhāgā ubhayaḥ guṇāḥ. PPB and NK, p. 229.*
- 109 (i) *Samyogavibhāgadvitvadviprthaktvādayo' nekāśritīḥ. PPB, p. 230.* (ii) *Anekaśabdaśca 'eko na bhavati' iti vyutpatyā dvayorbaḥsvapī sādharmaṇaḥ. NK, p. 230.*
- 110 *Ādigrahaṇāt tritvatviprthaktvādayaḥ. Kir., p. 106.*
- 111 *Śeṣāstvekaikavṛttayaḥ. PPB, and NK, p. 230.*
- 112 *Rūparasagandhasparśaikatvaikapṛthaktvapariṁṇaparatvāparatvagurutvadravatvasnehasaṁskārabuddhyādisābdāntā ekaikasyāmeva vyaktau varttanta ityārthaḥ. Kir., p. 106.*
- 113 *Rūparasagandhasparśasnehasāmsiddhikadravatvabuddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmā-dharmabhāvanāśābdā vaiśeṣikaguṇāḥ. PPB, p. 230.*
- 114 *Viśeṣo vyavacchedaḥ tasmai prabhavanti ye guṇāste vaiśeṣikā guṇā rūpādayaḥ. NK, p. 230.*
- 115 *Tathāhi rūpaṁ bhāsvratvādina, raso madhuratvādina, gandho gandhatvenaiḥ, sparśo uṣṇatādina, snehaḥ snehatvena, yathoktaṁ dravatvaṁ tādṛpyeṇa, buddhyādayo buddhitvādina svāśrayamitrebhya vyavacchindanti. Kir., p. 106.*
- 116 *Samkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṁyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvagurutvanaimittikadravatvavegāḥ sāmānyaguṇāḥ. PPB, p. 231.*
- 117 *Sāmānyam sādharmyam tadrūpā guṇāḥ sāmānyaguṇāḥ na svāśrayavyavacchedāya prabhavanti tyārthaḥ. Kir., p. 107.*
- 118 *Śabdasparśarūparasagandhā bhāyakaikendriyagrāhyāḥ. PPB, 231.*
- 119 (i) *Samkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṁyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvadravatvasnehavegā dvīndriyagrāhyāḥ. PPB, p. 232.* (ii) *Samkhyādayo vegāntāścakṣusparśanagrahaṇāyogyā ityārthaḥ. Kir., p. 107.*
- 120 *Buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnāstvantahkaraṇagrāhyāḥ. PPB, p. 232.*
- 121 *Viśayendriyādijanyaṁ vijñānaṁ kathamātmanyeva samavaiti? Yadyātmā sahajajñānamayo na syāt. Tasyācetanatve hi kāraṇatvāviśeṣādīndriyādisvapi jñānasamavāyo bhavedīti. Tatra svabhāvanīyamādeva nīyamopapatteḥ. Yathā tantūnāmapatave'pi tantutvajātīnīyamāteṣu samavāyo na turyādisu, tadvadacidātma-ke'pyātmanyātmatavajātīnīyamād jñānasamavāyasya nīyamo bhaviṣyati. NK, p. 235.*
- 122 *Gurutvadharmādharmaḥbhāvanā hyātīndriyāḥ. PPB, p. 236.*
- 123 *Indriyamatītya varttanta ityātīndriyāḥ na kenacidīndriyeṇa gṛhyante ityārthaḥ. Kir., p. 107.*
- 124 *Apākājarūparasagandhasparśapariṁṇaikatvaikapṛthktvadravatvasnehavegāḥ kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ. PPB, 236.*
- 125 *Svāśrayasya yatsamavāyīkāraṇam tasya ye guṇāstatpūrvakā rūpādayaḥ, tanturūpadipūrvakāḥ paṭarūpādayaḥ. NK, p. 236.*
- 126 *Vegena sthitisthāpako' pyupalakṣaṇīyaḥ. Eṣvevaitatsambhāvyata ityanyayogavyavacchedenaitatsādharmyam, tena kvāpi karmajate'pi vegasya na doṣaḥ. Kir., p. 107.*
- 127 *Buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmaḥbhāvanāśābdā akāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ. PPB, p. 238.*
- 128 *Ete akāraṇaguṇapūrvakā evetyārthaḥ. Tathā ca samyogavibhāgaveganaimittikadravatvairakāraṇaguṇapūrvakairapi nātivyāptiḥ. Na hyevamjātīyā akāraṇaguṇapūrvakā eva, kvacītkāraṇaguṇapūrvakānāmapī darśanāt. Kir., p. 108.*
- 129 *Buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmaḥbhāvanāśābdātūlapariṁṇottarasamyoganaimittikadravatvaparatvāparatvapākajāḥ samyogajāḥ. PPB, p. 238.*
- 130 *Buddhyādayaḥ pākajāntīḥ samyogajāḥ samyogāsamavāyīkāraṇakā ityārthaḥ. Kir., p. 108.*
- 131 *Buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmaḥbhāvanā ātmamanahsaṁyogajāḥ. Śabdo bheryākāśasaṁyogajāḥ. Tūlapariṁṇam pracayākhyasaṁyogajam. Uttarasamyogaḥ samyogajāḥ samyogo'bhīmataḥ. Naimittikadravatvaṁ vahnisaṁyogajam. Paratvāparatve dikkālapīndasaṁyogaje. Pārthivaparamānūrūparasagandhasparśā vahnisaṁyogajā iti vivekaḥ. NK, pp. 238–39.*

- 132 *Pārthivaparmānūrūpādayaḥ te'pyagnisamyogajā ityete eva saṁyogajā na tvete saṁyogajā eva. Tathāhi śabdo vibhāgajāḥ śabdajo'pyastīti. Vyo., p. 435.*
- 133 *Samyogavibhāgavegāḥ karmajāḥ. PPB, p. 239.*
- 134 *Ādyau saṁyovibhāgau karmajau. NK, p. 239.*
- 135 *Vego'vegavadravyārabdhe vartamāna iti. Kir., p. 108.*
- 136 *Samyogavibhāgavegāḥ karmabhyo jātā karmajā ityete eva. Na tvete karmajā eva. Vyo., p. 435.*
- 137 *Śabdottaravibhāgau vibhāgajau. PPB, 239.*
- 138 *Ādayḥ śabdo vibhāgādapi jāyate, uttaro vibhāgo vibhāgādeva jāyata iti vivekaḥ. NK, p. 239.*
- 139 *Paratvāparatvadvitvadviprthaktvādayo buddhyapekṣāḥ. PPB, p. 239.*
- 140 *(i) Eṣāmutpattau nimittakāraṇaṁ buddhiḥ. NK, p. 239. (ii) Ādigrahaṇāt tritvatiprthaktvādayo grāhyā, taditare ca tadviparītā ityarthāt. Kir., p. 108.*
- 141 *Rūparasagandhānuṣṇasparśaśabdaparimāṇaikatvaikaprthaktvasnehāḥ samānajātyārambhakāḥ. PPB, p. 240.*
- 142 *Atra kāraṇatvamātram vivakṣitam, na tvasamavāyikāraṇatvam, anyathā vijātyānām pākajānām nimittakāraṇasyoṣṇasparśavyavacchedo'saṅgatārthaḥ syāt. NK, p. 240.*
- 143 *Atra cānuṣṇagrahaṇamuṣṇasparśavyavacchedārtham, tasyāpyubhayārambhakatvāt. Vyo., p. 435.*
- 144 *Sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnāścāsamānajātyārambhakāḥ. PPB, p. 240.*
- 145 *Sukhamicchāyaḥ kāraṇam duḥkhaṁ dveṣasya icchādveṣau prayatnasya so'pi karmanaḥ. NK, p. 240.*
- 146 *Samyogavibhāga -saṁkhyāgurutvadratavoṣṇasparśajñānadharmādharmasaṁskārāḥ samānāsamānajātyārambhakāḥ. PPB, p. 241.*
- 147 *Samyogāt samānajātyā uttarasamhyogo vijātyāṁ dvitūlake mahtparimāṇam, vibhāgādvibhāgaḥ śabdaśca. NK, p. 241.*
- 148 *Samyogādvijātyam dravyādi, vibhāgācchabdaḥ, saṁkhyātaḥ parimāṇam, gurutvāpatanam, dravatvāt syandanam, snehāt saṁgrahaḥ, uṣṇasparśāt pākajāḥ. Kir., p. 109.*
- 149 *Buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣabhāvanāśābdāḥ svāśrayasamavetārambhakāḥ. PPB, p. 242.*
- 150 *Tathāhi buddhirātmani varttate tatraiva jñānam saṁskāraheturbhaviṭi. Sukhādicchā ātmanyeva duḥkhādvēṣastatraiva icchā tatsmaraṇaprayatnānvātmanyeva śabdaścākāśe varttamānasatatraiva śabdāmārabhata iti. Vyo., p. 436.*
- 151 *Rūparasagandhasparśaparimāṇasnehaprayatnāḥ paratrārambhakāḥ. PPB, p. 242.*
- 152 *Avayavarūpādayaḥ snehāntā avayavini rūpādikamārabhante. Prayatnaścātmani varttamānaḥ śarīre ceṣṭām. Kir., p. 110.*
- 153 *Samyogavibhāgasamkhyāikaprthaktvagurutvadratavavegadarmādharmāstūbhayat-rārambhakāḥ. PPB, p. 243.*
- 154 *Samyogo dravyaṁ svāśraye bherīdaṇḍādisamhyogo nabhasi śabdām, vaṁśadalayorvibhāgo vibhāgaṁ svāśraye, . . . śabdāmanyatra, saṁkhyā kāraṇagatā kārye saṁkhyā parimāṇaṁ ca, svāśraye dvitvādikam. Dharmasā svāśraye sukhāmanyatra jvalanādaḥ kriyāmiti. Kir., p. 110.*
- 155 *Gurutvadratavavegaprayatnadharmādharmasamhyogaviśeṣāḥ kriyāhetavaḥ. PPB, p. 244.*
- 156 *Gurutvāt patanam, dravatvāt syandanam, vegād bhramaṇam, prayatnācceṣṭā, dharmādharmābhyaṁbhūkampādi, samhyogaviśeṣānnodanābhīghātālakṣṇādiśvādikar-ma. Kir., p. 111.*
- 157 *Rūparasagandhānuṣṇasparśasaṁkhyāparimāṇaikaprthaktva-snehaśābdānāmasama-vāyikāraṇatvam. PPB, p. 244.*
- 158 *Atha kimīdamasamavāyikāraṇatvaṁ nāma? Prayatnasya kāryajanakatvam. Yadyasya pratyāsaṇnaṁ sajjanakatvenopalabhasāmārthyaṁ vyāptya tattasyotpattīvasamavāyikāraṇam. Kā punariyaṁ pratyāsaṭīḥ? Ekārthasamavāyaḥ. Sā tu bhīdyate kāryakārthasamavāyulakṣṇā kāryakāraṇaikatārthasamavāyulakṣṇā ceti. Vyo., p. 438.*

- 159 *Sukhādīnām samavāyikāraṇamātmā, tatra samavāyādātmamaṇḥsaṃyogasteṣāmasa-*
mavāyikāraṇam. Sarvatrāvadhr̥tasāmṛthyastu jñātr̥maṇḥsaṃyoga ityētavatā
viśeṣeṇa tasyaivāsamavāyikāraṇatvaṃ tathā paṭarūpasya samavāyikāraṇam Paṭ-
arūpasya samavāyikāraṇena paṭeṇa sahaikasminnarthe tantau samavāyāt tanturūpa
paṭarūpasyaśamavāyikāraṇam. NK, pp. 244–45.
- 160 *Buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmabhāvanānām*
nimittakāraṇatvam. PPB, p. 246.
- 161 *Nimittatvam nimittakāraṇatvameva. Yathā ca pratyāsattiviśeṣe'pi*
naiśāmasamavāyikāraṇatvaṃ tathā vakṣyate. Kir., p. 111.
- 162 *Buddhyādibhāvanāntānām nimittakāraṇatvami. Samavāyysamavāyilakṣaṇarahita-*
sya janakatvam. Vyo., p. 439.
- 163 *Saṃyogavibhāgoṣṇasparśagurutvadravatvavegānāmubhayathā kāraṇatvam. PPB,*
p. 246.
- 164 *Tathā hi bherīdaṇḍasaṃyogaḥ śabdopattaṃ nimittam bheryākāśasaṃyogo'samavāyik-*
āraṇam. Evaṃ vibhāge dalavibhāgo nimittam vaṃśadalākāśavibhāgo'samavāyikār-
aṇam. Uṣṇasparśa uṣṇasparśasyāsamavāyikāraṇam pākajānām nimittakāraṇam.
Gurutvaṃ svāśraye patanasyāsamavāyikāraṇam. Nodanābhighātaḥ (sic.) kriyotpattaṃ
nimittakāraṇam. NK, pp. 246–47.
- 165 *Dravatvaṃ saṃgrahādau nimittam dravatvasyandanayorasamavāyī. Vego*
vegagamanayorasamavāyī abhighāte nimittamiti. Kir., p. 111.
- 166 *Paratvāparatvadvitvadviprthaktvādīnāmākāraṇatvam. PPB, p. 247.*
- 167 *Paratvādīnāmākāraṇatvaṃ na nimittatvaṃ nāpyasamavāyitvamiyarthah. Kir., p. 112.*
- 168 *Nanveteṣām jñānādyutputtāvastyeva kāraṇatvam. Satyam.*
Tadvyatīrekenānyatrākāraṇatvaṃ vivakṣitamiti ... Eteṣāmākāraṇatvameva, na
iveteṣāmeva pārimaṇḍalyāderapyakāraṇatvāt. Vyo., p. 440.
- 169 *Saṃyogavibhāgaśabdātmaviśeṣguṇānām pradeśavṛttitvam. PPB, p. 247.*
- 170 *Pradeśavṛttitayo'vyāpyavṛttitayā svāśraye varttante, na varttante cetyarthah.*
Nanvetadayuktam, yugapadekasyaikatra bhāvābhāvavirodhāt. Nānupapannam,
pramāṇena tathābhāvapratiṭeḥ. Tathā hi mahato vṛkṣasya puruṣeṇa sahāgre saṃyogo
mūle ca tadabhāvaḥ pratiyate mūle vṛkṣopalambho'pi saṃyogasya
sarvairanupalambhāt. NK, p. 247.
- 171 *Evaṃ śabdo'pyākāśam na vyāpnoti, tatraivāsya deśabhedenopalambhānupalambhāb-*
hyām yugapad bhāvābhāvasambhavāt. Buddhyādayo hyantarbaḥścopalambhānupala-
mbhābhyāmavyāpakāḥ. NK, p. 248.
- 172 *Śeṣāṇāmāśrayavyāpītvam. PPB, p. 249.*
- 173 *Pūrvoktebhyāḥ saṃyogādibhyo ye'nye te śeṣāḥ teṣāmrūparasagandhasparśasaṃkhyā-*
parimāṇaprthaktvagurutvadravatvasnehavegāsthitisthāpakatvaparatvāparatvānāmity-
arthah. Kir., p. 112.
- 174 *Apākajarūparasagandhasparśaparimāṇaikaprthaktvasāṃsiddhikadravatvagurutvasn-*
ehānām yāvaddravyabhāvitvam. PPB, p. 249.
- 175 *Apākajādīnām snehāntānām yāvaddravyabhāvitvam, yāvadaśrayameteṣām*
sthitiravināśaḥ. Āśrayavināśādeva paramete vināśyanti na tvanyathetyarthah. Kir.,
p. 112.
- 176 *Śeṣāṇāmāyāvaddravyabhāvitvam. PPB, p. 249.*
- 177 *Apākajarūpādīvyatirikṭā guṇā yāvaddravyam na santi, satyevāśraye naśyantītyarthah.*
NK, p. 249.
- 178 *Tadetaduddeśamātramācāryeṇoktam. Evamanyadapi svyamūhanīyam. Tadyathā rūpā-*
dyekaiikatyaḥsāṃsiddhikadravatvarūparasagandhasparśasne-
hānām mūrtaviśeṣaguṇatvam. Rūparasagandhasnehagurutvadravatvasthitisthāpakat-
ānām sparśavyāpyatvam. Kir., p. 113.
- 179 *Snehaśaityaśāṃsiddhikadravatvānāmjalāmātravṛttitvam. Auṣṇyabhāsvaratvayostejom-*
ātravṛttitvam. Rasagurutvayorjalāvaniguṇatvam. Gandhamādhuryetararasaśukletara-
rūpānām prthivīmātravṛttitvam. Buddhyādīnām bhāvanāntānāmātmaviśeṣaguṇat-
vaṃ, rūpadravatvayoḥ prthivyaptejomātravṛttitvam. Ibid.

- 180 *Naimittikadravatvasyaskṣitejomātravṛttitvam. Naimittikadravatvapārthivaparamānūrūpādīnām pākajatvaṃ. Saṃkhyāparimāṇapracayānāmeva parimāṇakāraṇatvam. Saṃyogavibhāgaśabdānāmeva śabdakāraṇatvam. Ibid.*
- 181 *Sparśaguruvaprayatnavegānāmevābhīghātahetutvam. Ekatvaikapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgānāmevānekāśṛitaguṇārambhakatvam. Paratvāparatvayorevadikkālapiṇḍasaṃyogajetvam. Paratvāparatvacaramajñānadvitvadvipṛthaktvādīnāmeva nimittvinaśavināśyatvam. Etadanyesāmeva guṇāntaravināśyatvam. Kāryaguṇānāmevāśrayavināśavināśyatvam. Apārthivaparamānūrūparasasparśasāmsiddhikadravatvasneha-guruvasthitiṣṭhāpakānityadravyaika-tvaikapṛthaktvaparimāṇeśvarabuddhicchāprayatnānām nityatvākāryatve. Itareṣām guṇānāmanityatvākāryatve ityādi. Ibid.*

5 Modes and means of knowing

- 1 As already indicated and as will be authenticated from the statement of Praśastapāda, quoted below in note no. 7 of this chapter, epithets such as 'knowledge', 'knowing' and 'cognition' are used as synonyms in the Vaiśeṣika tradition. These terms should be taken in a restricted sense and not in their current connotations.
- 2 *Indriyadoṣāt saṃskāradoṣāccāvidyā. Tadduṣṭajñānam. The Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda with the comments from the Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra and the Vivṛtti of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, translated into English by A.E. Gough, New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975, 9/2/10–11.*
- 3 *Aduṣṭam vidyā. VAK, 9/2/12.*
- 4 *Tasyāḥ satyapyanekavidhātve samāsato dve vidhe-vidyā cāvidyā ca. Tatṛāvidyā caturvidhā-saṃśayaaviparyayānādhyavasāyasvapnalakṣaṇā. Praśastapādabhāṣyam (Padārthadharmaśaṅgrahākhyam) of Praśastapādācārya, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), 2nd edn, Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 411.*
- 5 *Buddherviśayabhedenā satyapi bhede saṃkṣepato dvaividyamāha ... atra pratipādanamātrasya vivakṣitātvaṃ paścāduddiṣṭāmapyavidyām prathamam kathayati. Nyāyakandālī of Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma, 1997, p. 414.*
- 6 *Sā cānekaprakārā, arthānāntyāt pratyarthaniyatatvācca. PPB, p. 410.*
- 7 *Buddhirūpalabdhirjñānam pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ. Ibid.*
- 8 *Yadyapi buddhirjñānamityetāvataiva svastham, yasmin satyātmani 'jñāmi' ityanuvyavasāyo bhavati sā buddhiḥ. Tathāpi buddhyādiśabdānām kēdarthabhedumāhuḥ tatpratyaḥkhyānārtham paryāyokīrtanam ... Sāṅkhyā hi prakṛteḥ sattvapradhānam prathamam parināman mahadākhyantaḥkaraṇaviśeṣam buddhimāhuḥ ... Buddhyate upalabhate jñāti pratyeti loka samānārtham. Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya, J.S. Jetly vi (ed.), Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971, p. 170.*
- 9 *Tatṛāvidyā caturvidhā-saṃśayaaviparyayānādhyavasāyasvapnalakṣaṇā. PPB, p. 411.*
- 10 *Sāmānyapratyakṣādviśeṣāpratyakṣādviśeṣasmrteṣca saṃśayaḥ. VAK, 2/2/17.*
- 11 *Drṣṭāṇca drṣṭavat. VAK, 2/2/18.*
- 12 *Saṃśayastāvat prasiddhānekaviśeṣayoḥ sādṛśyamātradarśanādubhayaśeṣānusmaraṇādadharmācca kiṃsvidityubhayāvalambī vimarśaḥ. PPB, p. 411.*
- 13 *Vidyā vidyātaṣca saṃśayaḥ. VAK, 2/2/20.*
- 14 *Udayaveera Shastri, Vaiśeṣika Darśana: Vidyodayabhāṣya, Ghaziabad: Virajananda Vaidika Shodha Sansthan, 1972, p. 108.*
- 15 *Samśtīḥ saṃśayaḥ saṃśayate'nenātmā supta iva bhavati niruktirlakṣaṇam. Vyomavati of Vyomaśivācārya, Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, pp. 535–36.*
- 16 *Saṃśayasya ca nityam duḥkha hetutvam, anyathā tadbādhānārtham viśeṣajijñāsānupapattēḥ. Kir., p. 172.*
- 17 *Tatraikasmin dharmīṇi virodhinānāprakāraḥ jñānam saṃśayaḥ. Kanādarahasyam of Śaṅkara Miśra, Vindhyeswari Prasad Dwivedi (ed.), Benares: Chowkhamba, 1917, p. 115.*
- 18 *Viparyayo'pi pratyakṣānumānaviśaya eva bhavati. Pratyakṣaviśaye tāvat prasiddhānekaviśeṣayoḥ pittakaphānilopahatendriyasyāyathārthālocaṇādasaṃnīhitav-*

- iṣayājñānajasamskārāpekṣādātmanasoh saṁyogādadharmāccātasamistaditi pratyayo viparyayaḥ. PPB, p. 423.*
- 19 *Asatyapi pratyakṣe pratyakṣābhimāna ityādinā nirviṣayaṁ viparyayamāheti. Vyo., p. 541.*
- 20 *Ibid., pp. 541–42.*
- 21 *Evam laukikaviparyayamuktivā parīkṣakaviparyayamudāharati trayīti śarīrendriyamanaśsvātmābhimānasteṣāmanātmatvasya pramāṇāsiddhatvāt. Kir., p. 177.*
- 22 *PPB, pp. 434–35.*
- 23 (i) *Kimityālocanamātram kūrṇ nāmeti jñānam viśeṣasañjñollekhasūnyam anudhyavasāya iti. Vyo., p. 547.* (ii) *Seyam sañjñāviśeṣānanvadhāraṇātmikā pratitiranadhyavasāyaḥ. NK, p. 436.*
- 24 *NK, p. 436.*
- 25 *Tathā svapnaḥ. VAK, 9/2/7.*
- 26 *Ātmamanahsaṁyogaviśeṣādasaṁavāyikāraṇāt svāpa ityākhyā sañjñā yasyātmamanahsaṁyogaviśeṣasyāsau tathoktaḥ. Vyo., p. 551.*
- 27 *Uparatendriyagrāmasya pralīnamanskasyendriyadvareṇaiva yadanubhavanam mānasam tat svapnajñānam katham? Yadā buddhipūrvādātmanah śarīravayāpārādahani khinnānām prāñinām niśi viśrāmāthamāhārapariṇāmātham vādṛṣṭakāritaprayatnāpekṣādātmanātaḥkaraṇasambandhānmanasi kriyāprabandhādantārḥḍaye nirindriye ātmapradeśe niścalaṁ manastiṣṭhati, tadā pralīnamanaska ityākhyāyate. Pralīne ca tasminnuparatendriyagramo bhavati, tasyāṁavasthāyām prabandhena prāñpānasantānapravṛttivātmamanahsaṁyogaviśeṣāt svāpākhyat saṁskārāccendriyadvareṇaivāsatsu viśāyeṣu pratyakṣākāram svapnajñānamutpadyate. PPB, pp. 436–38.*
- 28 *Evamajātāneva jātān mṛtāniva jīvataḥ yūna iva sthāvīrānityādī. Kir., p. 181.*
- 29 *Tattu trividham- saṁskārapāṭavāddhātudoṣādadrṣṭācca. PPB, p. 439.*
- 30 *Priyatamām śatruṁ vādṛto 'numanyamānaścintayan svapīti, tadā saiva cintāsantatiḥ smṛtisantatiḥ saṁskārātiśayāt pratyakṣākāra sāṁskādarthābhāsini sañjāyate. NK, p. 439.*
- 31 *Yat svayamanubhūteṣvananubhūteṣu vā prasiddhārtheṣvapasiddhārtheṣu vā yacchubhūvedakam gajārohaṇacchatralābhādi, tatsarvaṁ saṁskāradharmābhyām bhavati. Viparītām ca tailābhyañjanakharoṣṭrārohaṇādi tat, sarvamadharmasamskārābhyām bhavati. Atyantāprasiddhā' rtheṣvadrṣṭādeveti. PPB, p. 440.*
- 32 *Vide Kir., p. 180.*
- 33 *Svapnāntikam. VAK, 9/2/8.*
- 34 (i) *Svapnāntikam yadyapyuparatendriyagrāmasya bhavati, tathāpyatītasya jñānaprabandhasya pratyavekṣanāt smṛtireveti. PPB, pp. 440–41.*
(ii) *Kadācit svapnadṛṣṭasyārthasya svapnāvasthāyāmeva pratisandhānam bhavati- ayaṁ mayā drṣṭa iti, tacca pūrvānubhūtasya svapnasyā'nte'vasāne bhavatīti svapnāntikamucyate. NK, pp. 441–42.*
- 35 *Nyāyalīlavatī (NL), pp. 454–60.*
- 36 *VAK, 9/2/1–13.*
- 37 *Vidyāpi caturvidhā-pratyakṣalaingikasmṛtyārśalakṣaṇā. PPB, p. 441.*
- 38 *The Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Early Vaiśeṣika, with an appendix Daśapadārthī of Candramati, Keiichi Miyamoto, Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1996, p. 86.*
- 39 *Ibid., p. 90.*
- 40 *Notably, there are some later scholars of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition who argue that perception is the most supreme among the pramāṇas (pramāṇa-jyeṣṭha). Vide M.K. Gangopadhyaya, Indian Logic in its Sources, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1984, pp. 24–25.*
- 41 *Tatrākṣamaṁsaṁ pratītyotpadyata iti pratyakṣam. Akṣāñindriyāṇi, ghrāṇarasanaśakṣu- stvakcchrotramanāmsi ṣaṭ. PPB, p. 442.*
- 42 *Ghrāṇajādiprabhedena pratyakṣam ṣaḍvidham matam. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśvanātha, reprint, Harīrām Śukla Śāstrī (ed.), Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2005, verse 52.*

- 43 *Akṣāṇḍriyāṇi ghrāṇādīni ṣaṭ na tvekādaśa sām̐khyavat pañca vā bauddhavat. Kir., p. 183.*
- 44 *Ādau pratyakṣasya nirdeśaḥ kāraṇatvāt, tadanantaramanumānasya tatpūrvakatvāt, tadanantaraṁ smṛteḥ pratyakṣānumiteṣvartheṣu bhāvāt, laukikapramāṇānte saṅkīrtanamārṣasya lokottārāṇāṁ puruṣāṇāṁ tadbhāvāt. NK, p. 442.*
- 45 *Sākṣātkāri yathārthaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣamīti. Kir., p. 183.*
- 46 *Tatpratyakṣaṁ (dravyādiṣveva) dravyakarmasāmānyesvevotpadyate, na viśeṣasamāvāyayorityarthaḥ. NK, p. 444.*
- 47 *Dravye tāvad dvividhe mahatyanekadravyavattvodbhūtarūpaprakāśacatuṣṭ-ayasannikarṣād dharmādisāmagrye ca svarūpalocanamātram. PPB, p. 443.*
- 48 *Sāmānyaviśeṣadravyaguṇakarmāpekṣādātmamanahsannikarṣāt pratyakṣamutpadyate. PPB, p. 447.*
- 49 *Tatra sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu svarūpalocanamātram pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇaṁ, prameyā dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ, pramātātmā, pramitirdravyādiviśayaṁ jñānaṁ. PPB, p. 471.*
- 50 *Sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattāvavibhaktamālocanamātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇaṁ, asmīnnānyat pramāṇāntaramasti, aphalarūpatvāt. PPB, pp. 472–73.*
- 51 *Sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattau pramāṇaṁ, viśeṣajñānotpattāvapīndriyārthasannikarṣaḥ pramāṇaṁ bhavatyeva pramāhetutvāt kintu viśeṣajñānasahakāritayā na kevalaḥ, sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattau tu jñānānapekṣaḥ kevala evetyabhiprāyaḥ. NK, pp. 472–73.*
- 52 *Athavā sarveṣu padārtheṣu catuṣṭayasannikarṣādavitatthamavyapadeśyaṁ yajjñānamutpadyate tatpratyakṣaṁ pramāṇaṁ, prameyā dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ, pramātātmā pramitirguṇadoṣamādhyasthyadarśanamīti. PPB, pp. 474–75.*
- 53 *For details see D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1976, pp. 428, 430 and 436.*
- 54 *Asyedaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ samyogi virodhi samavāyi ceti laiṅgikam. VAK, 9/2/1.*
- 55 *Jñānamīti prakṛtam. Vaiśeṣikasūtrapaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra, 2nd edn, Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra (ed.) and translated from Sanskrit into Hindi by Dhunḍhirāja Śāstrī, 2nd edn, Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2002, p. 485.*
- 56 *Darśanaśabda upalabdhipavacanā na cākṣuṣapratūtivacanaḥ. NK, p. 476.*
- 57 *Līṅgasya darśanāt jñānāt samyag jāyamaṇaṁ laiṅgikamīti vākyaṛthaḥ. Tasya ca jñānasya samyagjātīyasya yathārthaparicchedakatayotpādaḥ, sarvadhiyaṁ yathārthaparicchedakatvasya . . . kuladharmatvāt. NK, p. 477.*
- 58 *Samśayaviparyayau tāvad yathāśāvarthaṁ na tathā paricchintāḥ. Smṛtirapyaparicchedikā na bhavati anubhavadpāratantryāditi. Ibid.*
- 59 *Heturapadeśo līṅgaṁ nimittaṁ pramāṇaṁ kāraṇamītyanarthāntaram. VAK, 9/2/4.*
- 60 *Yadanumeyena sambaddhaṁ prasiddhaṁ ca tadanvīte. Tadabhāve ca nāstyeva talīṅgamanumāpakam. PPB, p. 478.*
- 61 *Viparītamato yat syādekena dvitayena vā. Viruddhāsiddhasandigdhamalīṅgaṁ kāśyapo'bravīt. PPB, p. 480.*
- 62 *Aprasiddho'napadeśo'san sandigdhaścānapadeśaḥ. VAK, 3/1/15.*
- 63 *See above, note no. 61 of this chapter.*
- 64 *Vyo., p. 569.*
- 65 *Tatra dṛṣṭaṁ prasiddhasādhyayoratyantajātyabhede'numānaṁ. Yathā gavyeva sāsnaṁātramupalabhya deśāntare'pi sāsnaṁātradarśanād gavi pratipattiḥ. PPB, pp. 507–08.*
- 66 *Prasiddhasādhyayoratyantajātibhedalīṅganumeyadharmasāmānyānuvṛtito'numānaṁ sāmānyatodṛṣṭam. Yathā karṣakavaṇigrājapuruṣāṇāṁ ca pravṛtteḥ phalavattvamupalabhya varṇāśramaṇāmapī dṛṣṭaṁ prayojanamanuddiśya pravartamānānāṁ phalānumānamīti. PPB, pp. 508–09.*
- 67 *Tatra līṅgadarśanaṁ pramāṇaṁ pramitiragnijñānaṁ. Athavā'gnijñāmeva pramāṇaṁ pramitiragnau guṇadoṣamādhyasthyadarśanamītyetat svanīścītārthamanumānaṁ. PPB, pp. 509–10.*
- 68 *Asyedaṁ kāryakāraṇasambandhaścāvayavādbhavati. VAK, 9/2/3.*
- 69 *PPB and NK, pp. 558–60.*

- 70 *Ātmanasoh saṃyogaviśeṣāt saṃskārācca smṛtiḥ*. VAK, 9/2/6.
- 71 *Liṅgadarśaneccā . . . smṛtiriti*. PPB and NK, p. 625.
- 72 *Paṭvabhyāsādarapratyayajanitād iti saṃskāra-kāraṇam*. ‘*Saṃskārād*’ ityasādhāraṇakāraṇam. *Anena lakṣaṇaṃ sūcayati-saṃskārasādhāraṇakāraṇikā matiḥ smṛtiḥ . . . Icchādveṣayoh sukhaduḥkhasādhana-smṛtihatutvityarthah*. Kir., p. 243.
- 73 *Ata eva na pramāṇam tasyāḥ pūrvānubhava-viśayatvenopadarśanenārthaṃ niścinvatyā arthaparicchede pūrvānubhava-pāratantryāt*. NK, pp. 625–26. The above view of Śrīdhara has been alleged to be inconsistent with the *bhāṣya* of Praśastapāda and identical with the Bhāṭṭa view. Vide Govardhan P. Bhatt, *The Basic Ways of Knowing*, 2nd edn, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989, p. 82.
- 74 *Nanvayuktametad vidyamāne’pi vastuni smaraṇasya darśanāditi*. Vyo., p. 621.
- 75 *Tatpūrvānubhavaḥ pramā, asmr̥tirūpaṃ jñānam anubhavaḥ*. *Saptapadārthī* of Śivāditya, D. Gurumurti (ed. and translated into English), Adyar: Theosophical Society, 1932, p. 101.
- 76 *Smṛtirapi mānāntaram, arthaniścaya-hetutvāt*. *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Vallabhāchārya, Harihara Śāstrī (ed.), 2nd edn, Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1991, p. 620.
- 77 *Svaviśayajñānapramāṇyāpekṣatvasya śabdāsādhāranyāt*. NL, p. 621.
- 78 *Sā dvividhā smṛtiranubhavaśca*. *Tarka-Saṃgraha* of Annaṃbhāṭṭa, Y.V. Athalye (ed.) and translated into English by M.R. Bodas, 2nd edn, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974, p. 21.
- 79 *Smṛtirapi dvividhā yathārthāyatharthā ca*. TS, p. 57.
- 80 Chandrodaya Bhattacharya, *Elements of Indian Logic and Epistemology*, 2nd edn, Calcutta: Modern Book Agency, 1966, p. 249. There seems to be a misprint in this book because both Types of knowledge, i.e. valid as well as invalid has been characterised as ‘non - mnemonic’.
- 81 *Āraṇ siddhadarśaṇca dharmebhyaḥ*. VAK, 9/2/13.
- 82 *Tadyogipratyakṣe’ntarbhāvānna vidyāntaramiti vṛttikṛtaḥ*. *Āraṇ jñānaṃ caturthī vidyāiva, sā ca ṛṣṇāṃ laukikānāṇca bhavati*. *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* (VSUp.), p. 519.
- 83 *Āmnāyavidhātṛṇām atītānāgatavartamāṇeṣavatīndriyeṣvartheṣu dharmādiṣu granthopanibaddheṣu cātmanasoh saṃyogād dharmaviśeṣācca yat prātibhaṃ yathārthanivedanaṃ jñānamutpadyate tadāraṇamityacakṣate*. PPB, p. 628.
- 84 PPB and NK, pp. 629–30.
- 85 Jonardan Ganeri, *Semantic Powers*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1999, p. 63.
- 86 Vide Stephen Philips, ‘Epistemology in classical Indian philosophy’, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, pp. 1–28, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-india/> (accessed 28 June 2012).
- 87 PPB, p. 512.
- 88 Vyo., pp. 583–84.
- 89 *Asmīnnānyat pramāṇāntaramasti aphalarūpatvāt*. PPB, p. 473.
- 90 *Viśayendriyasambandho vyāpāraḥ so’pi śaḍvidhaḥ*. *Dravyagrahastu saṃyogāt saṃyuktasamavāyataḥ*. *Dravyeṣu samavetānām tathā tatsamavāyataḥ*. *Tatrā’pi samavetānām śabdasya samavāyataḥ*. *Tad vṛttinām samavetasamavāyena tu grahaḥ*. *Pratyakṣaṃ samavāyaṃ viśeṣanatayā bhavet*. *Bhāṣāparichheda* (BP), verse 59–62.
- 91 *Ālocanaṃ indriyārthasannikarṣastanmātram (avibhaktam) kevalaṃ jñānānapekṣamiti yāvat*. NK, p. 472.
- 92 *Ālocanamindriyārthasannikarṣaḥ*. Kir., p. 288.
- 93 *Critique of Indian Realism (CIR)*, Shastri 1976, p. 429.
- 94 PPB, pp. 509–10.
- 95 *Mitena liṅgena liṅgino’rthasya paścānmānāmanumānam*. NBh. (NS, 1/1/3).
- 96 *Pramāṇaśabdaḥ karaṇavyutpattisiddho na phalaṃ vinā paryavasyati, ataḥ pramāṇaphalavibhāgaṃ darśayati tatra liṅgadarśanamiti*. *Tatrānumāne liṅgajñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ pramīyate’neneti vyutputtyā, pramītiḥ pramāṇasya phalamagnijñānam*. *Yadyapi liṅgalingijñānāyorutpattyapekṣayā viśayabhedastathāpi liṅgajñānsyāpi liṅgini jñānotpattau vyāpārāṅliṅgiviśayatvam, tataśca pramāṇaphalayorna vyadhikaraṇatvam*. NK, p. 511.

- 97 *Prakārāntaramāha athaveṭi. Agnījñānaṁ pramāṇam, pramitiḥ pramāṇasya phalam. Agnau guṇadoṣamādhyasthyadarśanaṁ guṇadarśanaṁ sukhasāadhanametaditi jñānam, doṣadarśanaṁ duḥkhasāadhanatvajñānam, mādhyasthyadarśanaṁ sukhaduḥkhasāadhanatvābhāvajñānam, agnījñāne sati tathāpratītyutpādāt. NK, p. 511.*
- 98 *Etena śābdam vyākhyātam. VAK, 9/2/3.*
- 99 *Śabdādīnāmapynumāne'ntarbhāvaḥ, samānavidhitvāt. PPB, p. 512.*
- 100 *Vide ShashiPrabha Kumar, 'Śabda as Pramāṇa in Vaiśeṣika', in Śabda-Text and Interpretation in Indian Thought, Santosh K. Sareen and Makarand Paranjape (eds), New Delhi: Mantra Books, 2004, pp. 98–106. For further readings on Śabda-pramāṇa, see Purushottama Bilimoria, Śabdapramāṇa : Word and Knowledge in Indian Philosophy, reprint, New Delhi: D.K. Printworld, 2008.*
- 101 *Prasiddhābhīnayaśya ceṣṭayā pratipattidarśanāt tadapyanyumānameva. PPB, p. 529.*
- 102 *Āptenāprasiddhasya gavayasya gavā gavayapratipādanādūpamānam āptavacanameva. PPB, p. 530.*
- 103 *Darśanādarthāptatīrvirodhyeva, śravaṇādanumitānumānam. PPB, p. 534.*
- 104 *Sambhavo'pyavinābhāvītvādanumānameva. PPB, p. 542.*
- 105 *Karyānutpādena kāraṇabhāvaḥ pratīyata ityabhāvarūpatayaiva pramāṇāntaramiti kecī. Tannīśedhārthaṁ na paraṁ sambhavo'bhāvo'pyanyumānamevati. Vyo., p. 591.*
- 106 *'Iti ha' iti nipātasamudāyaḥ purāvyṛte vartate. Tasya bhāva āptiḥyam . . . etādarśaṁ cāvitatamevetyāptopadeśa eva. Tathā cānumāna evāntarbhavatīti bhāvaḥ. Kir., p. 220.*

6 Agent of knowing

- 1 *Prasiddhyā jñānena prasādhakaḥ jñātā'numīyate. Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya, J.S. Jetly (ed.), Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971, p. 85.*
- 2 *Tatrātmā manaścāpratyakṣe. The Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda with the comments from the Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra and the Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, translated into English by A.E. Gough, New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975, 8/1/2.*
- 3 *Prāṇāpānanimēṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnāścātmano līngāni. VAK, 3/2/4.*
- 4 (i) *Śarīrapariḡrṛhite vāyau vikṛtakarmadarśanād bhastrādhmāpayiteva. Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ (Padārthadharmasāṅgrahākhyam) of Praśastapādācārya, 2nd edn, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 200.*
- (ii) *Vayustiryaggamanasvabhāvaḥ, śarīrapariḡrṛhite vāyau prāṇāpānākhye vikṛtaṁ svabhāvaviparītaṁ karmaurdhvagamanamadhogamanam ca dṛśyate, tasmāt prayatnavān vīgrahasyādhiṣṭhānumīyate, yastathā vāyūṁ prerayati, anyathāśya vikṛtavāyvasambhavāt. Bhastrādhmāpayiteva dṛṣṭāntaḥ, śarīraṭ prayatnavadhiṣṭhita-micchāpūrvavakavikṛtavāyavāśrayatvād bhastrāvat. Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sarma (ed.), 2nd edn, Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, pp. 200–201.*
- 5 *Akṣipakpakṣmaṇoḥ saṁyogahetuḥ karma nimeṣaḥ vibhāgahteturimeṣaḥ tenāpi prayatnavānanumīyate . . . Atrāpi prayogaḥ 'jīvaccharīraṁ bhoktrprayatnavadhiṣṭhitam, viśiṣṭanimeṣonmeṣakriyāvattvāt dāruyantravat'. Kir., p. 89.*
- 6 (i) *Dehasya vṛddhikṣatabhagnasamrohaṇādīnimittatvāt grhapatiriva. PPB, pp. 200–202. (ii) Samrohaṇam punaḥ saṁghaṭanaṁ tayornimittatvād grhapatiriva prayatnavānadhīṣṭ hātā anumīyate. NK, p. 201.*
- 7 *Bahuṣu vastuṣu puraḥsthitheṣvapi yatra vastuni didṛkṣaḥ so' bhimato viṣayastadagrāhakaṁ karaṇam cakṣustatsambandhanimittena manaḥkarmaṇā vīgrahasyādhiṣṭhātā prayatnavānanumīyata ityārthaḥ. Pelakaṁ khelāviśeṣaṁ śiśūnāṁ jatuguṭikā. Grhakoṇeṣu vyavasthite guṭikāntare vastvantare vā pelakapreraḥko dārakaḥ śiṣurivetyārthaḥ. Sūktī of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, p. 365.*

- 8 For detailed explanation of this argument, which is also given by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtras*, please see Chakrabarti, 'I touch what I saw', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52, no. 1, (March 1992), 103–16.
- 9 *Tathā nayanaviśayaḥlocaṇānantaraṁ rasānusr̥mtikrameṇa rasavikriyādarśanāt anekagavākṣāntargata- prekṣakavadubhayadarśī kāścīdvijñayata iti.* Vyo., p. 405.
- 10 *Na kevalaṁpūrvoktairhetubhiḥ, sukhaduḥkhecchādveśādibhiḥsa guṇairguṇyanumīyate. Ahaṅkāreṇāhamitī pratyayenekavākyatvamekādhikaraṇatvam sukhādīnām.* NK, p. 204.
- 11 *Yasya tattvajñānam niḥśreyasāya ghaṭate viparyayañānam saṁsāraheturyadarthāni ca bhūtāni tat.* NK, p. 167.
- 12 *Ātmatvam nāma sāmānyaviśeṣaḥ tadabhisambandhādātmā itarebhyo bhidyata iti Kir.,* p. 85.
- 13 *Tasya sauksmyādapratyakṣatve sati karaṇaiḥ śabdādyupalabdhyanumitaiḥ śrotrādibhiḥ samadhigamaḥ kriyate.* PPB, pp. 167–68.
- 14 *Nanu dr̥śyasya sattvaṁ tadākārasaṁvedanena vyāptam, na cātmākāraṁ kasyacitsaṁvedanamasti, ato vyāpakānupalabdhya tasya sattvameva nirākriyate, kuto dharmanirūpaṇamityāśaṅkya tatsadbhāve bādhakaṁ pramāṇam nāsti, pratyakṣānupalabdheranyathāsiddhatvāt, sādhaḥkaṁca pramāṇamanumānamastīti pratipādayannāha tasyeti. Pratyakṣopalabdhivyogayatāviraḥ saukṣmyam.* NK, p. 168.
- 15 *Śabdādyupalabdhyāḥ karaṇasādhyāḥ, puruṣavyāpāratvāt, dātrādikaraṇakacchidādik-riyāvat. Sūkti, p. 361.*
- 16 *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra (ed.), translated into Hindi by Dhunḍhirāja Śāstrī, 2nd edn, Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2002 (VAK, 3/2/14), pp. 254–55.
- 17 *Manomātrasya gocarāḥ. Nyāyasiddhāntamutāvalī* of Viśvanātha, Harirām Śukla Śāstrī (ed.), Varanasi: Chaukhambha, reprint, 2005, verse 50, p. 172.
- 18 *Sauksmyaṁ bāhyendriyagrahaṇayogyatāviraḥ, tasmādapratyakṣatve tasya karaṇaiḥ śrotrādibhiḥ samadhigamaḥ kriyate. Kir.,* p. 85.
- 19 *Ahaṁkārasyāśrayo'yam. BP,* verse 50, p. 172.
- 20 *Na śarīrasya caitanyam, ghaṭādivad, bhūtakāryatvāt, mṛte cāsambhavāt. PPB,* p. 171.
- 21 (i) *Mrtāvasthāyāṁ caitanyasya rūpādivadanupalabdhera śarīraviśeṣaguṇatvam. Tathāhi caitanyam śarīraviśeṣaguṇo na bhavati, sati śarīre nivartamānavāt. Vyo.,* p. 394. (ii) *Yadi śarīrāśritam caitanyam syāttadā mṛte śarīre'pi syāt tadasambhavāt tadadarśanādaśarīrāśritam caitanyamityarthaḥ. Sūkti, p. 362.*
- 22 *Caitanyam śarīrasya viśeṣaguṇo na bhavati, ayāvaddravyabhāvitvāt saṁyogavat. Ata eva tatkarāṇānyapracetanāni, teṣāṁ caitanye kārye'pi caitanyam syāt. Ekasmin śarīre jñātr̥bahutvaṁca prāpnoti. Tataścaikābhiprāyeṇa pravṛttiniyamābhāvādidoṣaḥ. NK,* p. 172.
- 23 *Jñānādhikaraṇamātmā. Turka-Saṁgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa, Y. V. Athalye (ed.) and M. R. Bodas, (trans. Eng.) 2nd edn, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974, p. 12.
- 24 *Yatkaraṇam tat kenacit kartrā prayujyate, Kārye vyāpāryate, yathā vāsyādikam vardhakaṇā. Karaṇaṁca śrotrādikam tasmāt kenacit prayoktavyaṁ ya eṣāṁ prayoktā sa ātmā ... karaṇatvaṁca śrotrādīnām niyatārthasya grāhakatvāt, pradīpavat. NK,* pp. 168–69.
- 25 *Śabdādiṣu prasiddhyā ca prasādhako'numīyate. Śabdādiṣu viśayeṣu prasiddhirjñānam tatrāpi prasādhako jñātānumīyate. Jñānam kvacidāśritam, kriyātvāt cchidikriyāvat, yatredamāśritam sa ātmā. NK,* p. 169.
- 26 *Nendriyānām, karaṇatvāt, upahateṣu viśayāsānnidhye cānusr̥mtidarśanāt. PPB,* pp. 171–73.
- 27 *Tathā cendriyeṣu caitanyāśrayeṣu svikriyamāṇeṣu teṣāmupaghāte 'ndhādibhiḥ pūrvānubhūtanām rūpādīnāmasmrāṇaprasaṅgāt. Kir.,* p. 86.
- 28 *Ata eva viśayasyāpi na caitanyam, naṣṭe viśaye tatsmaraṇayogāt. Ito'pi na tasya caitanyam taddeśajñānasya tajjanyasya ca sukhāderananubhavāt buddhipūrvakaceṣṭā-viśeṣābhāvācca. NK,* pp. 172–73.

- 29 *Yadi hi viṣayāścetaṣṭayaṣṭeṣāmasannidhāne' nusrmṛtirnadadyāt. Asannidhiśca nāśahetuko draṣṭavyaḥ. Na hysatyānubhavitari smaraṇamupapadyate kṛaṇābhāvdīti bhāvaḥ. Kir., p. 87.*
- 30 *Nāpi manasaḥ karaṇāntarānapekṣitve yugapadālocanasmr̥tiprasaṅgāt, svayaṁ karaṇābhāvēcca. PPB, p. 173.*
- 31 *Jñānāśryatayā mano' numīyamānaṁ kartṛ syāt na tu tatkarāṇam, tathā ca yugapadanekaviṣayasannidhau anekacakṣurādīkaraṇādhiṣṭhānena yugapadanekānyālocanānyanekāśca smṛtīrārabheta. Na hi karaṇavat karturayaṁ dharmo yadekadaikāmeva kriyāmabhinirvartayate. Tathāṭve vā vyāsaṅgo na syāt. Karaṇāntarāpekṣāyāṁ ca saṁjñābhedaṁmātram. Kir., p. 87.*
- 32 *Tathāhi caitanyaṁ pradhānakriyā sā ca kartari karmaṇi vā samavaiti. Na karaṇe bhaviturmahati, anupalambhāt. Na hi karaṇamṁ pradhānakriyāśrayo dṛṣṭa iti. Vyo., p. 395.*
- 33 *Tathāhi bodharūpaṁ kāryaṁ bodhādeva bhavati. Yathā śuklācchuklamityādi. Vyo., p. 401.*
- 34 *Ayamabhiprāyaḥ. Jñānāśryatvenānumīyamānaṁ mano karttaiva syāt na jñānakaraṇaṁ tathā ca cakṣurādīndriyāṇāṁ yugapattatadviṣayasannikarṣe manasastattadindriyasannikarṣāpekṣāṁ binā yugapadanekasyālocanasya jñānasya prasaṅgāt karaṇasyaiva karttureva vyāpāramātrajananaṇīyamābhāvāt. Sūktī., p. 363.*
- 35 *Mano'pi na tathā jñānādyanadhyakṣaṁ tadā bhavet. BP, verse 49 and NSM (Commentary on Bhāṣāparichheda), pp. 158–59.*
- 36 *Siddhe hi caitanyaśraye karttari karaṇaṁ mano'numīyate, tathā ca dharmigrāhakaḥpramāṇābhāda iti bhāvaḥ. Kir., p. 87.*
- 37 (i) *Parīṣeṣādātmakāryatvātenātmā samadhiḡamyate. PPB, pp. 173–75.*
(ii) *Tadevaṁ parīṣeṣādātmakāryatvāccaitanyasya, tenātmā samadhiḡamyate. Kaḥ punaryaṁ parīṣeṣaḥ? Prasakteṣu śarīrādiṣu jātyādiṣu ca viṣayeṣu caitanyapratīṣedhe tathā tadāśrayasya vyavasthāpanānnātvādhigamādākāśādīnāṁ ekatvenāprasakteḥ śīṣyate ca dravyāntaramiti parīṣeṣaḥ kevalavyatirekyaṇumānam. Vyo., p. 395.*
- 38 *Tadindriyaviṣayabuddhidehādvyatiricyamānamupādānamātmāiva. Nyāyalīlāvatī of Vallabhāchārya, Harihara Śāstrī (ed.), Benaras: Chowkhamba, 1991, p. 316.*
- 39 *Vivādādhyāsitaḥ prāṇo na jñānādhāraḥ kāryatvāt, vāyutvāt, prāṇatvāt, susuptāvasthaprāṇavat. Mānamanohara of Vādi Vāgīśvara, Swāmī Yogindrānanda, ed. and translated into Hindi, Varanasi: Saddarsana Prakaskan Pratisthana, 1973, p. 29.*
- 40 *Vide J.C. Chatterjee, Hindu Realism, Delhi: Swastika Publications, 1975.*
- 41 *Tasya dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte. VAK, 3/2/5.*
- 42 *Yathā vāyuparamāṇoravayavakalpanāyāṁ na pramāṇamato nityatvaṁ tathātmāno'pi. Yathā guṇavattvādvāyuparamāṇurdravyaṁ tathā'tmāpītyarthaḥ. VSUp., p. 245.*
- 43 (i) *Ātmatvābhisambandhādātmā. PPB, p. 167.*
- 44 *Ātmatvaṁ nāma sāmānyaṁ tadabhisambandhādātmēti vyavahāraḥ. NK, pp. 168–69.*
- 45 *Tasmājjñānāśraya ātmēti siddham. MM, p. 41.*
- 46 *Janyajñānādhīkaraṇatvam. Siddhāntacandrodaya (A commentary of Tarkasaṁgraha) of Śrīkrṣṇa Dhūrjati, V. R. Lele, Bombay: Gujarati Printing Press, 1923, 1, p. 12.*
- 47 *Yatreyaṁ prasiddhirādhrīṭa, ya ghrāṇādīnāṁ karaṇānāṁ prayoktā sa ātmā. VSUp., (VAK, 3/1/2), p. 198.*
- 48 *Ātmendriyādyadhiṣṭhātā. BP, verse 47, p. 152.*
- 49 *Prayatnāśraya ātmā. MM, p. 45.*
- 50 *Tatrātmā sarvasya draṣṭā, sarvasya bhoktā sarvajñāḥ sarvānubhāvī. Nyāyadarśanam (Nyāyasūtra) of Maḥarṣi Gautama and Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī, ed. and translated into Hindi, unique edition, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1999, (NS, 1/1/9), p. 21.*
- 51 *Tatra cecchādīnāṁ pratisandhānam ātmāstitvapratipādakam. Nyāyavārtikam of Uddyotakaraṇācārya, (NS, 1/1/10), Anantalal Thakur (ed.), New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, p. 60.*

- 52 *Tasyaguṇāḥbuddhisukhadūḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārasaṃkhyā-parimāṇapṛthakṭva-saṃyogavibhāgāḥ*. PPB, p. 208.
- 53 (i) *Ātmaliṅgādhikāre buddhyādayaḥ prayatnāntāḥ siddhāḥ*. PPB, pp. 208–09.
(ii) *Buddhyādināmātmāni sadbhāve sūtrakārānumatiṃ darśayati*. NK, p. 208.
- 54 *Ātmendriyārthasannikarṣād yanniṣpadyate tadanyat*. VAK, 3/1/18.
- 55 *Yadyapi buddhistatra kaṇṭharaveṇa nāsti tathāpi sukhādaya eva svakāraṇatayā tāmākṣipanti . . . Indriyāntaravikārāccobhayadarśitam vivakṣitvā buddhiguṇatvamātmāno darśitamiti bhāvaḥ*. Kir., p. 98.
- 56 *Sacetanaścītā yogāttadyogena vinā jadaḥ*. Nārthāvabhāsādanyiddhi caityanyam nāma manmahe. *Nyāyamanjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Part II, Surya Nārāyaṇa Śukla, Reprint, Varanasi: Chaukhamba, 1998, p. 6.
- 57 *Asyaiva kartṛtvam bhokṛtvam ca*. *Kaṇādarahasyam* by Śaṅkara Miśra, Vindhyeswari Prasad Dwivedi (ed.), Benares: Chowkhamba, 1917, p. 37.
- 58 *Iṣṭāniṣṭakāraṇaviśeṣādvirodhācca mithaḥ sukhaduḥkḥayorathāntarabhāvaḥ*. VAK, 10/1/1.
- 59 *Anugrahalakṣaṇamanugrahasvarūpaṃ yasminnutpanne satyā' tmānugrhitāmātmānam manyata iti. . . upaghatalakṣaṇamupaghatasvarūpamduḥkhamiti*. *Upahanyate'nenetyupahatāmātmānam manyata iti*. Vyo., pp. 624–25.
- 60 *Samśayanirṇayāntarābhāvāśca jñānāntaratve hetuḥ. Tayorniṣpattiḥ pratyakṣalaṅghikābhyām. Abhūḍityapi. Sati ca kāryādarśanāt. Ekārthasamavāyikāraṇāntareṣu dṛṣṭatvāt*. VAK, 10/1/2–6.
For a detailed discussion of these arguments by Kaṇāda and explanation thereupon provided by Śaṅkara Miśra, see Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti, *Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyāya Dualist Tradition*, Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1999, pp. 45–51.
- 61 *Ayameva tasyopakāro'yameva cātiśayo yasmin sati sukhaduḥkḥabhokṛtvam*. NK, p. 207.
- 62 *Sukhavattvamasyāsiddham suhasvarūpatvāditi cet na aham sukhīyanubhavāt anyathāham sukhāmīti syāt*. KR, p. 37.
- 63 *'Anandam' ityatra matvarthīyācpratyayavirodhācceti*. NSM, pp. 166–67.
- 64 *Svārtham parārtham vā'prāptaprārthanecchā. Sā cātmamanasoḥ saṃyogāt sukhādyapekṣāt smṛtyapekṣādvotpadyate*. PPB, p. 634.
- 65 *Prajvalanātmako dveṣaḥ. Yasmin sati prajavalitāmivātmānam manyate sa dveṣaḥ. Sa cātmamanasoḥ saṃyogādduḥkḥāpekṣāt smṛtyapekṣādvotpadyate*. PPB, p. 637.
- 66 *Prayatnaḥ saṃrambha utsāha iti paryāyāḥ. Sa dvidvidho- jīvanapūrvakāḥ icchādveṣapūrvakaśca Sa cātmamanasoḥ saṃyogādicchāpekṣādvotpadyate*. PPB, p. 638.
- 67 *Dharmaḥ puruṣaguṇaḥ . . . Adharmo'pyātmaguṇaḥ*. PPB, pp. 660 and 677.
- 68 *Ātmāntaraguṇānāmātmāntarenā'kāraṇatvāt*. VAK, 6/1/5.
- 69 *Anyasamavetābhyām dharmādharmābhyāmanasya sukhaduḥkḥānupapatteḥ. Utpattau ca kṛtāhānāḥkṛtābhyāgamaprasaṅgāt*. Kir., p. 98.
- 70 *Yāvadātmāni dharmādharmau tāvadāyuh śarīramindriyāṇi viṣayāśceti*. Quoted in Vyo., p. 639.
- 71 *Ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣāt saṃskārācca smṛtiḥ*. VAK, 9/2/6.
- 72 *Samskāraḥ smṛtyutpattau kāranavacanāt*. PPB, p. 209.
- 73 *Vyavasthāto nānā*. VAK, 3/2/20.
- 74 *Kā Punariyam Vyavasthā? Sukhaduḥkḥādinām niyamaḥ*. Vyo., p. 408.
- 75 Kir., p. 99.
- 76 *Śāstrasāmarthyācca*. VAK, 3/2/21.
- 77 *Yaccaikatvapratipādakaṃ vākyam tatparmātmāpekṣayā vyākhyeyam*. Vyo, p. 410.
- 78 *Abhedaśrutayastu gaunārthā iti dik*. NK, p. 213.
- 79 *Na ca nānāmapakṣe sarveṣāṃ krameṇa muktāvante saṃsārocchedaḥ aparimitānāmanyananyūnatiriktatvayogāt. Yathāhurvārtikakāramiśrāḥ: Ata eva ca vidvatsu mucyamāneṣu santatam. Brahmāṇḍaloke jīvānāmanantatvādaśūnyatā*.

- Antyanyūnātiriktatve yujyate parimānavat. Vastunyaparimeye tu nūnam teṣāmasambhavaḥ. NK, p. 213.*
- 80 Athalye-Bodas, notes on *TS*, p. 143.
- 81 *Vibhāvānmaḥānākāśastathā cātmā. VAK, 7/1/22.*
- 82 *Vibhutvameva tasya kuta iti cet, na, tatkāryasya jñānasukhādeḥ sarvatra darśanāt. Kir., p. 100.*
- 83 *NK, pp. 213–14.*
- 84 *Sarvamūrtadravyasamyogitvaṁ vibhutvam. TD, p. 11.*
- 85 *Prthaktvamapyata eva. PPB, p. 213.*
- 86 *Samkhyāsiddhyā samkhyānurūpaṁ prthaktvamapi sidhyatīti. Setu of Padmanābha Miśra, Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, p. 390.*
- 87 *Sannikarṣajavatī sukhādīnām samyogaḥ. PPB, p. 215.*
- 88 *Sukhādayao hi kāryatvādasamavāyikāraṇamapekṣante na cānyatsambhavatītyātmān taḥkaraṇasamyogaḥ siddhaḥ. Vyo., p. 411.*
- 89 *Tadvināśakatvādvibhāga iti. PPB, p. 215.*
- 90 *Tasya samyogasya vināśakatvāt vibhāgaḥ siddhaḥ, ātmanasornityatvenāśrayavināśasya vināśahetorabhāvādityarthaḥ. NK, p. 215.*
- 91 *VAK, 3/2/4, quoted earlier, see note 3 this chapter.*
- 92 In view of this, there are scholars who have raised questions about him being an atheist. Vide Gopika Mohan Bhattacharya, *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism*, Calcutta: Calcutta Sanskrit College, 1961, pp. 160–63.
- 93 *PPB, pp. 1–2 and 127–31.*
- 94 *Vyo., p. 298 and NK, pp. 138–39.*
- 95 ShashiPrabha Kumar, *Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha Nirūpaṇa*, Delhi: Publications Division, University of Delhi, 1992, p. 216.
- 96 *Ātmā tu Paramātmā kṣetrajñāśceti dvividhaḥ. Saptapadārthī of Śivāditya, D. Gurumurti, ed. and translated into English, Adyar: Theosophical Society, 1932, p. 20.*
- 97 John Vattanky, 'Aspects of early Nyāya theism', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 6.4, 1978, 393–404.
- 98 *So'yaṁ dvividhaḥ kṣetrajñāḥ sarvajñāśceti. KR, p. 39.*
- 99 *Kāryayojanadhṛtyādeḥ padāt pratyayataḥ śrutaḥ. Vākyaṭ samkhyāviśeṣacca sādhyo viśvavidavyayaḥ. Nyāyakusumañjali of Udayanācārya, vol.1, translated into English by N.S. Dravid, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996, p. 374.*
- 100 Karl H. Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (EIP)*, Vol. II, pp. 102–07.
- 101 *Tathāhi Maheśvareccchā nimittakāraṇamātmanāmaṇubhiḥ samyogāścāsamavāyikāraṇamaṇavastu samavāyina ityaṇuṣu karmānyutpadyante. Vyo., p. 298.*
- 102 *PPB, pp. 127–31.*
- 103 *Cetanamadhiṣṭhātāramantareṇācetanānām pravṛttyabhāvāt. NK, p. 141.*
- 104 *MM, p. 7.*
- 105 *Kṛtimātrasiddhāvapi katham nityasarvajñāsiddhiriti cet na pakṣadharmatābalena tatsiddheḥ dvyaṅkaṁrābhya bhūgolaparyantaṁ kṣityupādānābhijñāḥ sarvajña eva syāt. KR, p. 40.*
- 106 *Tathā ca ya eva cetayate sa eva budhyate jānātyupalabhate pratyeti ceti nārthāntarakalpanā yukteti dik. VSUp., p. 449 (VAK, 8/1/1).*

7 Abode and faculties of knowing

- 1 *Sadākāraṇavanitiam. The Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda with the comments from the Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra and the Vivṛtti of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, translated into English by A.E. Gough, New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975, 4/1/1.*
- 2 *Tatpunaḥ prthivyādikāryadravyaṁ trividhaṁ śarīrendriyāviśayasamjñakam. VAK, 4/2/1.*

- 3 *Aśarīrīnāmātmanāmnaviṣayāyabodhaḥ. Prāśastapādabhāṣyam* (Padārthadharmasaṅgrahākhyaṁ) of Prāśastapādācārya, 2nd edn, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 141.
- 4 *Tasmādyadavacchinne ātmani bhogastadantyāvayavi śarīram. Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayanācārya, J. S. Jetly (ed.), Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971, p. 37.
- 5 *Bhokturbhogāyatanaḥ śarīram. Nyāyakandaḥ* of Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), 2nd edn, Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 82.
- 6 The issue of parts and whole (*avayava* and *avayavin*) is highly significant from the Vaiśeṣika standpoint. Accordingly the whole is a new entity different from its parts, otherwise the perception of external objects is not possible. For details see J. N. Sinha *IR* 1938, pp. 254–55.
- 7 *Antyāvayavitvam avayavajanyatve satyavayavajanakatvam. Tarka-Saṁgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa, Y. V. Athalye (ed.) and translated into English by M. R. Bodas, 2nd edn, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974, pp. 106–07.
- 8 *Śarīramantyāvayavi ceṣṭābhogendriyāśrayaḥ. Tārkikarakṣā* of Varadaraja, V. P. Dwivedi (ed.), Varanasi: 1903, 1/28.
- 9 *Ātmaśarīrendriyārthabuddhimanahpravrttidosaṁpretyabhāvaphaladuḥkhāpavargāstu prameyam. The Nyāyadarśanam (Nyāyasūtra)* of Maḥarṣi Gautama & Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī, ed. and translated into Hindi, unique edition, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1999, 1/1/9.
- 10 *Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayanācārya, Shashinatha Jha (ed.), Darbhanga: Mithila Vidyapeetha, 1973, p. 7.
- 11 *Pratyakṣāpratyakṣāṇām saṁyogasyāpratyakṣatvāt pañcātmatvaṁ na vidyate. VAK*, 4/2/2.
- 12 *Dravyeṣu pañcātmatkatvaṁ pratiśiddham. VAK*, 8/2/4.
- 13 *Guṇāntarāprādurbhāvācca na tryātmatkaṁ. VAK*, 4/2/3.
- 14 *Niḥśvāsocchvāśopalabdheścāturbhautikaṁ. NS*, 3/1/29.
- 15 *Pārthivaṁ guṇāntaropalabdheḥ. NS*, 3/1/27.
- 16 *Bhūtasamīyogo hi mithaḥ pañcānam na niśiddha iti. NBh. on NS*, 3/1/27, p. 158.
- 17 *Gandhavanti dvyānukāni gandhavadbhireva paramānubhirārabhyante, kāryatve sati gandhavattvāt, pārthivaparamānūdvaīrābdhadvyaṇukavat. Kir.*, p. 41.
- 18 *Nāpi caturātmatkatvaṁ pṛthivītvādīnām vyāpyavṛttīve jātisaṅkaraprasaṅgāt. Setu* of Padmanābha Miśra, Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, p. 216.
- 19 *Tasmāt sajātīyānāmevārambhakatvaṁ na vijātīyānāmiti sthitam. Kir.*, p. 41.
- 20 *Gandhakledavyūhāvakaśadānebhyaḥ pāñcabhautikaṁ. NS*, 3/1/30.
- 21 *Tathāpi, śarīrasya kathaṁ pārthivatvaniścayaḥ? Ittham, kledādīnām parāvṛttāvapi śarīrasya pratyabhijñānāt, gandhasya ca yāvaddravyabhāvitvāt ghaṭavat. Kir.*, p. 41.
- 22 Gajendragadkar 1988, p. 241.
- 23 *Vyomavatī* of Vyomaśivācārya, Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, pp. 244–45.
- 24 *Tatra śarīram dwividham-yonijamayonijam ca. VAK*, 4/2/5.
- 25 *Aniyatadikdeśāpūrvakatvāt. VAK*, 4/2/6.
- 26 *Pārthivā jalīyāḥ taijaśā vāyavyāśca paramāṇavaḥ sarvāsu dikṣu sarveṣu deṣeṣu ca santi teṣāṁ digdeśanīyamābhāvāt ayonijaśarīrotpattau na paramānūdurbhikṣam. Vivṛtti*, quoted by Gough in *VAK*, 1975, p. 148.
- 27 *Dharmaviśeṣācca. VAK*, 4/2/7.
- 28 *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* of Śāṅkara Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra (ed.), translated into Hindi by Dhunḍhirāja Śāstrī, 2nd edn, Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2002, p. 290.
- 29 *Samākhyābhāvācca. VAK*, 4/2/8.
- 30 *Samākhyā sañjñā tasyābhāvāt sattvāt vījipitradikam vinaiveti śeṣaḥ na hi sarvāḥ sañjñāḥ pitradīnaiva nīveśitāḥ ghaṭapaṭādisañjñānāntatātvābhāvāt tathā ca yeneśvareṇa ghaṭapaṭādyacetaneṣu sañjñā nīveśitāstenaiva manumarīcyādisañjñā ayonījeṣu śarīreṣu nīveśitā iti bhāvaḥ. Vivṛtti*, quoted by Gough in *VAK* 1975, p. 150.
- 31 *Sañjñāyā anāditvāt. VAK*, 4/2/9.

- 32 *Sargādau yā brahmādisanijñā ādibhūtā prāthamikūṭayā kriyate astyayonijaṃ śarīramiti na hi tadā brahmaṇo mātāpitarau staḥ yābhyāṃ brahmādisanijñā kṛtā syāditi.* VSUp., p. 291.
- 33 *Santyayonijāḥ.* VAK, 4/2/10.
- 34 *Idānīm caturṇām sūtrāṇām sādhyam nirdiśati manumarīcyādīnām dehaviśeṣā iti śeṣaḥ.* Vivṛtti, quoted by Gough, p. 150.
- 35 *Vedaliṅgācca.* VAK, 4/2/11.
- 36 *Vedarūpaṃ yallīṅgaṃ jñāpakam tasmāt tathā brāhmaṇo'sya mukhamāsīt sa mukhato brāhmaṇamasṛjāt ityādikebhyo vedebya eva ayonijāḥ śarīraviśeṣāḥ santīti jñāpyate.* Vivṛtti, quoted by Gough, p. 151.
- 37 (i) *Śukraśonitasannipātaṃ yonijam.* PPB, p. 82. (ii) *Śukrañca śonitañca tayoh sannipātaḥ samyogaviśeṣaḥ tasmājjātaṃ yonijamityucyate pītuḥ śukraṃ mātūḥ śonitaṃ tayoh sannipātānantaram.* NK, pp. 84–85.
- 38 *Tatrāyonijamanapekṣya śukraśonitaṃ devaṛṣṇāṃ śarīraṃ dharmaviśeṣasahitebhyo'nubhyo jāyate. Kṣudrajanātūnām yātanāśarīraṇyadharmaviśeṣasahitebhyo'nubhyo jāyante.* PPB, p. 82.
- 39 *Jarāyuriti garbhāśayasyābhidhānaṃ tena veṣṭitaṃ jāyata iti jarāyujam. Aṇḍam bimbaṃ tena veṣṭitaṃ jāyate tadanḍajam.* NK, pp. 87.
- 40 *Dehaścaturvidho jantorjñeya utpattibhedataḥ. Udbhijjāḥ svedajo'nḍotthaścaturthaśca jarāyujāḥ. Udbhidya bhūmim nīrgacchnudbhijjāḥ sthāvaraśca yaḥ. Udbhijjāḥ sthāvarā jñeyāstṛṇagulmādirūpiṇāḥ. Yogārṇava,* quoted in *Nyāyakośa*, Bhīmācārya Jhalakīkar, Vāsudeva Śāstrī Abhyankar (revised edn), Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1996, p. 870.
- 41 *Ayonijaṃ svedajodbhijjādikam. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (commentary on *Bhāṣāparichheda*) of Viśvanātha, Harirām Śūkla Śāstrī (ed.), Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2005, p. 117.
- 42 *Dinakarī* (a commentary of NSM) on the above, pp. 117–18.
- 43 *Yadyapi codbhido'pi vrkṣādayaḥ śarīrabhedatayā'traiva vyākhyātumucitāḥ tathāpyatimandāntaḥsañjñatayā laukikāpekṣayā sukhaduḥkhabhoktradiṣṭhānatvamamiśānavivakṣan prāyeṇa jaṅgamopakāraakatayā tudadhīnatayā ca viśayatām vivakṣan teṣṣevānatarbhāvya vyākhyāsyante.* Kir., p. 39.
- 44 *Yadyapi vrkṣādayo'pi śarīrabhedā eva bhogādhiṣṭhānatvāt ... vṛddhiḥsatabhagnasamrohaṇe ca bhogopapādake sphuṭe eva, āgamo'pyasi ... śmaśāne jāyate vrkṣaḥ kaṅkagrādrādisevitaḥ ityādiśca, tathāpi ceṣṭāvattvamindriyavattvaṇa nodbhidāṃ sphuṭataramato na śarīravavyavahāraḥ.* VSUp. (VAK, 4/2/5), p. 289.
- 45 *Vrkṣādiṣu sphuataraceṣṭā ādipratīterabhāvāt prāyaḥ śarīravavyavahāro na prākṛtānāmiti jñeyam. Prabhā* (a commentary of NSM), p. 96.
- 46 *Na cānukūlatarkacintā kāryā, anyathāgamārthasyaivānupapattiprasaṅgāt. 'Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavarttatāgre bhūtasya jātaḥ patireka āsīt.'* (Rgveda. 10/121/1). *Mānamanohara* of Vādi Vāgīśvara, Swāmi Yogindrananda, ed. and translated into Hindi, Varanasi: Saddarsana Prakashan, 1973, p. 16.
- 47 *Pūrvakṛtaphalānubandhāt tadutpattiḥ.* NS, 3/2/60 and NBh. on the same.
- 48 *Dharmaviśeṣācca.* VAK, 4/2/7.
- 49 *Aviduṣo rāgadveṣavataḥ pravarttakāddharmāt prakṛtāt svalpāddharmasahitād brahm-endraprajāpatipīṭmanuṣyalokeśvāśayānurūpāriṣṭaśarīrendriyaviśayasukhādi bhīry-ogo bhavati.* PPB, p. 678.
- 50 *NK*, pp. 679–80.
- 51 *Tathā prakṛtādudharmāt svalpadharmasahitāt pretatiryagyonisthāneṣvanīṣṭaśarīrendriyaviśayaduḥkhādibhīryogo bhavati.* PPB, pp. 678–79.
- 52 *Vide Potter, Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. II, 2004, p. 704.
- 53 *Prāṇanīrodhe satyanyābhyāṃ labdhavṛttibhyāṃ dharmādharmābhyāmātmamanahsa myogasahāyābhyāmṛtaśarīrad vibhāgākāraṇamapasarpānakarmotpadyate. Tataḥ śarīrād bahirapagataṃ tābhyāṃ dharmādharmābhyāṃ samutpannenātīvāhikaśarīreṇa sambudhyate.* PPB, pp. 237–38.

- 54 (i) *Ātmananāḥsaṃyogaḥ tasmin manāḥparicchedye mana eva karanamiti. Parakīyena ca manasā sūkṣmaśarīrasthaṃ manāḥ pretyābhisambandhayati (?) tatsambadhaṃ ca tadgrhṇātīti. Vyo., p. 559.*
(ii) *Ātivāhikaśarīraṃ cāgamabalādabhyupagatatantaḥkaraṇasya pariḡrhitavādīti. Vyo., p. 676.*
- 55 *Tasmānmṛtaśarīrapratyāsannamadr̥ṣṭavaśūdupajātakriyairanubhirdvyaṇukādi prakra-menārabdha-matisūkṣmamanupalabdhiyogyaṃ śarīraṃ parikalpyate. Tacca mṛtaśarīramatikramya manasaḥ svarganarakādideśātivāhanādharma katvādātivāhika-mucyate. NK, pp. 738–39.*
- 56 *NK, pp. 737–38.*
- 57 *Mṛtaśarīre tadyogyatvāt tadvypadeśaḥ. NK, p. 82.*
- 58 *VSUp. (VAK, 5/2/16), p. 321–22.*
- 59 *Na tāvatccharīritvameva kartrtvam, susuptasyodāsīnasya ca kartrtvaprasaṅgāt, kintu paridr̥ṣṭasāmarthyakāraka-prayojakatvam, tasmin sati kāryotpatteḥ. NK, pp. 138–39.*
- 60 *Atha satyeva śarīre preryyaprakatvam, ihāpi satyeva paramāṇau preryyaprakatvamiti samānam. Vyo., p. 305.*
- 61 *Śarīrāśrayaṃ jñāturaparokṣapratītisādhanaṃ dravyamindriyam. NK, p. 82.*
- 62 *Śarīrasaṃyuktamatīndriyaṃ sākṣātpatītisādhanamindriyam. Kir., p. 37.*
- 63 *Indriyatvaṅca smṛtyajanakajñānakāraṇamanaḥ-saṃyogāśrayatvam, śabdetarodbhūta-viśeṣaguṇānāśrayatve sati jñānakāraṇamanaḥsaṃyogāśrayatvam vā. VSUp., pp. 283–84.*
- 64 Since the sixth and the internal organ, mind, has been said to act as an essential instrument in the process of knowing, it will be discussed in a separate chapter.
- 65 *Karṇaśaṣṭkūlyavacchinnaṃ nabhaḥ śrotram. Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Part II, S.N. Śukla (ed.), reprint, Varanasi: Chaukhamba, 1998, p. 8 and p. 232.*
- 66 *Tacca śarīrasaṃyoge satyeva sākṣātpramītisādhanam. Tārikakarakṣā of Varadarāja, V.P. Dwivedi (ed.), Varanasi: 1903, p. 28.*
- 67 *Vaiśeṣikāiḥ sādhitam manasa indriyatvam naiyāyikā apyabhyupagacchanti. Pramāṇādi padārthaprakāśikā of Laugākṣibhāskara, p. 21 (quoted in Nyāyakoṣa, p. 142).*
- 68 *Śarīrasaṃyuktam aparokṣapratītisādhanamatīndriyamindriyam. Lak., p. 6.*
- 69 *Indriyārthasannikarṣajanyaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam. TS, p. 29.*
- 70 *Vide Chatterjee 1965, p. 133.*
- 71 *Bhūyastvāt gandhavattāt ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne prakṛtiḥ. VAK, 8/2/5.*
- 72 *Indriyaṃ gandhavyañjakam sarvaprāṇinām jalādyanabhibhūtaiḥ pāṛthivāvayavairārabdham ghrāṇam. PPB, p. 87.*
- 73 *Ātmā jighrati gandhamupādatte'neneti. NK, 88.*
- 74 *Gandhopalabdhyā tāvatkaraṇamātraṃ siddham. Kriyāyāḥ karaṇamātraniṣpādyatvaniyamāt. Kir., pp. 41–42.*
- 75 *Itaradravyānabhibhūtaiḥ pāṛthivāvayavairārabdhatvameva bhūyastvam. VSUp., pp. 465–66.*
- 76 *Yathā ghr̥taṃ svagandhasahitameva kuṅkumagandhamabhivyanakti, tathā ghrāṇamapi svagandhasahitamevindrīyam, ato na svagandhasya grāhakam, tenaiva tasyāgrahanāt. NK, p. 88.*
- 77 *Tacca prāpyakāri janakatve sati tadaprāptāvanaktvāt. Kir., p. 42.*
- 78 *Dravyaṃ ca saṃyogāśrayatvāt, pāṛthivaṃ ca gandhavattvāt, gandhavattvaṃ ca rūpādyavyañjakatve sati gandhābhivyañjakatvāt. Kir., p. 42.*
- 79 *Indriyaṃ sarvaprāṇinām rasavyañjakam vijātanabhibhūtairjalāvayavairārabdham rasanam. PPB, p. 96.*
- 80 *Indriyaṃ tu pāṛthivādyanuṣṭabdhajalāvayavairārabdham rasanamāpyam. Kaṇādarahasyam by Śāṅkara Miśra, Dwivedi (ed.), Benares: Chowkhamba, 1917, p. 16.*
- 81 Although localisation of the sense of taste in the tip of the tongue does not agree with the findings of experimental psychology. The taste buds occur largely in the posterior part of the tongue. Vide Chatterjee 1965, pp. 133–34.

- 82 *Indriyaṃ sarvaprāṇināṃ rūpavyaṅjakamanyāvayavānabhibhūtaistejo'vayavairārabdham cakṣuḥ*. PPB, p. 99.
- 83 *Anudbhūtarūpasparśaṃ yathā nāyanam*. VSUp. (VAK, 2/1/3), p. 116.
- 84 *Indriyaṃ sarvaprāṇināṃ sparśopalambhakam, prthivyādynabhibhūtaivāvayavairārabdham sarvaśarīravapyi tvagindriyam*. PPB, p. 113.
- 85 *Tvagiti ca na bāhyameva carma kevalamucyate api tu sakalaśarīravapyi tuhinakaṇaśi-śīrasalilapānasamayē'ntarhṛdaye'pi śītasparśopalambhāditi*. NM, p. 48.
- 86 *Śrotraṃ punaḥ śravaṇavivaraśāṅjñako nabhodeśaḥ*. PPB, p. 152.
- 87 *Śrūyate'neneti 'śru' dhātoḥ karaṇe śtran pratyayaḥ*. *Karṇaśaṣṭkūṭivivarāvaccchinnamāk-āśaṃ śrotramityarthaḥ*. *Prabhā* (Commentary on NSM) of Nṛsiṃhadeva Śāstrī, Lahore, 1921, p. 122.

8 Instrument of knowing

- 1 (i) *Bāhyendriyairagrhitāsukhādigrāhyāntarabhāvāccāntaḥkaraṇam*. *Praśastapādabhā-
syaṃ* (Padārthadharmasaṅgrahākhyam) of Praśastapādācārya, 2nd edn, Sri Durgadhara
Jha Sharma (ed.), Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 218. (ii)
Karaṇamindriyaṃ tanmanah. *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa, 2nd edn, Sri
Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p.
217. Kaṇāda is silent on the point of *manas* being a sense-organ. Vide Sinha 1934, p. 16.
- 2 *Manyate'nena*. *Vācaspatyam*, vol. VI, 3rd edn, compiled by Sri Taranath Tarka
Vachaspati, Varanasi: Chaukhamba, 1969, p. 4737.
- 3 *Sukhādyupalabdhisādhanaṃindriyaṃ manaḥ*. *Tarka-Saṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa, Y. V.
Athalye (ed.) and translated into English by M.R. Bodas, 2nd edn, Poona: Bhandarkar
Oriental Research Institute, 1974, p. 13.
- 4 *Ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe jñānasya bhāvo'bhāvaśca manaso liṅgam*. *The Vaiśeṣika
Aphorisms of Kaṇāda* with the comments from the *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra and the
Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, translated into English by A.E. Gough, New
Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975, 3/2/21.
- 5 *Yugapajjñānānutpattirmanaso liṅgam*. *Nyāyadarśanam* (Nyāyasūtra) of Mahārṣi
Gautama & Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī, ed. and translated into
Hindi, unique edition, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1999, 1/1/16.
- 6 *Manah saṃyogānapekṣasya īndriyārthasannikarṣasya jñānhetutve yugapadutpadyeran
jñānanānti*. NBh., on the above, p. 26.
- 7 Ganeri 2001, p. 23.
- 8 *Śrotrādyavyāpāre smṛtyutpattidarśanāt*. PPB, pp. 216–18.
- 9 *Smṛtistāvadindriyajā jñānatvāt, gandhādijñānavat, na cāsyāḥ śrotrādīni karaṇāni,
badhirādīnāṃ śrotrādyavyāpārābhāve tasya utpattidarśanāt*. NK, p. 217.
- 10 Quoted earlier, see note 1 of this chapter.
- 11 *Sukhādipratītirindriyajā, aparokṣapratītivād rūpādipratītivat, yacca tadindriyaṃ
tanmanaḥ, cakṣurādīnāṃ tatra vyāpārābhāvāt*. NK, p. 218.
- 12 NBh. before NS, 1/1/16, p. 53.
- 13 *Ātmapratītiḥ karaṇasādhya, aparokṣapratītitvād, rūpopalabdhdhivaditi tatsiddhiḥ*.
Lakṣaṇāvalī of Udayanācārya, Shashinatha Jha (ed.), Darbhanga: Mithila Vidyapeetha,
1973, p. 15.
- 14 *Nyāyatīlāvati* of Vallabhācārya, Harihara Śāstrī (ed.), 2nd edn, Varanasi: Chowkhamba,
1991, pp. 323–28.
- 15 *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (Commentary on *Bhāṣāparichheda*) of Viśvanātha, Harirām
Śukla Śāstrī (ed.), reprint, Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2005, p. 328.
- 16 *Sukhaduḥkṣhādhyasamavāyikāraṇam saṃyogaḥ kvacidāśritah
mukhyasambandhātsamavāyavaditi, yaśca tasyāśrayaḥ tadeva manaḥ*. *Prabhā*
(Commentary on NSM), 2nd edn, Nṛsiṃhadeva, Lahore, 1929, p. 365.
- 17 *Sukhādīsākṣātkāraḥ karaṇasādhyaḥ, janyasākṣātkāratvāccākṣuṣasākṣātakāravat*.
Quoted by Athalye and Bodas in the notes on TS, p. 146.

- 18 *Ātmendriyārthasannikarṣajñānasya bhāvo'bhāvaśca manaso līngam. Tasya dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte. Prayatnādyaugapadyājñānāyugapadyāccai-kam.* VAK, 3/2/1–3.
- 19 *Manastvayogānmanaḥ. PPB*, p. 216.
- 20 *Sparśarahitātve sati mūrtam manaḥ. Lak.*, p. 15.
- 21 *Manastvājñātyogi sparśaśūnyaṁ kriyādhikaraṇaṁ manaḥ. Saptapadārthī* of Śivāditya, D. Gurumurti (ed. and translated into English), Adyar: Theosophical Society, 1932, p. 68.
- 22 *Yatsukhopalambhakamindriyaṁ tanmanaḥ. NL*, p. 328.
- 23 *Sarvaviśayamantaḥkaraṇaṁ manaḥ. Nbh.*, p. 21 (NS, 1/1/19).
- 24 Vide *Mānamanohara* of Vādi Vāgīśvara, Swāmī Yogindrānanda, ed. and translated into Hindi, Varanasi: Saddarsana Prakashan, 1973, p. 48.
- 25 *Sarvopalabdhisādhanaṁ. Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, Viśveśhwara (ed.), 10th edn, Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2000, p. 283.
- 26 *Tasya guṇāḥ samkhyāparimāṇaprthaktvasaṁyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasaṁskārāḥ. PPB*, p. 221.
- 27 *Prayatnādyaugapadyājñānāyugapadyāccai-kam. VAK*, 3/2/3.
- 28 *Manastvaṁ nāma sāmānyaṁ manovyktīnāṁ bhede sthite satyanumeyam. NK*, p. 216.
- 29 *Aṇutve hi manaso bahutvamarthasiddham, anyathaikasminnekatra vartamāne śārīrāntare tatkāryaṁ jñānādi na syat. Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya, J.S. Jetly (ed.), Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971, pp. 101–02.*
- 30 *Ato bahutve satyekasminnapi śārīre tairbahubhīryugapajñānotpattiprasaṅgastadavas-thaḥ. Kir.*, p. 102.
- 31 *Vaiśeṣikasūtrapakāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra on the above, Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra (ed.) and translated into Hindi by Dhuṇḍhirāja Śāstrī, 2nd edn, Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2002, pp. 237–38.
- 32 *Tathā ca kvacyaυgapadyābhīmānaḥ śatapatrasya patraśatavyatibhedavadāśubhāvād-ūhanīyaḥ. Kir.*, p. 101.
- 33 *Manastu pratyātmaniṣṭhatvāt anantam. SP*, p. 21.
- 34 *Tadabhāvādānu manaḥ. VAK*, 7/1/23.
- 35 Quoted earlier in note 18 of this chapter.
- 36 *Nityadravyagatasya vibhavābhāvasya aṇuparimāṇatvāvyabhicārāt. NK*, p. 223.
- 37 *Vibhūnāṁ tu parasparataḥ saṁyogo nāsti. PPB*, p. 360.
- 38 *Kaṇādarahasyam* of Śaṅkara Miśra, 1917, p. 44; *VSUP.*, p. 392.
- 39 *Vibhutvādātmamanasoḥ parasparasaṁyogābhāve satyātmaguṇānāṁ jñānasukhādīnām-anutpattirasamavāyikāraṇābhāvat. NK*, p. 224.
- 40 *Manaso vibhutva ātmamanaḥsaṁyogasyāsamavāyikāranasyābhāvājñānānutpattip-ras-aṅgāt. Na ca vibhudvayaṁ saṁyogo'stīti vācyam. Tutsaṁyogasya nityatvena suṣuptyābhāvaprasaṅgāt. Tarkadīpikā (TD), BORI*, p. 13.
- 41 *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*, 2004, p. 95.
- 42 *Śārīrasamānāparimāṇaṁ mana ityēke . . . Tadapi na gauravagrāsādeveti. Setu* of Padmanābha Miśra, Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, p. 420.
- 43 *Prthaktvamapyata eva. PPB*, pp. 221–23.
- 44 *Samkhyānuvidhānādevetyarthaḥ. Kir.*, p. 102.
- 45 *Apasarpaṇamupasarpaṇamaśūtapūṭasaṁyogāḥ kāryantarasaṁyogāścetyaḍṣakāritāni. VAK*, 5/2/17.
- 46 *Anyathā tadanupapattau pretyābhāvānupattiriti bhāvaḥ. Kir.*, p. 102.
- 47 (i) *Mūrtatvāparatvāparatve saṁskāraśca. (ii) Vibhavābhāvānmūrtatvaṁ siddham tasmād ghaṭādīvat paratvāparatvavegāḥ siddhāḥ. PPB and NK*, p. 225.
- 48 *Mahatyanekadravyavatvāt rūpāccopalabdhiḥ. VAK*, 4/1/6. It is worth mentioning here that this *sūtra* of Vaiśeṣika has been interpreted in two different ways. Vide 'Vaiśeṣikasūtra IV.1.9 and its two traditions of interpretation', Karin Preisendanz, *Early Vaiśeṣika*, pp. 867–890.
- 49 *Sparśavato hi dravyasya dravyārambhakatvadarśanāt. Vyomavatī* of Vyomaśivacārya, Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, p. 427.

- 50 *Asparśavattvād dravyānārambhakatvam. PPB*, p. 225.
- 51 *Kriyāvattvānmūrtatvam. PPB*, p. 225.
- 52 *Aṇutvapratipādanānmūrtatve siddhe'pi vispṣṭārthametaduktam. NK*, p. 225.
- 53 *Sādhāraṇaviśāhāvattvaprasaṅgādajñātvam. PPB*, p. 225.
- 54 *Yadi jñāṭi mano bhaveccharāramidaṁ sādharmaṇamupabhogāyatanam syāt. Na caivam, ekābhiprāyānurodhena tasya sarvadā pravṛttinivṛttidarśanāt; tasmādaññam manaḥ. NK*, p. 225.
- 55 *Syādetat. Karaṇatvena manasaḥ pūrvam jñāṭṛtvam pratiśiddham, tadanupapannam, jñānakaraṇatvajñānakartṛtvayorvirodhābhāvāt. Prayokṭṛprayojyayoḥ kathamekatvamiti cet, tathāpi bhedo'stu . . . pratyutābhiprāyavirodhāt na pravṛttirnanivṛttiśca syāditi bhāvaḥ. Kir.*, p. 103.
- 56 *Acetanam ca tat karaṇatvādītareṣāṁ hyekatra śarīre cetanadvayasamāvesādavyavahāraḥ syāditi. Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Part II, 3rd edn, Surya Nārāyaṇa Śukla (ed.), Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 1998, p. 68.*
- 57 *Mano'ñnam ajñāṭi. Tatra hetumāha sādharmaṇeti. Viśāhāḥ śarīram tadvattvam tadadhiṣṭhitatvam śarīrasya ātmasādhāraṇyena mano'dhiṣṭhitatvaprasaṅgādityarthaḥ. Sūkti of Jagdīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, p. 414.*
- 58 *Tathā ca karaṇam manaḥ tasmāt karturātmanaḥ puruṣārthasampādakamiti. Vyo.*, p. 428.
- 59 *Dikkālamanaśam vaiśeṣikaguṇavirahaḥ. Kir.*, p. 27.
- 60 *Rūparasagandhasparśasnehasāmāśiddhikadravatvabuddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmabhāvanāśabdā vaiśeṣikaguṇāḥ. PPB*, p. 230.
- 61 *PPB and NK*, p. 226.
- 62 *Manastu na bhautikam na niyataviśayaṁ . . . ata eva na tadguṇayogi na ca niyataviśayaṁsarvaviśayatvam tasya. NM, Part II, p. 67.*
- 63 *Mano'pi cāsamavetaṁ bhūtam. Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, 1957, p. 29.*
- 64 *Bandhanimittam mana iti. NM*, vol. II, p. 69.
- 65 *Nityatvādātmanasossamyoga iti. NM*, vol. II, p. 69.
- 66 *Guṇavattvāddravayam. PPB*, p. 226.
- 67 *Tacca paramāñurūpamiti prāñcaḥ trutirūpamiti navyāḥ. Padārthamañḍanam of Veṇīdatta, Gopal Sastri Nene (ed.), Allahabad: Saraswati Bhawan, 1930, p. 5.*
- 68 *Shashiprabha Kumar, Vaiśeṣikadarśana meṁ Padārtha-Nirūpaṇa (VDM PN), Delhi: Publication Division, University of Delhi, 1992, p. 248.*
- 69 *Tadānīmevā dṛṣṭena pañḍamanontaragrahaṇādvā. VSUp.*, on VAK, 3/2/3, p. 239.
- 70 *Agnerūrdhwajvalanam vāyostiryaggamanamañūnām manasaścādyam karmādrṣṭakāritam. VAK*, 5/2/13.
- 71 *Ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣāt sukhaduḥkhe. VAK*, 5/2/15.
- 72 *Tadabhāve samyogābhāvo'prādurbhāvaśca mokṣaḥ. VAK*, 5/2/18.
- 73 For details, see ShashiPrabha Kumar, 'Matter, mind and motion in Vaiśeṣika pluralism', *Facets of Indian Philosophical Thought*, Delhi: Vidyanidhi, 1999, pp. 110–11.
- 74 *Mahāpralayañtarāvasthāvyatirekenāśarīrasya manasaḥ karmābhāvam. NK*, p. 740.
- 75 *PPB*, pp. 737–38 and *NK*, pp. 738–39.
- 76 *Tathā hi gurutvadravatvāsthitisthāpakābhāve katham kriyāvattvam. Kir.*, p. 103.
- 77 *Nahi mūrtatvamātreṇa kriyetyata āha-prayatnādraparigrahāditi. Kvacitprayatnaparigrahāt kvacidrṣṭaparigrhādityarthaḥ. Kir.*, p. 103.
- 78 *PPB*, pp. 739–40 and *Vyo.*, pp. 675–76.
- 79 See note 19 of this chapter.
- 80 *Jñānañjanakasamīyogahetukriyājanakatāvacchedako manastvam nāma jātiviśeṣaḥ. Sūkti*, p. 412.
- 81 *Yā hi samānagunaḥkāryā vyaktyastāsu param samānyam dṛṣṭam yathā ghaṭādiṣu, samānagunaḥkāryāśca manovyakatayastasmāttāsu sadbhāve samānyayogaḥ. NK*, p. 216.
- 82 See note 47 of this chapter.

- 83 *Tathā'smadviśiṣṭānām . . . paramāṇuṣu muktātmamanassu . . . te'ntyaviśeṣāḥ*. PPB and NK, pp. 767–69.
- 84 The attribute of separateness (*prthaktva*) operates at the level of fixed distinction, while the ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*) works at the final level where all other distinctions cannot reach.
- 85 Vide Chapter 3, Objects of knowing.
- 86 For details, see Raghunath Safaya, *Indian Psychology*, Delhi: Munshi Ram Manohar Lal, 1976, p. 329.
- 87 Frauwallner 1973, p. 44.

9 Goal of knowing

- 1 *Yanna duḥkhena sambhinnaṁ na ca grastamanantaram. Abhilāṣopanītaṁ yat tatsukhaṁ svaḥpadāspadam. Bālanīmāṁsāprakāśa* of Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa, Kashi, 1902, p. 48, quoted in *Mīmāṁsākoṣa*, Kewalanand Saraswati (ed.), vol. VII, 2nd edn, Delhi: Satguru Publications, 1992, p. 4468.
- 2 *Janmamaraṇaprabandhocchedaḥ sarvaduḥkhaḥprahāṇamapavarga iti. Nyāyadarśanam (Nyāyasūtra)* of Maḥarṣi Gautama & *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, Dwārikādās Śāstrī 1999, (NS, 1/1/9), p. 21.
- 3 Śaṅkara's commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, reprint, Gorakhpur: Gita Press, 2007, 3/1/3–6
- 4 Vide *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa, 2nd edn, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 689.
- 5 *AprahāṇamasamprāptamanucchinnaśāśvatamAniruddhamanutpannametanirvāṇa-mucyate. Mūlāmādhyaṁikakārikās* of Nāgārjuna, L.V. Poussin (ed.), Calcutta: Bibliotheca Buddhica, 1913, 25.3.
- 6 *Tadvairāgyādapi doṣabījākṣaye kaivalyam. Yogasūtra* of Patañjali with the Commentary of Vyāsa, reprint, translated into English by Bangali Baba, Delhi: Motilal Banarsaidass, 2002, 3/49.
- 7 *Bandhahetvabhāvanīrjarābhyāṁ kṛtsnakarmavipramokṣo mokṣaḥ. Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāmi, 10.2, Vijaya K. Jain (ed.), Calcutta: Vira Sasana Sangha, 1960, p. 146.
- 8 The *Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda* with the comments from the *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra and the *Vivṛti* of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcāna, translated into English by A.E. Gough, New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975, 1/1/4.
- 9 *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayanācārya, J. S. Jetly (ed.), Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971, p. 6; NK, p. 690.
- 10 *Praśastapādabhāṣyaṁ (Padārthadharmaśaṅgrahākhyam)* of Praśastapādācārya, 2nd edn, Sri Durgadhara Jha Sharma (ed.), Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1997, p. 682.
- 11 *Kir.*, p. 5.
- 12 *Duḥkhāpāye cātyāntiko'pavargo niḥśreyasam. NBh. (NS, 1/1/2)*, p. 12.
- 13 *Praṇāmya hetumīśvaraṁ munīṁ Kaṇādamanvataḥ. Padārthadharmaśaṅgrahaḥ pravakṣyate mahodayaḥ. PPB*, p. 1.
- 14 (i) *Śiṣyāṇāṁ pravṛttyarthaṁ phalavattāṁ darśayati mahodaya iti. Mahānutkr̥ṣṭaḥ śuddhajñānarūpa udayao bodho yasmāt sa mahodayo granthaḥ. Sūktī* of Jagdish Tarkalāṅkāra, Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, p. 2. (ii) *Prekṣāvadupādānaprayojakaṁ saṁgrahasya phalavattvaṁ mahodayapadenāha mahānstativaviśayaḥ. Setu* of Padmanābha Miśra (Commentary on PPB), Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, p. 19.
- 15 (*Mahodaya*) *iti. Mahānodaya udgama udbodho jñānamiti yāvat. Kir.*, p. 4.
- 16 *Tasmādahitanivṛttirātyantikī mahodaya iti yuktam. NK*, p. 8.
- 17 *Tadatyantavimokṣo'pavargaḥ. NS, 1/1/22*.
- 18 *Tadabhāve saṁyogābhāvo'prādurbhāvaśca mokṣaḥ. VAK, 5/2/18*.
- 19 *Tadā nirodhāt nirbījasyātmanaḥ śarīrādinivṛttiḥ, punaḥ śarīrādanutpattau dagdhendhanānalavadupaśamo mokṣa iti. PPB*, p. 682.

- 20 *Ato nāstyātmano nityaṃ sukhāṃ tadabhāvānna tadanubhavo mokṣāvasthā kintu samastātmaviśeṣaḥ* gunocchedopalakṣitā svarūpasthitireva. NK, p. 692.
- 21 *Nahyapavṛktasya duḥkhaṃ pratyāpadyata iti kaścidadhyupaiti*. Kir., p. 5.
- 22 *Viśeṣaḥ* gunocchede hi satyātmanāḥ svarūpeṇāvasthānaṃ nocchedaḥ, nityatvāt. NK., p. 17.
- 23 *Muktaye yaḥ śīlātāvya śāstramūce sacetasām*. *Naiśadhamahākāvayam* of Śrī Harṣa, H. Shastri, Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 1967, XVII.75.
- 24 *Atha sarvaḥ* gunocchedād varaṃ vaiśayikam sukhāṃ duḥkhasādhanaparihāreṇa bhoktavyamiti manyase. *Tanna, tasya duḥkhānuśaṅgeṇa duḥkharūpatayā heyatvāt. Yeśāṃ caitadupādeyaṃ na tānpratīdamarthavacchāstram. Santi ca vaiśayikasukhadveṣiṇaḥ puruṣāḥ. Tānpratīdaṃ śāstram*. *Vyomavatī* of Vyomaśivācārya, Kaviraj and Shastri 1930, p. 20 (Ga).
- 25 *Nanvapuruṣārtho'yam sukhasyāpi hāneriti cenna. Bahutaraduḥkhānuviddhatayā, sukhasyāpi prekṣāvaddheyatvāt; madhuviśasamprkṭānnabhojanajanyasukhavat*. Kir., p. 6.
- 26 *Tasyāḥ sadbhāve kim pramāṇam? Duḥkhasantatīrdharmmiṇī atyantamucchidyate santatīrvāddīpasantaivāditi*. NK, p. 9.
- 27 VAK, 1/1/4.
- 28 (i) *Tacceśvaracodanābhivyaktāddharmādeva*. PPB, p. 18. (ii) *Dharmo'pi tāvanna niḥśreyasaṃ kurute yāvadiśvareccayā nānugrhye*. NK, p. 19.
- 29 *Tadanārambha ātmasthe manasi śarīrasya duḥkhābhāvāḥ saṃyogaḥ*. VAK, 5/2/16.
- 30 *Bahirindriyebhyo vyāvṛttaṃ mano yadātmasthamātmamātrāṇiṣṭhaṃ bhavati tadā tatkarmanūḥṇaprayatnābhāvāt karma manasi notpadyate sthīrataraṃ mano bhavati sa yogaḥ. Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra, Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra (ed.) and translated into Hindi by Dhundhirāja Śāstrī, 2nd edn, Varanasi: Chaukhambha, 2002, p. 320.
- 31 *Tasmāt tattvajñānameva niḥśreyasasādhanam*. Kir., p. 9.
- 32 *Tathā hi mīthyājñānaṃ savāsanam iha saṃsāramūlakāraṇam, tacca tattvajñānena virodhinā nivarṭtate. Tannivṛtau rāgādyapāye pravṛterapāyājjanmādyapāyaḥ, tathā ca duḥkhasantānocchedaḥ. Tacca tattvajñānaṃ puruṣaprayatnasādhyamiti*. Kir., p. 7.
- 33 *Jñānakarmasamuccayāditi vadāmaḥ*. NK, p. 683.
- 34 *Karmaṇā sattvasaṃsuddhirjñānenātmavinīścayaḥ. Bhaved vimuktirabhyāsattayoreva samuccayāt*. Quoted in NK, p. 689.
- 35 For delineation of this issue in detail by Vyomaśiva, see Shashiprabha Kumar, 'Vyomaśiva on Niḥśreyasa' *Brahmavidyā, Adyar Library Bulletin*, 68–70, 2004–2006, 195–204.
- 36 *Savāsanasamucchedo jñānoparama ityēke. Tathā ca paṭhanti-na pretya saṃjñāstīti*. NK, p. 6.
- 37 *Tadayuktam, sarvataḥ priyatamasyātmanāḥ samucchedāya prekṣāvātpravṛtṭyanupapatteḥ, bandhavicchedaparyāyasya muktīśabdasyātadarthatvācca*. Ibid.
- 38 *Nikhilavāsanoccheda vīgataviśayākāropaplavaviśuddhajñānodayo mahodaya ityapare. Tadayuktam, kāraṇābhāve tadanupapatteḥ*. NK, p. 7.
- 39 *Prakṛtipuruṣavivekadarśanādūparatāyāṃ prakṛtau puruṣasya svarūpeṇāvasthānaṃ mokṣa ityanye*. NK, p. 8.
- 40 *Tanna, pravṛttisvabhāvāyāḥ prakṛteraudāsīnyāyogāt. Puruṣārthanibandhanā tasyāḥ pravṛtīḥ, vivekakhyaṭīśca puruṣārthaḥ*. Ibid.
- 41 *Nityaniratiśayasukhābhivyaktīrmuktirityapare. Tadayasāram, agre nirākariśyamānatvāt. Tasmādahitanivṛtīrātyantikī mahodaya iti yuktam*. Ibid.
- 42 *Kim punarātmanāḥ svarūpaṃ yenāvasthīrīrmuktirucyate? Ānandātmā ceti. Tadayuktam. Vikalpāsahatvat. Sa kimānando muktavanubhūyate vā? Na vā? Yadi nānubhūyate? Sthitō' pyasthītna viśīyate anupabhogyatvāt. Anubhūyate cet? Anubhavasya kāraṇaṃ vācyam . . . svābhāvīkī cet? Saṃsāravasthāyāmapyānando' nubhūyeta*. NK, pp. 690–91.

- 43 *Yathā cāyaṃ puruṣārthastathopapāditam. NK*, pp. 691–92.
- 44 *Śarīrādibījadharmādharmarahitasyātmana utpannānām śarīrādīnām karmakṣayānnivṛttau yathā dagdhendhanasyānalasyopaśamaḥ punaranutpādaḥ evaṃ punaḥ śarīrānutpādo mokṣaḥ. NK*, p. 683.
- 45 *Niḥśreyasaṃ punarduḥkhaṇivṛttirāntyantikī. Atra ca vādināmvivāda eva. Kir.*, p. 5.
- 46 *NK*, pp. 5–6.
- 47 *NK*, pp. 683–84.
- 48 *Sphuṭkṛtātmatattvasyāpi jīvanmuktasya tāvatkarmāṇi bhavanti, yāvadyātrānuvarttate. NK*, p. 687.
- 49 *Evaṃ ca na prāvādukapravādāvakāśaḥ, jīvanmuktisahitāyāḥ paramamukteḥ puruṣārthatvāt. Nyāyalīlāvatī of Vallabhācārya*, 2nd edn, Harihara Śāstrī (ed.), Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1991, p. 595.
- 50 *Na ca sarvotpattimānnimittādrṣṭānutpattau sarvamukteranupapattiḥ, apavargasya bhogatatsādhanetarvāt. Kir.*, p. 7.
- 51 Vide ShashiPrabha Kumar, ‘Roots of Chinese buddhistic values in Indian thought (with special reference to the ideal of *Bodhisattva*)’.
- 52 Vide *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* 2004, p. 30.
- 53 *Na ca kranenā sarvamuktiḥ. Keṣāncidātmanām saṃsāryaikasvabhāvatvāt. NL*, p. 598.

10 An overview

- 1 Vide Chapter 1, Introduction.
- 2 Vide Chapter 2, Theme of knowing in Vaiśeṣika: *dharma*.
- 3 Vide Chapter 3, Objects of knowing (*padārthas*).
- 4 Vide Chapter 4, Methods of knowing (*sādharmya* and *vaidharṇya*).
- 5 B.K. Matilal, *Logic Language and Reality*, Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2008, p. 203.
- 6 For details, see K.K. Chakrabarti *Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyāya Dualist Tradition*, Albany: State University of New York, 1999, pp. 31–36.
- 7 Vide Chapter 5, Modes and means of knowing (*jñāna-prakāra* and *pramāṇas*).
- 8 Vide Chapter 6, Agent of knowing (*ātman*).
- 9 Vide Chapter 7, Abode and faculties of knowing (*śarīra* and *indriyas*).
- 10 Vide Chapter 8, Instrument of knowing (*manas*).
- 11 Vide Chapter 9, Goal of knowing (*niḥśreyasa*).
- 12 Vide Chapter 10, An overview.
- 13 *na sā dhīḥ kvacid apyasti yatra bhedo na bhāsate, ata eva na tan-mānavaṃ yan na bheda-pramāṇakam. Bhedaratna* of Śaṅkara Miśra (Quoted in *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, Stephen H. Phillips (trans. Eng.) Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997, pp. 269–70).

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Index

- abhāva* 35–7
abhidheyatva 40
abhyudaya 9
abode of experience 85–6
abode of knowing 85–6
absolute negation 36
abstaining *dharma* 10
activity 28–30, 39–42, 47; of attributes 48;
 effect of attributes 54; and mind 101;
 production of attributes 52
air 20–1
airy bodies 20
airy objects 21
airy organ 21
analogy 71
animals 88
Annambhatta 1
antecedent negation 36
antyavīśesa *see* ultimate particularity
apavarga 9
apprehension 64
artha 39–40
arthāntara 39–40
ārṣa darśana 10
ārśajñāna *see* intuitive cognition
astitva 14, 32, 40
atah 8
atha 8
ākāśa *see* ether
ānān 11–12, 24–5, 73; *see also* self
atomic substances 85
atomic theory 86–7
atoms 85
attributeness 47
attributes 26–8, 39–42, 44–5; causality
 and similarity 52–3; co-extensiveness
 55–6; co-inherence 54; corporeal 48–9;
 dual 49; generic 50; impression 44;
 inherent causes 51; inhering in multiple
 substances 49; inhering in one substance
 49; instrumental causes 54; means of
 effect 53–4; of mind 96–8; non-
 corporeal 49; non-inherent causes 54;
 partially pervasive 55; perception of
 50; produced by activity 52; produced
 by conjunction 51–2; produced
 by disjunction 52; of self 78–83;
 similarities and dissimilarities 48–57;
 specific 49–50; wholly pervasive 55
auditory organ 94
aversion 81

being 37
Bhartṛhari 12–13
Bhattacharya, C. 20–1
bliss 9
Bodas, M.R. 29
bodies: earthly 88–9; egg-born 88;
 embryonic 88; non-womb-born 87–8;
 types of 87; womb-born 88
body: as abode of experience 85–6;
 as abode of knowing 85–6; and
 consciousness 75; control of 99; dead
 90; of God 90; nature of 86–7; non-
 physical 89–90, 101–2; subtle 89–90
brain, and consciousness 77–8
Bronkhorst, J. 3
Buddhism 6, 26, 109

ca 45, 66
categories: similarity among 39–42;
 theory of 8
causal triad 63
causality, and similarity 52–3
causation theory 34–5, 86
causes: instrumental 54; non-inherent 54
celestial fire 19
Chakrabarti, K.K. 103
co-extensiveness, of attributes 55–6
co-inherence 54

- cognition 25, 40–1, 50, 52, 111; as
 attribute of self 79; defining 59;
 direct 64; inferential 65–6; intuitive 68;
 irresolute 61; perceptive 63–4;
 recollective 66–7
 commentaries 4–5
 concurrence 71
 conjunction 34, 51–4; mind 98; self 82
 consciousness 75–80, 99
 consequent negation 36
 corelation 15
 corporeal attributes 48–9
 creation 83
- Dasgupta, S.N. 6
 dead body 90
 deafness 22
 death 90, 98, 108
 deduction 38
 demerit 81
 derivation of name 3
 desire 80–1
dharma 81; as attribute of *ātman* 11–12;
 as attribute of objects 12–13;
dharmaviśeṣa 10–11; as moral
 obligation 12; nature of 9–11; overview
 8–9; source of 13
dharmin 5, 11, 14–15
 differentiation 33–4, 50
 direct cognition 64
dik 16, 23; *see also* direction
 direction 23–4
 disjunction 52–4; mind 98; self 83
 dissimilarity 11, 52–3; and similarity 38–9,
 46; *see also* similarity
 doubt 59–60, 65
dravya 14–16; *see also* substance
 dream 61–2
 dual attributes 49
 duality 9
- earth 16–17
 earthliness 86–7
 earthly bodies 88–9
 earthly objects 19–20, 80–9
 earthly fire 19
 effort 81
 egg-born bodies 88
 elemental substances 85–6
 eligible seekers 8
 embryonic bodies 88
 error 60–1, 65
 eternal objects 33
 eternal substances 41, 43, 85
- ether 21–2, 94
 exclusive notion 33
 existence 31–2
 extraordinary perception 33, 68
- fallacious reasons 65–6
 fallacy of infinite regress 34,
 48, 64
 fire 18–20
 Frauwallner, Erich 13, 100, 112
- Gajendragadkar, V.S. 58, 76, 92
 Ganeri, J. 8, 68
 Gangesa 97
 Gautama 26, 86
 generic attributes 50
 gesture 70
 God 45; body of 90; existence of 83–4;
 nature and attributes 84
 grace 11
guṇa 14, 26–9; *see also* attribute
guṇī 34
 gustatory organ 93
- Halbfass, W. 7, 110–11
 hearing 22, 94
 heaven 9
 hot touch 54
- I am* 75
 implication 71
 impression 44, 81
 inclusive notion 33
 indeterminate perception 64
 induction 38
 inference, as means of veridical knowing
 69–70
 inferential cognition 65–6
 infinite regress 34, 48, 64
 inherence 34–5, 37, 39–42, 47–8;
 co-inherence 54; and mind 103
 inner sense 103
 instrumental causes 54
 interrelation with other schools 6–7
 intuitive cognition 68
 invalid knowledge 59
 invalid remembrance 67
 irresolute cognition 61
- Jala see* water
 Jaina 6
 Jayanta 79–80, 99
jñāna 58–9; *see also* cognition
jñeyatva 40

kāla 16, 22; *see also* time

Kaṇāda 1–3, 8, 10–13, 17, 21, 24, 26–7, 29–32, 35–6, 38–9, 58–63, 65–70, 73, 76, 78, 80–3, 86, 88, 92, 97–8, 101, 104–6, 109–11

kāraṇa 39–42; *see also* cause

karma 28–30, 39–40; *see also* activity

kārya 39–41, 84

knowing: analogy 71; concurrence 71; faculties of *see* sense organs ; gesture 70; implication 71; means of veridical knowing 68–70; methods of *see* methods of knowing; non-apprehension 71; non-veridical 58–62; overview 58; tradition 71–2; types of 111; verbal testimony 69–70; veridical 58–9, 62–8; ways of 111–12; *see also* ultimate goal of knowledge: defining 58; invalid 59; obtaining 11; of self 79–80

law of individual retribution 24–5

learning, four factors 8

liberation 9, 105–8; for all 109; while living 108

limited universal 31

liquidity 45–6, 55

logic 38–9

mahodaya magnitude: of mind 97–8; of self 82

manas 25, 76, 90, 95–7, 102–3; *see also* mind

materialism 6

Maticandra 32

Matilal, B.K. 15

means of veridical knowing 68–70

medium universal 31

memory 61, 65, 76–7, 81; *see also* remembrance

merit 53, 81

methods of knowing 111; overview 38; similarity among categories 39–42; similarity and dissimilarity 38–9; *see also* attributes; substances

Mīmāṃsā 9

mind 25–6, 91; and activity 101; attributes 96–8; conjunction 98; control of 106; defining 96; disjunction 98; existence of 95–6; and inherence 103; as instrument of knowing 77; magnitude 97–8; nature of 99–101; number 97; and particularity 102–3; proximity 98; remoteness 98; separateness 98; severity 98; and universal 102; velocity 98

mindness 102

mineral fire 19

Miśra, śaṅkara 9–10, 60, 65, 68, 75, 78, 80, 83, 89, 91, 97

moral obligation 12

mind motion, of mind 101

narrow universal 31

negation 35–7

nihśreyasa 9–10

nivṛtilakṣaṇa 10

nomenclature 2–3

non-apprehension 71

non-being 35–6

non-corporeal attributes 49

non-eternal 41

non-eternal substances 43, 85

non-inherent causes 51, 54

non-physical body 89–90, 101–2

non-veridical knowing 58–62; doubt

59–60; dreams 61–2; error 60–1;

irresolute cognition 61

non-womb-born bodies 87–8

Nṛsimhadeva 96

number: effect 53; of ether 21; of mind 25, 97; of particularity 32; of self 24–5; self 81–2

objects: classification 5; *dharma* as attribute 12–13; eternal 33; types 34; use of term 17

objects of knowing *see padārthas*

obligations 12

olfactory organ 92–3

overview 1–2, 110–13

Padārthadharmasamgraha 3–4

padārthas 2, 37, 110; activity 28–30,

39–42; attributes 26–8, 39–42; common

characteristics 40; inherence 34–5, 37,

39–42; negation 35–7; overview 14;

particularity 32–4, 37, 39–42;

similarities among attributes 47–8;

similarity among categories 39–42;

similarity among groups of substances

43–7; similarity among substances

42–3; substances 14–26, 39–42;

universal 30, 39–42

pain 80

pañcabhūtas 86

partially pervasive attributes 55

particularity 32–4, 37, 39–42, 47; and mind 102–3

perception 26, 29; of attributes 50;
 extraordinary 33, 68; indeterminate 64;
 of inherence 35; as means of veridical
 knowing 69; of negation 36; of
 non-being 36; of particularity 33;
 yogins 33, 68
 perceptive cognition 63–4
 pervasiveness 98
 philosophical tradition 2
 philosophy, schools of 5
 pleasure 9, 80
 pluralism 5
prāṇa 21
Praśastapāda 1–4, 11–13, 21, 24,
 26–7, 29, 32, 35–6, 39–40, 42–4,
 46–7, 56, 58–60, 62–7, 69–72, 74–5,
 78–9, 81, 83, 88–92, 98, 104, 106,
 109, 111
prthivī 15–16, 31, 85; *see also* earth
 presuppositions 5–6
 proximity 22–3; of mind 98
puruṣaguna 11–12
puruṣārthas 112

 Radhakrishnan, S. 26
 realism 5–7, 84, 110
 reality 110; aspects of 5–6, 35; seers’
 perception of 10
 reals 2
 reasons: fallacious 65–6; valid 65
 rebirth 82, 108
 reciprocal negation 36
 recollective cognition 66–7
 reconstruction 3–4
 relata 34–5
 relation
 release 9
 relevance 112
 remembrance 66–7; valid and invalid 67;
 see also memory
 remoteness 22–3; of mind 98

sādharmya 11
sat 39
sattā 32, 40
 salvation 9
sāmavāya see inherence
sāmānya see universal
 scientific enquiry 11
 Seal, B.N. 30
 seeing 65
 self 11–12; attributes of 78–83; aversion
 81; conjunction 82; defining 78; desire
 80–1; disjunction 83; effort 81;

embodiment 85–6; impression 81;
 individual self 83; knowledge of 79–80;
 magnitude 82; means of knowing 73–5;
 merit and demerit 81; nature of 75–8;
 number 81–2; pain 80; pleasure 80;
 separateness 82; severalty 82; supreme
 self 83; types of 83–4
 self-dependence 15
 sense organs 75–6; auditory 94; defining
 91; external 91; gustatory 93; internal
 (mind) 91; olfactory 92–3; as physical
 92; tactile 93–4; types of 91–4; visual
 93; *see also* mind
 sensory experience 46–7
 separateness: of mind 98; of
 self 82
 seven categories 1–2
 severalty: of mind 98; of self 82
 sight 93
 significance 1, 110
 similarities 26
 similarity 11, 32; among attributes 47–57;
 among categories 39–42; among
 different groups of substances 43–7;
 among groups of attributes 48–57;
 among substances 42–3; and causality
 52–3; and dissimilarity 38–9, 46; *see*
 also attributes
 Śiromaṇi, Raghunātha 33, 100
 Śivāditya 1, 96
 six categories *see padārthas*
 smell 92–3
 sound 21–2
 sources 3–5
 specific attributes 49–50
 Śrīdhara/Śrīdhārācārya 36, 43–6, 49–50,
 63, 70–1, 74–6, 80, 82, 90, 92, 98, 104,
 107–8
 Srīvallabha/Vallabha 62, 96, 108
 substances 39–42; and activity 47; air
 20–1; atomic 43; and attributes 47;
 direction 23–4; earth 16–17; elemental
 85–6; eternal 41, 43, 85; ether 21–2, 94;
 fire 18–20; and inherence 47–8;
 non-eternal 43, 85; overview 14–16; and
 particularity 47; self 24–5; similarities
 42–3; similarity among groups 43–7;
 and substance 47; time 22–3; and
 universal 47; water 17–18;
 see also mind
 subtle body 89–90, 101–2
 supreme self 83
 supreme universal 31–2
svarga 9

- tactile organ 93–4
Tarkālankāra, Jagadīśa 77
taste 93
tattva 38–9
tejas 16, 18, 89; *see also* fire
theory of categories 8
time 22–3
touch 21, 46–7, 93–4
tradition 71–2
trees and plants 88–9
- Udayana/ Udayanācārya 1, 3, 15, 32–4,
41–6, 42, 48, 51, 53, 56, 59–60, 76–7,
79, 82–3, 84, 89, 91, 96–8, 104–7, 109
Uddyotakara 78
Ui, H. 2, 6
ultimate goal: liberation for all 109;
liberation while living 108; means of
attaining 106–8; nature of 105–6;
overview 104; proofs 106; terminology
104
ultimate particularity 32, 43
understanding 22, 51, 64–7, 111
universal 30, 37, 39–42, 47; and mind 102;
particularity as 32–3
- Vāgiśvara, Vādi 77–8
vaidharmya 11
Vaiśeṣikasūtras 3–5
valid reasons 65
- valid remembrance 67
Vātsyāyana 6, 78, 96
Vāyu 20–1; *see also* air
velocity 55; of mind 98
verbal testimony 69–70
veridical knowing 58–9, 62–8;
inference 69–70; inferential cognition
65–6; intuitive cognition 68; means
of 68–70; perception 69; perceptive
cognition 63–4; recollective cognition
66–7
- virtues 12
viśeṣa 1, 14, 32–4; *see also* particularity
visual organs 93
Viśvanātha 78, 96
vital air 21
Vyomaśiva 47, 49, 52, 55, 60, 70, 77, 81,
107
- water 17–18
weight 54
wholly pervasive attributes 55
wide universal 31
widest universal 31–2
womb-born bodies 88
- yoga* 6, 106; practice of 10
yogins: extraordinary perception 33, 68